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Smallholder irrigation has been promoted across the developing world as a means of poverty 
reduction and rural development. The potential of smallholder irrigated agriculture in 
alleviating rural poverty has led the South African government to prioritise and invest in 
irrigation establishment, rehabilitation and revitalisation. However, the extent to which 
smallholder irrigation has been able to reduce poverty in the rural areas of South Africa is not 
well understood. This study, therefore, aimed to contribute to smallholder irrigation literature 
in two ways. The first objective of this study was to conduct an in-depth impact evaluation of 
the Tugela Ferry smallholder irrigation scheme on household welfare using the treatment 
effect and propensity score matching (PSM) methods. Secondly, the study sought to 
investigate the determinants of household water security, and how the level of water security 
subsequently affects the farmers’ household welfare. A stratified random sampling technique 
was used to obtain a sample of 186 irrigators and 70 non-irrigators in the Tugela Ferry area. 
Descriptive analysis highlighted that although the demographic characteristics of the farmers 
were not significantly different, the irrigators were characterized by better welfare indicators 
compared to non-irrigators. The Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices also indicated 
that poverty incidence was more pronounced among non-irrigators than among irrigators. The 
results from the econometric models indicated that irrigation access plays an important role in 
the welfare of rural households, with irrigators consuming about R2,000 per adult equivalent 
per year more than the non-irrigators. While irrigation access is important, this study 
concluded that the poverty reduction effectiveness of smallholder irrigation can further be 
enhanced by ensuring that the irrigators are water secure. Factors such as age, off-farm 
income, duration of scheme membership, occurrence of conflicts, method of pumping water, 
location in the scheme and access to agricultural training influenced household water 
security. The study recommends that investments in smallholder irrigation should continue 
for poverty reduction, and that priority should be in ensuring water security not just irrigation 
participation. The study also recommends the introduction of small motorised pumps among 
the gravity-reliant irrigators and farmer training on water conservation techniques to improve 
the farmers’ water security in the smallholder irrigation schemes. Although the study 
highlighted how perceptions of irrigators could be used to generate the water security index, 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the problem  
Most of the poor people in developing countries depend directly or indirectly on smallholder 
agriculture for their livelihoods, and 75% of the poor live in rural areas (World Bank, 2008). 
Smallholder agriculture, therefore, is a relevant and potentially viable vehicle for reducing 
poverty and ensuring household food security in these rural areas (Altman et al., 2009). Since 
poverty is more prevalent among rural dwellers, several authors agree that reaching the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty and hunger by 2015 requires high 
priority to smallholder agriculture (Smith, 2004; Matshe, 2009; Tshuma, 2012). However, 
despite its potential, smallholder agriculture’s poverty reduction results in Africa have been 
disappointing (Lipton et al., 2003). Even though that rainfall is highly variable and insufficient in 
many cases, agricultural production in Africa is almost entirely rain-fed (You et al., 2010). 
Lipton et al. (2003) argued that Africa has experienced significantly less reduction in poverty 
compared to other regions due to, among other factors, its less proportion of cultivated area 
under irrigation.  
A general consensus is that irrigation remains a feasible and key strategy for improved 
smallholder agricultural production and/or productivity, household food security and rural 
poverty reduction in the developing countries (Kumar, 2003; Lipton et al., 2003; Hussain and 
Hanjra, 2004; Gebregziabher et al., 2009; Bacha et al., 2011). In fact, Carruthers et al. (1997), 
cited in Hussain et al. (2006), argued that irrigation development is the most effective tool for 
rural poverty reduction compared to any other public development, particularly in arid and semi-
arid climates. Although irrigation development is costly, and may have negative environmental 
and health consequences such as increased water logging, salinisation and water-borne diseases, 
it is an important factor in increasing crop productivity and improving overall agricultural 
performance (Hussain and Wijerathna, 2004). While access to irrigation decreases crop losses, it 
also increases the area under cultivation and crop intensity (Namara et al., 2010). Moreover, it 
leads to poverty reduction by expanding opportunities for higher and more stable incomes, and 




Irrigation farming is imperative in South Africa as rain-fed crop production is inherently risky 
due to unreliable rainfall and frequent droughts (Cousins, 2012). South Africa is generally dry, 
with over 60% of the country receiving less than 500 mm of rain per annum on average, and with 
only 10% receiving more than 750 mm (World Bank 1994, cited in Cousins, 2012). The 
importance of irrigation farming in South Africa is underscored by the fact that the irrigated 8% 
of land under crop production contributes almost 30% of total agricultural production 
(Backeberg, 2006; NDA, 2007; Hope et al., 2008). Smallholder irrigation accounts for about 0.1 
million hectares (about 8%) of total irrigated land in South Africa (Tlou et al., 2006; NDA, 2007; 
Van Averbeke et al., 2011). 
Although smallholder irrigation accounts for a small area of irrigated area in South Africa, it is 
important in South Africa for several reasons. Its importance arises primarily from its location in 
the rural areas, where poverty and food insecurity are concentrated (Perret, 2002; Sishuta, 2005; 
Vink and van Rooyen, 2009). South Africa is food secure at national level, while it is food 
insecure at the household level (Hart, 2009a; Backeberg and Sanewe, 2010). Therefore, the 
major area of concern in South Africa is to ensure availability of food at household level for the 
poor and food insecure households (Backeberg and Sanewe, 2010). Van Averbeke et al. (2011) 
highlighted the potential that smallholder irrigated farming has to significantly improve the 
welfare of participating homesteads in these densely populated rural areas. Furthermore, Van 
Averbeke et al. (2011) noted that smallholder irrigation can create employment in these 
underdeveloped rural areas, both directly and indirectly through forward and backward linkages.  
In South Africa, the smallholder irrigation sector is also important because a large number of 
rural people benefit directly and indirectly (Speelman, 2009). The number of smallholder 
irrigators ranges between 200,000 and 250,000 participants (Backeberg, 2006; Van Averbeke, 
2008). Assuming an average household size of 5 members (Machethe et al., 2004), this translates 
to over a million rural people directly benefiting, at least partially, from smallholder irrigation. 
Therefore, as highlighted by Aliber and Hart (2009), the large number of rural households 
involved in smallholder irrigation necessitates prioritisation and government support. 
Accordingly, the South African government has prioritised and invested in the development of 
smallholder irrigation schemes as a rural development and poverty reduction strategy (Denison 
and Manona, 2007a; Van Averbeke et al., 2011). 
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Smallholder irrigation schemes establishment, rehabilitation and revitalisation in South Africa 
were made possible through the investment of large public resources (Denison and Manona, 
2007a). Shah et al. (2002) valued the public investments in smallholder irrigation at R2 billion 
(R40,000/ha). In fact, smallholder irrigation schemes continue to be a major budget item on 
many developmental and district municipality financial plans (Denison and Manona, 2007a). 
However, many researchers argue that, despite these public investments, smallholder irrigation 
schemes have failed to meet the rural development and poverty reduction objectives in South 
Africa (Bembridge, 2000; Perret, 2002; Hope et al., 2008; Speelman, 2009; Yokwe, 2009; 
Fanadzo, 2012; Van Averbeke, 2012). According to Bembridge (2000), the performance and 
welfare impact of smallholder irrigation schemes has been poor, and fall far short of the 
expectations of many stakeholders. This is despite that smallholder irrigation has been successful 
in other developing countries, particularly in Asia (Hussain and Hanjra, 2004). 
Several reasons have been presented in the literature for the failure of smallholder irrigation in 
South Africa. Tlou et al. (2006) highlighted that infrastructure deficiencies as a result of 
inappropriate planning and design of the irrigation schemes are a cause of this failure. However, 
most studies have identified institutional issues as the major challenge in smallholder irrigation 
in South Africa (Machete et al., 2004; Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Fanadzo, 2012). According to 
Van Averbeke et al. (2011), human (capacity) and social (institutional) resource problems are at 
the centre of the poor performance of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa. Fanadzo 
(2012) agreed that weak institutional and organizational arrangements are the major factors 
leading to the failure of most smallholder irrigation schemes. Moreover, Kemerink et al. (2011) 
highlighted that the failure of the smallholder schemes is due to the fact that the individual 
characteristics or heterogeneity of the irrigators have received little attention.  
While too much attention has been placed on the physical (hydrology or engineering) aspects of 
irrigation at the schemes level, the social and distributive issues have largely been ignored in 
South Africa (Fanadzo, 2012). This neglect has left many farmers in irrigation schemes water 
insecure. As noted by Zeiton (2011), water insecurity is, in many cases, primarily social, with 
water security of some individuals being associated with insecurity of others. Adopted from Grey 
and Sadoff (2007) and Muller et al. (2009), household water security is defined in this study as 
access by the household to sufficient and reliable water to meet the agricultural needs throughout 
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the year; the ability of the household to pay for the water and water-related services; and the 
household’s ability to assert their right or entitlement to the water against other parties.  
An irrigator’s access to irrigation, although a necessary condition, is not sufficient for achieving 
water security and improved household welfare. Water security is important in enhancing the 
effectiveness of access to irrigation in poverty reduction and improving household food security. 
Findings from Hope et al. (2008), for instance, indicated that participating in smallholder 
irrigation results in expected income and food security benefits only to those farmers with secure 
irrigation access. Therefore, the understanding of how water security should be created and 
conferred to individual irrigators is an area in which research is urgently required (Hodgson, 
2004). Hodgson (2004) argued that without sufficient water security in irrigation schemes, the 
irrigation management transfer (IMT) programmes, where the government cedes the operation of 
irrigation schemes to the farmers, would be unsuccessful over the long-term as farmers would 
stop farming as soon as government support is withdrawn. 
1.2 Study motivation 
The need for empirical evidence on the poverty reducing impacts of government programs 
cannot be overemphasised (Ravallion, 2008). However, despite a number of reports and studies 
on smallholder irrigation in South Africa, limited research has been devoted to the systematic 
and quantitative assessment of the poverty reduction impact of smallholder irrigation projects. 
Most of the previous studies on the impact of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa 
(Hope et al., 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010; Van Averbeke, 2012) have been descriptive in nature 
and have not included any in-depth quantitative evaluations which controls for other 
confounding factors. Van Averbeke (2012), for example, used observations of cropping intensity 
as a performance and/or impact indicator, while Hope et al. (2008) relied on gross margin 
analysis. Although these evaluations are important and part of the measurements of poverty 
impacts of smallholder irrigation, they are not complete as they do not evaluate direct irrigation 
impact on household welfare.  
Other economic evaluations and analyses in the South African smallholder irrigation literature 
have focused on water use efficiency, willingness to pay, valuation of water and financial 
viability of these smallholder irrigation projects (Kamara et al., 2002; Speelman, 2009; Yokwe, 
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2009; Speelman et al., 2010). As noted by Van Averbeke et al. (2010) and Van Averbeke 
(2012), information on the incomes and/or expenditures of plot holders and on the contributions 
of irrigation farming to household incomes is limited in South Africa. As such, the poverty 
reduction impact of smallholder irrigation remains relatively not well understood in South 
Africa. It can, therefore, be argued that much of the discussions about the role and/or failure of 
smallholder irrigation projects and policies in South Africa are based on limited empirical 
evidence. Yet, effective discussions and policies should be based on empirical evidence. Project 
impact evaluations provide foundations for evidence-based policies (Cobb-Clark and Crossley, 
2003).  
Despite a number of irrigation impact studies elsewhere (e.g., Namara et al., 2008; Bacha et al., 
2010; Kuwornu and Owusu, 2012), there still remains a need for quantitative impact evaluations 
of South Africa’s specific irrigation schemes. This is because irrigation schemes are not 
homogenous between (and even within) countries but are case specific due to factors such as 
objective, natural resource base, technology, scheme and plot size, farmer profile and marketing 
opportunities (Bembridge, 2000; Denison and Manona, 2007a; Dillon, 2008; Van Averbeke, 
2008). This study, therefore, aimed to undertake an in-depth impact evaluation of the Tugela 
Ferry irrigation scheme and provide empirical evidence of the role of smallholder irrigation 
schemes on household welfare in South Africa. 
Unlike previous studies, this study went beyond just evaluating the impact of irrigation 
participation, but its other objective was to assess the extent to which variations in the water 
security level of irrigation participants influence household welfare. Previous irrigation impact 
evaluation studies have assumed that irrigation participation results in the same level of water 
security among the individual irrigators. This assumption is hard to defend, as heterogeneity 
among the irrigators plays a role in determining the household water security level, given 
irrigation access. Little scientific knowledge exists on key determinants of water security and 
how it enhances the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. Against this background, this study 
sought to investigate how the physical, socio-economic and institutional factors interact to 
influence the level of water security of an individual farmer, and how this water security level 
subsequently affects the farmer’s household welfare. Because Mnkeni et al. (2010) reported that 
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water distribution inequities were one of the major problems in the Tugela Ferry smallholder 
irrigation scheme, the scheme was deemed appropriate to achieve the study objectives.  
In summary, the study’s main goal was to answer the following two important questions 
empirically: To what extent do smallholder irrigation schemes improve household welfare? To 
what extent do variations in water security in an irrigation scheme influence household welfare? 
Information about how irrigating households vary by water security status, and the extent to 
which this relates to socio-economic and institutional variables, is central to questions such as 
how to target the poor and disadvantaged in the irrigation schemes. This knowledge is critical as 
it could assist in effective institutional design of new schemes and also recommend priorities 
when planning the revitalisation of existing schemes and the designing of successful IMTs. The 
research questions of the study were addressed by achieving the objectives listed in the next 
section.  
1.3 Study objectives 
Generally, the study’s objective was to evaluate the impact of smallholder irrigation and water 
security on rural household welfare. Specifically, the study’s objectives were to: 
a) Evaluate the impact of the smallholder irrigation on rural household consumption 
expenditure;  
b) Investigate the factors  that determine an irrigator’s water security level and; 
c) Evaluate the impact of water security on rural household consumption expenditure. 
PCA was used to generate the water security index while OLS was used to estimate the 
determinants of water security. 
1.4 Organisation of the study 
The thesis is organised into six chapters. The first chapter has motivated the research problem 
and the objectives of the study. The second chapter presents the literature on the role of 
smallholder irrigation in poverty reduction. The major focus of the literature review is the South 
African experience, though relevant global experiences are also discussed. The third chapter 
introduces the study area, the analytical framework and the empirical models used. The fourth 
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chapter presents the first set of results, which focuses on the evaluation of the impact of the 
Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme on household welfare. The second set of results is presented in 
chapter five. This chapter focuses on generating the water security index and estimating the 
determinants of water security. The impact of water security on rural household welfare is also 
examined in this chapter. The conclusions drawn and policy recommendations made are 











CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Smallholder irrigation plays an important role in the fight against rural poverty in developing 
countries. Accordingly, the South African government has invested substantially in smallholder 
irrigation. This chapter presents an overview of smallholder irrigation in South Africa, and 
synthesises the linkages among irrigation access, water security and household welfare. Factors 
that influence the poverty-reduction impacts of smallholder irrigation are also discussed. 
Furthermore, evidence from other developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond is 
presented. Before this, however, the next section describes the main concepts used in this study. 
2.2 Concepts and definitions 
Concepts such as poverty, food security and water security have been defined and measured in 
different ways by different researchers. This section discusses these concepts drawing from the 
literature. 
2.2.1 Poverty 
Poverty is failure to meet basic human needs (World Bank, 2005). There is, however, a great 
variation in the manner in which poverty is defined and measured in developing countries 
(Hussain et al., 2006; Namara et al., 2008; Bacha et al., 2011; Howe et al., 2012; Tshuma, 
2012). Although poverty has historically been described mainly as the inadequacies of income, 
consumption and wealth, the multiple dimensions of poverty and their complex interactions are 
now widely recognized (Hussain and Wijerathna, 2004; Hussain et al., 2006; Namara et al., 
2008; Tshuma, 2012). Namara et al. (2008:98) identified poverty dimensions as “isolation, 
deprivation of political and social rights, a lack of empowerment to make or influence choices, 
inadequate assets, poor health and mobility, poor access to services and infrastructure, and 
vulnerability to livelihood failure.”  
Poverty is divided into two categories: absolute poverty and relative poverty. Absolute poverty 
denotes the failure to purchase the minimal quantity of basic goods and services required for 
human survival (Frye, 2005). In other words, absolute poverty refers to subsistence below 
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minimum, socially acceptable living conditions, usually established based on nutritional 
requirements and other essential goods (Frye, 2005). Relative poverty, in contrast, is defined as 
when individuals, families and groups in the population “lack the resources to obtain the types of 
diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are 
customary or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong” 
(Townsend, 1979 cited in Frye, 2005:4). The relative poverty concept argues that an individual is 
poor when he/she is very much worse off than other people in their society (Tshuma, 2012). 
Thus, one’s poverty status is measured against other people within the same society.  
The preferred indicators of poverty and living standards have traditionally been reported using 
income or consumption expenditure (Achia et al., 2010). Poverty is generally measured using 
income in developed countries while consumption expenditure is a preferred poverty measure in 
developing countries (World Bank, 2005; Achia et al., 2010). By comparison, expenditure 
measures are much more reliable and easier to collect than income, especially in most rural 
settings (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The limitation of the income or consumption approach is 
the extensive data collection required, which is time-consuming and costly (Vyass and 
Kumaranayake, 2006). Given the resource constraints to measuring household income or 
expenditure in developing country settings, other methods of developing poverty indices have 
been used. Several authors have suggested the asset-based approach as an alternative method of 
measuring poverty (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006; Achia et al., 
2010; Howe et al., 2012).   
The asset-based approach involves data collection of variables that capture living standards, such 
as household ownership of durable assets (e.g. car) and infrastructure and housing characteristics 
(e.g. source of water, sanitation facility) (Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006). However, there is no 
agreement on the use of the asset-based approach (Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006; Namara et 
al., 2008). One weakness of the asset-based poverty measures is that they are more reflective of 
longer-run household wealth or living standards, but fail to take account of short-run or 
temporary interruptions, or shocks to the household (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Another 
weakness of the asset-based poverty measures is that conceptually, wealth is a stock, not a flow 
concept. If a household is depleting its asset base and another building its asset base, but these 
two have the same level of asset at a given moment in time, asset-based approach will put these 
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two households at the same poverty level. However, the poverty status of these households 
should be different. 
2.2.2 Food security 
Food security is one dimension of poverty, and it does not capture all the dimensions of poverty 
(Hendriks, 2005; Tshuma, 2012). They are highly correlated though. Food security is limited 
only to having the right type of food in correct qualities and quantities (Tshuma, 2012). Food 
security is defined as when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life (FAO, 2001). This widely accepted definition points to the following 
dimensions or pillars of food security: food availability, food access, utilization and stability 
(FAO, 2006).  
Food availability refers to the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, 
supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid) (FAO, 2006). Food access, 
on the other hand, refers to access by individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate 
foods for a nutritious diet. They should be able to access the food they prefer in a socially 
acceptable way (Hart, 2009b). The third pillar of utilization refers to use of food through 
adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being 
where all physiological needs are met (FAO, 2006). People must be able to select, store, prepare, 
distribute and eat food in ways that ensure adequate nutritional absorption for all members of the 
household (Hart, 2009b).  
The last pillar of food security, stability, points to the fact that to be food secure, a population, 
household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk 
losing access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks (e.g., an economic or climatic crisis) or 
cyclical events (e.g., seasonal food insecurity) (FAO, 2006). The concept of stability can 
therefore refer to both the availability and access dimensions of food security (FAO, 2006; Hart, 
2009b). A distinction is frequently made between transitory and permanent food insecurity 
(Pinstrup-Anderson, 2009). Transitory food insecurity describes periodic food insecurity such as 
seasonal food insecurity, while permanent food insecurity describes a long-term lack of access to 
sufficient food (Pinstrup-Anderson, 2009).  
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According to Hendriks (2005), measuring food security is complex, extensive and expensive, 
and is often limited by data and/or resource availability. Hendriks (2005) summarized the studies 
in South Africa that have measured food security using different methods. Some studies have 
used household perceptions of food insecurity as an indicator of food insecurity, others have 
used the food security index while others income or expenditure. The income or expenditure 
approach is the single most important determinant of a household’s ability to meet food security 
needs (Hendriks, 2005). Several studies that discuss the concept of food security and the 
different ways of measuring it have been done in South Africa (Hendriks, 2005; Altman et al., 
2009; Pinstrup-Anderson, 2009; Hart, 2009a; Hart, 2009b; Aliber, 2009). 
2.2.3 Water security 
Water security is an emerging concept, and there is no universal definition. Instead, there are 
multiple definitions which are often competing and evolving (GWP, 2000; Grey and Sadoff, 
2007; Schultz and Uhlenbrook, 2007; Norman et al., 2010). The GWP (2000:12), for instance, 
defined water security as meaning that “every person has access to enough safe water at 
affordable cost to lead a clean, healthy and productive life, while ensuring that the natural 
environment is protected and enhanced.” Although this definition brings out some components 
of water security such as the water availability, affordability, and environmental dimensions, its 
limitation is that it focuses on water availability and affordability for mainly household 
consumption use.  
Grey and Sadoff (2007:548), on other hand, defined water security as “the availability of an 
acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, 
coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies.” 
In simple terms, water security involves harnessing the productivity of water while limiting its 
negative impact (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Grey and Sadoff (2007)’s definition is more 
comprehensive, as it indicates the importance of ensuring secure water access for livelihoods and 
productive uses, not just consumptive use. The weakness of this definition, however, is that it 
applies at the national level and fails to address the requirements at local or household level for 
achieving water security for irrigating households (Muller et al., 2009).   
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The water security concept is related to concepts such as food security in that there is need to 
ensure that the population has access to sufficient water to meet all its needs (productive or 
consumptive). However, the difference is that unlike in food security, it is not only the absence 
of water that causes insecurity, but its presence as well. The destructive element of water in its 
natural, unmanaged state e.g., floods, also causes water insecurity (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Due 
to the close relation between the food security and water security concepts, Muller et al. (2009) 
suggested that they both should be considered in a similar manner. Muller et al. (2009) argued 
that, as it is widely recognized that food security needs to be considered at both household and 
national level, water security should also be considered in a similar way, particularly in the rural 
context.  
This, however, has not been the case so far. In fact, the common feature of the different 
definitions cited above is that they relate to water security as it applies mainly at national level. 
The emphasis is on the availability of water in a country, and the investments needed to ensure 
that water reaches the population of that country in appropriate quantities and qualities. An 
attempt to adapt Grey and Sadoff (2007)’s definition to apply at the irrigation scheme level is 
presented in Muller et al. (2009), who highlighted that water security at irrigation scheme level is 
achieved when the social and productive potential of water has been harnessed adequately to the 
benefit of all the irrigators, and its destructive potential is sufficiently contained. This definition 
albeit being relevant to this study, does not present itself to ease of measurement. In order to 
operationalise the definition for this study, some elements were modified and/or added.  
Firstly, all the definitions emphasise the need to ensure reliable water availability to achieve 
water security, thus this aspect was maintained. Secondly, the ability of the household to access 
the water is critical. Access here implies the household’s ability to afford the water, and also the 
rights or entitlement to the water. It is acknowledged that water security of different farmers may 
not be the same due to their geographic location in the irrigation scheme, gender, and other 
socio-economic factors. The rights of the individual farmers and their ability to exercise those 
rights are very pivotal in ensuring their water security. Water security, according to Cremers et 
al. (2005), implies that an irrigator is able to materialize water use rights now and in the future, 
and to avoiding, or controlling the risks of, unsustainable water management. However, this level 
of water use rights may not be attainable in rural areas as it implies formal rights. Water use 
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rights in the rural areas are mainly informal, and are governed by customary law (Boelens et al., 
2007). This study focussed on the question of whether a particular farmer is able to seek some 
form of recourse if they do not receive water they are entitled to. The other aspect of water 
security is that of the destructive element of water. Since this applies mainly with regards to 
water in its unmanaged state, this aspect was dropped as this study focusses on water security at 
a household level from managed irrigation.  
For the purpose of this study, household water security was defined as access by the irrigating 
household to sufficient and reliable water of suitable quality to meet their agricultural use needs 
and their ability to assert the water rights against other parties. The key aspects of water security 
in this definition are; access to reliable and adequate water supply, the ability of the household to 
pay for the water, and their right or entitlement to the water which they are able to assert against 
other parties. Water security was, therefore, understood as a continuum of these above-
mentioned components, where a household scoring high on these components is more water 
secure than the one scoring less. Water insecurity was, thus, defined as the perceived difficulty 
farmers face in securing adequate and reliable access to water for agricultural production 
(Rijsberman, 2006; Komnenic et al., 2009). Cullis and O’Regan (2004) define water insecurity 
as a lack of capability to obtain water or as lack of entitlement for water. The water security 
variable is, therefore, aimed to capture whether farmers have or lack these capabilities. 
2.3 Overview of irrigation in the developing countries 
Irrigation refers to “the purposive, organized, controlled, and artificial supply of water to a 
cropped area in order to complement rainfall and to overcome drought, and to reach a given crop 
production objective” (Tlou et al., 2006:12). Irrigation water is applied to ensure that the water 
available in the soil is sufficient to meet crop water needs and thus reduce water deficit as a 
limiting factor in plant growth (Van Averbeke et al., 2011). Irrigation farming plays an important 
role in food production and food security in the world today. About 30% of the world’s food 
production comes from about 18% of the total cultivated land under irrigation (FAOSTAT, 
2012). There are wide variations in the proportion of irrigated agricultural land in the developing 
world, with 37% in Asia, 15% in Latin America, 6% in Africa and 4% in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(FAOSTAT, 2012). Irrigation, therefore, currently plays a less significant role in African 
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agriculture compared to other regions as Africa’s irrigated cultivated land is way lower than the 
world average. 
As highlighted earlier, Lipton et al. (2003) argued that Africa’s poor performance in terms of 
poverty reduction can be to a large extent attributed to its less reliance on irrigation farming. 
According to Lipton et al. (2003), differences across regions, countries and areas within 
countries in terms of irrigation access is an important factor in determining rates of poverty 
reduction. The fact that Asia has experienced significant poverty reduction, while poverty has 
increased in Africa (Faurès and Santini, 2008; Bacha et al., 2011) in recent years is no 
coincidence but an indication of the key role irrigation plays in poverty reduction, ceteris paribus 
(Lipton et al., 2003). As reported by You et al. (2010), agricultural production in Africa is 
almost entirely rain-fed despite that rainfall is highly variable and insufficient in many cases 
(You et al., 2010). Low levels of irrigation in Africa are as a result of high irrigation investment 
costs, declining world food prices, perceived failures of many past irrigation projects, limited 
government commitment, rugged topography and poor rural infrastructure, heterogeneous and 
fragmented farmers, low population densities; and diets tied to crops with low water 
requirements (Inocencio et al., 2007; You et al., 2010).  
It is largely acknowledged in the literature that the Green Revolution in Asia could not have 
happened without investments in irrigation water (Lipton et al., 2003; Hussain, 2007a; Hussain, 
2007b; Turral et al., 2010). Irrigation was an important element of the Green Revolution package 
which not only lifted large numbers of rural Asians out of poverty but also created conditions 
that were conducive for economic development (Turral et al., 2010). A similar development path 
as that of Asian countries has been recommended for Africa (Lipton, 1996 cited in Van 
Averbeke, 2012). This is so, given that the potential of irrigation development for Africa, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is large (Inocencio et al., 2007; You et al., 2010). According to 
You et al. (2010), there is a need to prioritise irrigation development in Africa not only because 
of the existence of water resources, but also because of the high value of irrigated agriculture on 
the continent and the large number of rural poor that could benefit from productivity 
enhancement as a result of irrigation investment.   
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa included, have realised the important role 
of irrigation in food production, and irrigation investments have increased in the region. You et 
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al. (2010) reported that the average rate of expansion of irrigated area over the past 30 years was 
2.3% in both Sub-Saharan Africa and all of Africa. Total irrigated land in Africa is estimated to 
be about 12.2 million hectares and six countries, namely Egypt, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Sudan account for nearly 75% of this total irrigated land (FAOSTAT, 2012). 
The 1.3 million hectares of irrigated land in South Africa constitute about 11% of the total 
irrigated land in Africa. Despite some notable irrigation expansion, the developmental impact of 
smallholder irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa has been limited and below expectations (Inocencio 
et al., 2007; García-Bolanos et al., 2011).  
According to Van Averbeke et al. (2011), irrigated agriculture presents an attractive investment 
in South Africa as the water deficits caused by low and erratic rainfall limits rain-fed crop 
production in most of South Africa. DWAF (2004) agreed, noting that water scarcity is a major 
constraint to socio-economic development in South Africa. Therefore, the government of South 
Africa has invested significantly in irrigation development in South Africa. Smallholder 
irrigation, particularly, has received high priority in the rural areas to reduce poverty and ensure 
household food security. The next section discusses the nature of smallholder irrigation in South 
Africa. 
2.4 The nature of smallholder irrigation in South Africa 
The agricultural sector is the highest consumer of water in South Africa, accounting for about 
62% of the total water used, while it directly contributes only about 4% of GDP (NDA, 2007; 
Kanyoka et al., 2008). Although there are efforts to change it, South Africa’s agricultural sector 
in general, and the irrigation sector in particular, is characterised by a dualistic production 
structure (Backeberg and Sanewe, 2010). This dualistic production structure consists of two 
categories of farmers: the large-scale farmers and the small-scale farmers. Large-scale irrigation 
refers to the modern, commercial irrigation operations undertaken by an estimated 28,350 
farmers whose majority are white men (Backeberg, 2006; Van Averbeke, 2008). The large-scale 
commercial farmers produce for local and export markets (Backeberg and Sanewe, 2010). Small-
scale irrigation, in contrast, refers to the traditional, subsistence irrigation activities undertaken 
by an estimated 200,000-250,000 farmers whose majority are black women (Backeberg, 2006; 
Tlou et al., 2006). The small-scale irrigators mainly produce for household consumption.  
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Small-scale irrigation farming uses about 4% of all irrigation water, while the large-scale 
commercial farming uses the remaining 96% of irrigation water (Perret, 2002). Whereas the 
main criteria often used to classify farmers as small-scale include land size, purpose of 
production (subsistence or commercial), and income level (whether poor or rich), racial group 
plays a big role in classifying South African farmers (Fanadzo, 2012). In the South African 
context, small-scale farmers are defined as black
1
 farmers most of whom reside in the former 
homelands (Machethe et al., 2004; Fanadzo, 2012). Terms used to describe small-scale farmers 
in South Africa include smallholder farmers, resource-poor farmers, peasant farmers, food deficit 
farmers, household food security farmers and land reform beneficiaries (Machethe et al., 2004). 
It is generally accepted that the divide between large-scale commercial farms and small-scale 
farms in South Africa is a legacy of the racially discriminatory policies of the past (Van 
Averbeke, 2008; Vink and van Rooyen, 2009).  
According to Vink and van Rooyen (2009), the policies during the apartheid era were biased 
towards the white-dominated large-scale farms, while inhibiting agricultural growth and 
development among the black-dominated small-scale farms. Therefore, as highlighted by 
Denison and Manona (2007b), the word smallholder in South Africa not only recognises a 
characteristic of small farm size, but also a partially developed link to the larger economic 
system. While large-scale farmers have access to fully formed external markets, small-scale 
farmers do not (Denison and Manona, 2007b). The fact that the market-oriented part is 
dominated by white farmers and the subsistence part by black farmers is a cause for concern 
from a political perspective (Backeberg, 2006). There is, therefore, a political desire to improve 
the productivity, profitability and sustainability of smallholder agriculture in South Africa 
through investments in smallholder irrigation schemes (Backeberg, 2006; Denison and  Manona, 
2007b).  
Van Averbeke (2008) categorized smallholder irrigation into four groups, namely (i) farmers on 
irrigation schemes; (ii) independent irrigation farmers; (iii) community gardeners; and (iv) home 
gardeners. This study is concerned particularly with the smallholder irrigators operating on 
irrigation schemes. Although smallholder irrigation schemes vary in size (Fanadzo, 2012), Van 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted, however, that not every black farmer is a smallholder farmer and that smallholder farmers are 
not a homogenous group (Machethe et al., 2004). 
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Averbeke (2008) defined smallholder irrigation schemes as irrigation projects larger than 5 ha in 
size that were established in the former homelands or in the resource poor areas by black people 
or agencies. These irrigation projects involve many farmers and their major objective is to assist 
in rural poverty reduction and development (Van Averbeke, 2008). According to Van Averbeke 
(2012), these irrigation schemes were established specifically for occupation by black farmers 
and they involve multiple plot holdings depending on a shared distribution system for access to 
irrigation water. The key features of the smallholder irrigation schemes are that they usually 
involve a gravity-based supply system, farmers have limited average plot sizes, and production is 
prominently subsistence oriented (Perret, 2002; Perret and Geyser, 2007).  
About 302 smallholder irrigation schemes existed in South Africa in 2010, with a command area 
of 47,667 ha (Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Fanadzo, 2012; Van Averbeke, 2012). This represents 
about 48% of the total smallholder irrigation area in the country and about 4% of the 1.3 million 
ha under irrigation at the national level (Backeberg, 2006; Van Averbeke, 2008). Van Averbeke 
et al. (2011) presented a number of key facts about smallholder irrigation in South Africa. In 
terms of the beneficiaries, the study reported that there were 34,158 plot holders in smallholder 
irrigation schemes in 2010. Rivers were reported to be the main source of water for smallholder 
irrigation schemes in South Africa, while water was mainly pumped to the plots. According to 
the study, a total of 96.7% of smallholder irrigated land obtained its water from rivers, while 
small percentage obtained water from either groundwater (3.0%), municipal water (0.2%) or 
spring water 0.1%. The study also reported that water was pumped on 48.5% and gravitated on 
34.6% of the smallholder irrigated land. The remainder (16.9%) relied on a combination of both 
gravity and pumping.  
The largest number of smallholder irrigation schemes is located in Limpopo Province (about 
56%), followed by the Eastern Cape Province (about 23%), and then KwaZulu-Natal Province 
(about 12%) (Denison and Manona, 2007b; Van Averbeke et al., 2011). The above-mentioned 
percentages indicate that 80% of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa are located in 
these three provinces, while the remainder are scattered across the other provinces. As reported 
in Van Averbeke et al. (2011), smallholder irrigation sustainability is a major challenge in South 
Africa. Of the 296 smallholder irrigation schemes with known operational status in 2011, above 
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30% were not operational. Table 2.1 shows the operational status of smallholder schemes by 
province in South Africa in 2010. 
Table 2.1 Operational status of smallholder irrigation schemes by province in South Africa, 
2010 










Limpopo 101 69 0 170 
Eastern Cape 51 16 5 72 
KwaZulu-Natal 35 0 1 36 
Mpumalanga 7 2 0 9 
Western Cape 7 1 0 8 
Northern Cape 2 1 0 3 
Free State 1 1 0 2 
North West 2 0 0 2 
Total 206 90 6 302 
Source: Van Averbeke et al. (2011). 
The majority of these non-operational schemes were located in the Limpopo and Eastern Cape 
provinces, with 69 and 16 non-operational schemes, respectively. In terms of operational status, 
the KwaZulu-Natal province fared very well. All of the smallholder irrigation schemes with 
known operational status were operational in KwaZulu-Natal, and it was the only province with 
such a remarkable statistic. Use of pumps was cited as the major cause of smallholder irrigation 
scheme collapse in South Africa (Van Averbeke et al., 2011). The majority of the non-
operational smallholder schemes were those that involved pumping of water. According to Van 
Averbeke et al. (2011), about 84% of the 90 non-operational schemes engaged in an irrigation 
system that involved pumping of water while only 16% of the non-operational schemes were 
gravity-fed.  
This implies that, as highlighted by Van Averbeke (2012), there is a higher chance of gravity-fed 
smallholder schemes to remain operational compared to those involving pumping water. The 
overheard costs associated with pumps, and high maintenance pump costs make them 
unsustainable for smallholder irrigation schemes (Van Averbeke, 2012). To understand some of 
the reasons why some of smallholder irrigation schemes were non-operationally, the next section 
provides a brief history of smallholder irrigation development in South Africa, drawing mainly 
from Van Averbeke (2008) and Fanadzo et al. (2010). 
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2.5 The history of smallholder irrigation development in South Africa 
Four periods of smallholder irrigation development in South Africa have been identified in the 
literature (Van Averbeke, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). These are:  
 the peasant and mission diversion scheme era;  
 the smallholder canal era;  
 the independent homeland era, and;  
 the irrigation management transfer (IMT) and revitalization era.  
Irrigation was introduced to South Africa in the 19
th
 century after the arrival of European settlers 
(Perret, 2002; Van Averbeke, 2008). According to Van Averbeke (2008), there is little evidence 
of the use of irrigation during pre-colonial times, and smallholder irrigation development was as 
a result of technology transfer from colonial settlers to the locals. This period of smallholder 
irrigation development is described as the peasant and mission diversion scheme era (Van 
Averbeke, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). This era was associated with missionary activity and the 
emergence of African peasant farming, particularly in the Eastern Cape (Fanadzo et al., 2010).  
Van Averbeke (2008) reported that these schemes were typically small, with very little land 
under irrigation. As a result, these schemes were not that important in people’s livelihoods, and 
ceased to function by the end of the 19th century (Van Averbeke, 2008). This highlights the 
importance of ensuring that development projects play a significant part in the beneficiaries’ 
livelihoods, otherwise the beneficiaries would lose interest and stop participating as soon as 
external support and/or funding is withdrawn. 
The second era of smallholder irrigation development, the smallholder canal era, lasted from 
about 1930 until about 1960 (Fanadzo et al., 2010). The smallholder canal era was characterized 
by the development of schemes to provide families in the Native or Bantu areas with a full 
livelihood (Van Averbeke, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). Natives or Bantu areas, also known as 
homelands or Bantustans, were territories set aside for black inhabitants of South Africa as part 
of the policy of apartheid (Speelman, 2009). Most of the irrigation schemes in the smallholder 
canal era started after the publication of the report from the Tomlinson Commission in 1955 on 
the socio-economic development of the homelands (Perret, 2002). This report and the 
implementation of some of its recommendations changed the settlements, land use patterns and 
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irrigation development in black rural areas (Van Averbeke et al., 1998, cited in Perret, 2002). 
According to Denison and Manona (2007a), at least 37% of the existing irrigation area was 
developed during this era.  
The third period of smallholder irrigation development occurred during the time when 
independent homelands were set up, hence the era is described as the independent homelands era 
(Van Averbeke, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). This era covered the period 1970-1990 (Fanadzo et 
al., 2010). The independent homelands era saw a number of new irrigation schemes being 
established with funding from the South African government (Van Averbeke, 2008). According 
to Van Averbeke (2008), the motivation for the development of these schemes was to give 
credibility to the concept of independence of the homelands. The policy of independent 
homelands was aimed at establishing self-government for each of the different African tribes. 
Therefore, improving the economic and social conditions in the homelands through smallholder 
irrigation schemes was deemed important for this policy to succeed (Van Averbeke, 2008; 
Fanadzo et al., 2010).  
About 64 of the existing schemes covering about 13,000 ha of land were established during this 
era (Denison and Manona, 2007a). These schemes were large, and their management was placed 
in the hands of specialised parastatals (Laker, 2005). Management of these large schemes proved 
complex and costly to maintain without government support (Laker, 2005). Consequently, the 
dismantlement of homeland parastatals after democratization in 1994 without transfer of 
management skills to local communities was followed by immediate partial or total collapse of 
these large schemes (Bembridge, 2000; Perret, 2002; Laker, 2004). The collapse of these 
schemes highlights the importance of appropriate technology that takes into account the skills 
levels of the beneficiaries. Otherwise, there is a need for governments to implement exit 
strategies that seek to empower the beneficiaries to operate the projects on their own first before 
withdrawal of support. 
The IMT and revitalization era began in the 1990s and is currently underway (Van Averbeke, 
2008; Fanadzo, 2012). IMT refers to the transfer of the responsibility of managing, operating and 
maintaining irrigation schemes from the state to farmers (Van Averbeke, 2008). Van Averbeke, 
(2008) reported that at least 62 schemes were developed in the early period of the 1990s with a 
focus on food security. During this era, some existing irrigation schemes were also identified as 
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important for economic development, and the need for their revitalisation was prioritised. This 
revitalisation of the schemes was linked with IMT, which was a global trend (Van Averbeke, 
2008). Though IMT is noble and it has been used successfully elsewhere in the world (Shah et 
al., 2002), the transfers were rushed in South Africa, leading to smallholder irrigation collapses 
(Perret, 2002).  
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, there is a general consensus in the literature that smallholder 
irrigation projects have failed as development initiatives in South Africa (e.g., Bembridge, 2000; 
Perret, 2002; Hope et al., 2008; Yokwe, 2009; Fanadzo, 2012). Although the assessment of 
economic performance of irrigation schemes by the 1955 Commission was highly positive (Van 
Averbeke, 2008), the more recent assessments have mostly reported that the success of 
smallholder irrigation has been limited in South Africa. However, even though performance has 
been below expectations, and many schemes have collapsed, it remains a relevant question to 
determine the welfare impacts of those schemes that are still operational. This is so, given the 
poverty and inequality reduction objectives of the water policies in South Africa. The next 
section presents the water policies in South Africa, and how they relate to smallholder irrigators. 
2.6 Water policies and smallholder irrigation in South Africa 
Since 1994, the South African government has undertaken many reforms aimed at addressing 
rural poverty and inequalities inherited from the past regime (Perret and Geyser, 2007). The 
White paper on Water Policy (DWAF, 1997), the National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 (DWAF, 
1998), National Water Resource Strategy-1 (NWRS-1) (DWAF, 2004) and the National Water 
Resource Strategy-2 (NWRS-2) (DWA, 2012) are among the important policy documents that 
shape the current water policy in South Africa. This set of policy documents has put South 
Africa among the leaders in water reform. The National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 in particular 
has been lauded by many researchers as a progressive policy with the most promising legal 
framework to address the country’s challenges in the water sector (Perret, 2002; Hodgson, 2006; 
Tlou et al., 2006; Movik, 2009; Speelman, 2009). The NWA initiated several changes in the 
management and use of water in South Africa. 
While water was allocated on a riparian system during apartheid, the new water law abolished 
riparianism and water access was separated from land ownership. Water is now understood as a 
22 
 
common resource which cannot be privately owned by individuals, but is owned by the public 
with the state acting as the custodian of the water resources in the public interest (DWAF, 1998). 
The government allocates water use rights to individuals who are supposed to apply and be 
registered. The allocation between uses and users is based on the need to achieve optimum and 
long-term benefits for the society from their use (DWAF, 1998). Water rights allocations are 
time limited to allow for flexibility. Licenses are granted on a five year cycle with a maximum 
length of forty years (DWAF, 1998) . A licensee may apply to the responsible authority for the 
renewal of the license. Hodgson (2006) argued that time limited licenses are a source of 
insecurity if, for instance, license renewals are not certain. Secure water rights help to expand 
opportunities for farmers by reducing risks associated with appropriation by external agents, and 
lengthening farmers’ planning and investment horizons (Tyler, 2007). 
Water access was characterized by racial and gender inequity during the apartheid era (Movik, 
2009). Therefore, the NWA sought to ensure that water is shared on an equitable basis, so that 
the needs of those without water for productive and consumptive activities are met regardless of 
their gender or race (DWAF, 1998). The NWA also emphasised the need for efficiency, equity 
and sustainability in the use of the water resources. The NWA represents a unique approach as it 
has sought to incorporate issues of racial and gender equity in water reform, something that has 
not been done by many countries (Faysse and Gumbo, 2004; Hodgson, 2006). Many modern 
water policies allocate water resources to activities with the highest productivity per cubic meter, 
benefitting predominantly the economically and politically well-to-do (Boelens et al., 2007). 
However, researchers have reported that the reallocation of water resources to promote equitable 
distribution in South Africa has progressed slowly (Anderson et al., 2008; Movik, 2009; Muller 
et al., 2009; Van Koppen et al., 2009).  
Movik (2009) reported that water redistribution has been hindered by an emergency of views that 
purport that the continuation of the status quo is pivotal for economic stability and sustainability. 
Water redistribution to the historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) has been perceived as 
associated with low production and/or productivity, thus posing a high degree of risk of 
destabilizing the economy (Movik, 2009). Moreover, achieving gender equity in water access 
has been hampered by culture, especially in the rural areas (Kemerink et al., 2011). Therefore, 
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although the equity vision established by the South African water act is clear, actually achieving 
that vision on the ground has been elusive (MacKay et al., 2003).  
 Whereas irrigating farmers were organized into irrigation boards (IBs) before, the NWA called 
for the transformation of all the IBs into Water User Associations (WUAs) (DWAF, 1998). The 
WUAs are expected to incorporate all users in the defined area of jurisdiction, whether they have 
a formal water entitlement or not (Faysse, 2004). It is through these WUAs that water user 
groups like smallholder farmers should secure water rights. It was also envisaged that the 
transformation from IBs to WUAs would enable better participation of HDIs in the management 
of water resources (Faysse, 2004). Although incorporating smallholder irrigators into WUAs 
holds promise, there has been little progress with the establishment of WUAs so far (Perret, 
2002; Tlou et al., 2006; Speelman, 2009). The government is currently working on the 
transformation of all irrigation boards into WUAs by 2014 and the required transformation plan, 
according to DWA (2012), is already in place. It remains to be seen if this would happen as 
envisaged, and whether these new WUAs will successfully work as vehicles for building 
capacity of smallholder farmers.  
One important aspect of the WUAs is their role in irrigation schemes. Each irrigation scheme is 
to be managed by a WUA, which will take charge of both water management, and cost recovery 
for water services (Perret and Geyser, 2007). The WUA is expected to achieve financial 
sustainability by selling water and water services to farmers, who it is assumed are willing and/or 
able to pay (Perret, 2002; Backeberg, 2006). The NWA pointed to the need to introduce water 
pricing and full cost recovery. Although introducing water pricing and full cost recovery would 
be viable in the long-run, the NWA acknowledged the need to waive these water charges for a 
determined time so that the disadvantaged groups could also access water for productive 
purposes such as agriculture (DWAF, 1998). Speelman (2009) reported that there was yet to be 
water charges in many smallholder irrigation schemes. Speelman (2009) and Yokwe, (2009) 
argued that introducing water charges would lead many of the small-scale farmers to become 
bankrupt as they currently do not make enough money to cover other costs despite not paying for 
water. Perret and Geyser (2007) also argued that achieving full cost recovery is unrealistic in 




The NWA also sought to ensure widespread stakeholder participation which includes the poor, 
women and those in rural areas in the water sector (DWAF, 1998). However, this stakeholder 
participation as envisaged in the NWA has not been accomplished (Kemerink et al., 2011). 
Although there has been establishment of water management structures meant to promote 
stakeholder participatory governance, this has not materialized in rural areas (Malzbender, 2005). 
The participation of the poor, the majority being women, has often been limited in rural areas 
because of language and illiteracy (Marlzbender, 2005; Kemerink et al., 2011). The water policy 
also acknowledged the importance of farming in rural areas, stressing that water should not be 
transferred from agriculture to other sectors based on water productivity as this would destroy 
the backbone of the rural economies (DWAF, 1998). This is why the introduction of water 
markets needs to be regulated. Farolfi and Perret (2002) gave evidence that if allowed to trade 
water rights, the small-scale farmers would easily transfer all their rights to the mining sector 
because of the high water productivity of mining compared to agriculture. 
Generally, despite its noble intentions, the setback of the NWA has been in the implementation 
of its provisions. Many of the challenges faced in the water sector, according to DWA (2012), 
are related to poor implementation of good policies and strategies. Tlou et al. (2006) agreed, 
adding that the NWA remains unclear about the implementation of key issues such as water 
rights, local institutions, and water markets. Tlou et al. (2006) noted that the NWA has been 
difficult and slow to implement especially in smallholder irrigation farming. It should be 
highlighted, however, that the fact that the NWA states the need for such reforms to take place 
offers hope that ultimately, the smallholder farmers and the poor will play a meaningful role in 
the South African water sector. The importance of smallholder irrigation in reducing poverty in 
the rural areas is compelling, and the next section describes the poverty-irrigation inter-linkages.  
2.7 Irrigation, water security and household welfare linkages 
Many studies have argued that ensuring smallholder farmers’ access to irrigation is important for 
poverty reduction and achieving household food security in developing countries (Hussain and 
Hanjra, 2004; Molden et al., 2007; Gebregziabher et al., 2009; Muller et al., 2009). Irrigation is 
an essential part of the package of technologies, institutions and policies that underpins increased 
agricultural output (Hussain, 2007a). Thus, as a production input in agriculture, irrigation water 
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is an important socio-economic good, with a positive role in poverty alleviation (Hussain and 
Hanjra, 2004). However, Hussain and Hanjra (2004) warned against perceiving access to 
irrigation alone as the solution to all rural poverty problems. Instead, irrigation farming should be 
understood as forming part of a broader livelihood strategy (which also includes non-farming 
projects) among the majority of rural people (Van Averbeke and Mohamed, 2006). Hussain and 
Hanjra (2004) highlighted that, even though irrigation water is only a single element in the 
poverty equation, it plays a disproportionately dominant role.  
Hussain and Hanjra (2004) discussed in detail the main pathways through which access to 
irrigation reduces poverty. According to Hussain and Hanjra (2004), access to irrigation enables 
farmers to adopt new technologies and intensify cultivation, leading to increased productivity, 
overall higher production, and greater returns from farming. However, it is not just participation 
in an irrigation scheme that results in these positive effects, but access to reliable irrigation 
water. As was concluded by Hope et al. (2008), participation in an irrigation scheme although a 
necessary condition, is not sufficient to ensure improved household welfare. It is important that 
the individual farmers have secure access to adequate and reliable water. It is the access to 
reliable water under irrigation which actually affects the farmers’ incentives to invest in 
improved inputs and technologies (Hussain and Hanjra, 2004; Tyler, 2007).  
In contrast, uncertainties regarding how much water would be available to a particular farmer 
results in low incentives to invest in improved inputs and technologies (Faurès and Santini, 
2008). Faurès and Santini (2008) argued that uncertainty regarding access to a reliable irrigation 
water supply causes farmers to apply less seed and fertilizer than they might otherwise do. This 
highlights the importance of ensuring water security, not just irrigation participation, among the 
farmers. A household’s access to irrigation, coupled with physical, socio-economic and 
institutional factors, results in household water security. Figure 2.1 sketches the important inter-
linkages among the physical aspect of irrigation, the socio-economic circumstances of the 


















Figure 2.1 Linkages between smallholder irrigation, water security and household welfare 
Source: Grey and Sadorf (2007) and Muller et al. (2009)  
The physical aspect of irrigation includes the canal infrastructure, pumps, etc., that ensure 
reliable water supply. The socio-economic circumstances of the farmer are the factors (such as 
gender, income sources, geographic location in the scheme, etc.,) which influence access to 
irrigation water and the ability to pay for the water and water-related services. The institutional 
and organizational structure involves irrigation committees, farmer associations, and rules and 
regulations that ensure water rights are respected and that conflicts are resolved. Heterogeneity 
within the scheme in terms of gender, plot sizes, income sources and social capital variables 
influence households’ capacity to participate in the WUAs, management of the scheme, making 
and enforcement of water resource use rules and regulations, and the resolution of emerging 
conflicts (Kamara et al., 2002). It is this capacity that determines the water security level of an 
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The preceding figure indicates that while household’s access to irrigation is important, it is water 
security which gives the household the incentives to invest in improved inputs and technologies. 
Household water security also encourages investments in improved water management and 
agricultural technologies (Kumar, 2003) and this leads to improved crop output and household 
welfare. Improved household welfare has a positive feedback to crop production and household 
water security. Improved incomes enhance the ability of a household to invest in improved 
technologies, pay for water and thus enhance water-use security. Despite its importance, water 
security has not been achieved in South Africa, leaving many farmers water insecure (Muller et 
al., 2009). 
Water insecurity stems from a combination of the physical environment, built infrastructure, and 
institutions or human governance (Norman et al., 2010; Zeiton, 2011). The physical environment 
highlights the hydrological patterns of the area while built infrastructure speaks of artificial water 
storage facilities such as dams. Zeiton (2011) argued that efforts to achieve water security have 
failed because the prevailing water policies in many countries have been narrowly focusing on 
the physical processes. The narrow and deterministic approach blames water insecurity chiefly 
on physical phenomena and reacts through infrastructural development (Zeiton, 2011). Fanadzo 
(2012) highlighted that this was the case in South Africa for a long period, with poor irrigation 
infrastructure viewed as the single major cause of poor performance and the government has 
invested huge sums of money towards repairing irrigation infrastructure.  
Several researchers have, however, argued that infrastructure development alone as a dominant 
part of intervention in irrigation has failed in South Africa and beyond (Denison and Manona, 
2007a; Innocencio et al., 2007; Faurès and Santini, 2008; Zeiton, 2011). It has been argued that 
the development of water infrastructure and institutions should go hand-in-hand to achieve water 
security (Grey and Saddoff, 2007; Zeiton, 2011). One other major cause of water security is the 
geographic location of an individual farmer along the water channel. Downstream farmers are 
usually economically worse off than farmers upstream because of heightened uncertainties 
regarding water availability downstream compared to upstream (Mbatha and Antrobus, 2008).  
This is because downstream farmers are usually water insecure, and their production decision 
uncertainties result in economic inefficiencies. The economic disadvantage translates to political 
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disadvantage, which has the effect of further worsening water insecurity. Hence, efforts in 
irrigation schemes should be exerted to improve household level access to reliable and sufficient 
water to enable farmers to improve productivity within current cropping patterns and to consider 
diversifying their crop choices (Faurès and Santini, 2008). According to Faurès and Santini 
(2008), water security has substantial influence on the motivation, ability and success of 
smallholders in maximizing production and the value of investments in the water sector. 
Therefore, authors such as Kumar (2003) and Van Averbeke (2008) have emphasised the need 
for equitable access to and control over irrigation water for irrigation schemes to operate 
successfully and contribute to household food security. Water insecurity increases the 
vulnerability of the politically and economically weaker poor water users (Bruns et al., 2005).  
Kumar (2003) highlighted three concerns that need to be addressed to ensure irrigation has the 
desired impacts on food security: adequate supply of irrigation at national (or scheme) level, 
water security for the farmers at household level, and adequate economic incentives for farmers 
to maximize their production from the available land and water with least environmental 
consequences. While it is clear that there is a need to create and confer water security to 
individual farmers to ensure irrigation effectiveness in poverty reduction, water security is not 
the only enhancing factor. The next section presents briefly other factors that improve the 
effectiveness of access to smallholder irrigation in reducing poverty. 
2.8 Factors that influence poverty reduction capacity of smallholder irrigation 
It has been largely established that farmers with access to irrigation perform better than those 
without (Tyler, 2007; Namara et al., 2010). However, evidence from across the developing world 
indicates that smallholder irrigation has been successful in some areas, while it has performed 
poorly in other areas. Irrigation has not been successful in ensuring rural poverty reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Inocencio et al., 2007). The factors that influence the success of 
smallholder irrigation schemes in reducing poverty at household level are, inter alia, institutions, 
land tenure, and support services and infrastructure (such as credit, extension, markets, 





Many researchers have concluded that the poor performance of smallholder irrigation in South 
Africa is due to institutional issues (Machete et al., 2004; Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Fanadzo, 
2012). Van Averbeke et al. (2011) argued that poor institutional support is at the heart of the 
poor performance of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa. According to Van 
Averbeke (2008), the successful co-operation among smallholders in the management of their 
irrigation schemes depends on functional water institutions and organizations to guide collective 
action. Water institutions are defined broadly to include organizations and capacity, as well as 
governance, policies, laws and regulations and incentives in water management (Grey and 
Sadoff, 2007). Water institutions address issues ranging from water allocation, quality, rights and 
pricing, to asset management and service delivery performances (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Bruns 
et al. (2005) noted that improved water institutions can raise water productivity and enhance 
rural livelihoods. Without the development of appropriate institutions, irrigation water 
infrastructure will be poorly managed and may not support rural economic growth (Grey and 
Sadoff, 2007).  
The development of smallholder irrigation systems in South Africa has often followed a top 
down approach with very little input from the farmers the schemes were intended to serve (Tlou 
et al., 2006). The responsibility for the management and even the implementation of the two 
important functions of sharing of water and maintaining the canals on South African smallholder 
irrigation schemes was previously the responsibility of the state (Van Averbeke, 2008). This, 
according to Tlou et al. (2006), is why farmers have had little control and interest in the 
sustainable and profitable running of such schemes.  
However, the smallholder irrigation policy was reviewed following regime change in South 
Africa in 1994. The responsibility to manage the irrigation schemes was being transferred to 
farmer communities through the adoption of IMT programmes (Perret, 2002). According to 
Denison and Manona (2007a), IMT programmes necessitate institutional clarity. That is, clear 
and enforceable rules of engagement regarding the water management are critical to reduce 
institutional uncertainties. This will allow behavioural change in farming where greater risks are 
accepted and greater returns can be achieved by the irrigators (Denison and Manona, 2007a). 
Denison and Manona (2007a) highlighted the need for separating the water-related institutional 
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functions (rules of scheme operation) from the agricultural, organisational and support elements 
in South Africa. According to the study, excessive institutionalisation of the agricultural 
production elements (such as input sourcing and marketing) can hamper individual enterprise 
and profitability. This suggests the need to balance the level of institutional support to give the 
farmers without inhibiting their initiatives and entrepreneurship.  
2.8.2 Land tenure security 
Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people with 
respect to land (Hodgson, 2004). Land tenure status is an important factor in determining the 
productivity of farmers (Machethe et al., 2004; Tekana and Oladele, 2011). Economists argue 
that secure land rights enhance investment incentives (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002; 
Fenske, 2011). Farmers with secure land rights are expected to be both more willing and able to 
undertake investment in inputs and technology for three reasons: the assurance effect, the 
realisability effect, and the collateralisation effect (Brasselle et al., 2002). The assurance effect 
points to the fact that farmers have a greater incentive to undertake investments when they are 
convinced that they will receive the benefits of their investment, which implies their right or 
ability to maintain long-term use over their land (Brasselle et al., 2002; Fenske, 2011).  
The realisability effect, on the other hand, implies that farmers would likely improve their land 
productivity through investments when that land can easily be sold or rented (Brasselle et al., 
2002). In other words, secure land rights allow for gains from trade (Fenske, 2011). More so, 
farmers are more able to invest when secure freehold titles are established as the land acquires 
collateral value and access to credit becomes easier (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002). This 
collateralisation effect is very important especially as formal lenders require collateral to lend to 
farmers. According to Fenske (2011), the most obvious means by which land rights increase 
access to capital is through the ability to use land as collateral. 
Tekana and Oladele (2011) suggested that providing security of tenure is a pre-condition for 
intensifying agricultural production in rural South Africa. For farmers to be productive, they 
should have ownership rights so that they can sell or rent their land and also that their children 
can inherit the land (Tekana and Oladele, 2011). Machethe et al. (2004) argued that the tenure 
which prevails in smallholder areas limits tenure security and also hampers the exchange of land 
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for productive use. The common practice in smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa of 
granting to scheme farmers the permanent status of tenants only does not foster the motivation to 
invest. For instance, Mnkeni et al. (2010) found out that the farmers on quitrent and right-to-
occupy land tenure arrangements in Zanyokwe irrigation scheme in the Eastern Cape had no 
sense of ownership and hardly invested in new technologies. Mnkeni et al. (2010) argued that 
these insecure land tenure arrangements undermined the interest and commitment of irrigators to 
farming.  
Perret (2002) and Denison and Manona (2007a) agreed, adding that scheme farmers should have 
a title-deed to their irrigated plots, as insecure land tenure limits not only the incentive to make 
investments but provides no room for a land-leasing market as well. According to Perret (2002), 
the lack of clear and secure land tenure system is one of the main reasons for low productivity on 
irrigation schemes as it hampers establishment of a land-leasing market. It has been reported that 
those farmers who currently have rights access to the irrigated land tend to avoid leasing their 
plots as they are not sure if they would be able to claim back their land when they want it back 
(Perret, 2002; Denison and Manona, 2007a). Consequently, most of the high-value irrigation 
land on the smallholder irrigation schemes is not being utilized in South Africa because of land 
tenure problems (Denison and Monona, 2007a).  
The other challenge is that landholdings in the form of Permission-to-Occupy (PTO) are 
generally allocated to men (Denison and Manona, 2007a). The implication is that although 
women are responsible for over 60% of farming activity in the smallholder irrigation sector, 
decisions are made mainly by men (Denison and Manona, 2007b; Altman et al, 2009). This 
disempowers the women and could reduce their incentives to produce. Moreover, in most 
irrigation schemes, access to water is linked to access to land as the size of the land one owns 
determines the amount of water one can access (Molden et al., 2007; Namara et al., 2010).  
Namara et al. (2010) argued that this link further disadvantages women as land allocation has 
been historically skewed against women. It is, however, important not to overstretch the 
importance of secure land rights in improving women’s livelihoods. Jackson (2003) called for a 
multi-faceted approach, that acknowledges the primacy of land rights and also of other factors 
(such as credit, extension and information services) in tackling the agricultural production 
constraints affecting women. 
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2.8.3 Technology type 
The need for appropriate technology for smallholder farmers cannot be overemphasised. 
According to Horst (1998, cited in Turral et al., 2010), irrigation is a socio-technical process 
which will succeed if technology is matched with human needs, conditions and institutional 
arrangements. The smallholder farmers need small-scale, low cost and labour-intensive irrigation 
techniques as they lack capital and/or credit (Lipton et al., 2003). Such irrigation techniques are 
more likely to be of benefit to the poor than large-scale, capital intensive technologies (Lipton et 
al., 2003). In South Africa, it has been concluded that the smallholder irrigation schemes that 
were designed to use the large-scale, capital intensive technologies always collapse as soon as 
external funding is withdrawn (Van Averbeke et al., 2011).  
Higher operating costs and greater maintenance requirements in intensive pressurised irrigation 
systems lead to their high likelihood of failure compared to simple gravity-fed systems (Van 
Averbeke et al., 2011). Van Averbeke (2012) found a strong and statistically highly significant 
correlation between the operational status of smallholder irrigation schemes in Vhembe district 
and hydraulic head, indicating that gravity-fed schemes were more likely to be (and remain) 
operational than pumped schemes. One important technology aspect is that of synergy. If not 
complemented by other technologies, irrigation alone will not succeed in reducing poverty. The 
success of the Green Revolution, for example, was established upon the use of technologies such 
as fertilizers and high yielding varieties to take advantage of moisture availability under 
irrigation (Hussain, 2007b). 
2.8.4 Farmer participation 
Farmer participation is a key success factor in enhancing agricultural productivity (Backeberg 
and Sanawe, 2010). Experience elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa has shown that smallholder 
irrigation schemes can succeed if farmers participate in their design and management (FAO, 
2000). Yet, a number of smallholder irrigation schemes were planned and established following 
a centralised estate design in South Africa (Fanadzo et al., 2010). Control over farming activities 
and decision making was strictly enforced by central management with little or no input from 
farmers (Perret, 2002). According to Perret (2002), this created a high level of dependency 
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among farmers in the schemes and poor performance when farmers were left to manage the 
schemes on their own.  
Mnkeni et al. (2010) argued that the poor maintenance of irrigation infrastructure at smallholder 
irrigation schemes is as a result of the fact that farmers do not view the scheme infrastructure as 
their property. To ensure that ownership is entrenched in the minds of the irrigators, Mnkeni et 
al. (2010) recommended that all revitalisation and development initiatives at the irrigation 
schemes should involve the irrigators in a participatory way at all stages of the processes. 
Denison and Manona (2007b) agreed, emphasising that the overall performance of interventions 
in irrigation systems is a demand-driven mode. Interventions offered with a high level of 
farmers’ involvement in irrigation projects, has been better than those provided with support in a 
supply-driven mode with moderate or low levels of farmer participation (Denison and Manona, 
2007b). The study recommended that service providers should be more client-focused and 
customer-oriented, and include wider stakeholders’ participation with the empowerment of water 
user organisations such as farmers’ associations and their involvement. As explained earlier, the 
South African water policies have put several strategies whose implementation would result in 
meaningful farmer participation. 
2.8.5 Information services, infrastructure support and market access  
Access to relevant information and markets, among other support services, are fundamental to 
the success of irrigation projects (Faurès and Santini, 2008). Irrigation farming is more likely to 
be successful when information supply to farmers and market development are prioritised in the 
overall irrigation intervention design (Denison and Manona, 2007b). The small-scale farmers 
especially lack information on the availability of credit, inputs and market information (DAFF, 
2011). Viable input and output markets enable smallholders to obtain inputs and sell produce at 
competitive prices (Faurès and Santini, 2008). The success of irrigation development in the past 
in South Africa can be related to marketing potential of produce and the level of profitability of 
farming (Backeberg, 1994 cited in Denison and Manona, 2007a). According to Denison and 
Manona (2007a), smallholder schemes will not succeed without profitability even if all other 
components are in place. Commercialization and the production of higher-value crops are 
common denominators in schemes that have been successful in South Africa (Denison and 
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Manona, 2007a). Yet, commercialization implies the need to connect the smallholder irrigators 
with markets for their produce.  
Market participation of small-scale farmers is a function of transaction costs (costs associated 
with the search for trading partners, negotiating and drafting an agreement) (Makhura, 2001; 
Ortmann and King, 2010). Transaction costs are higher when farms are isolated from market 
information sources by an inadequate information support (Makhura, 2001). Farmers need useful 
information on market opportunities, production methods and weather forecasts to make 
decisions. DAFF (2011) noted that small-scale farmer’s decision making process has been poorly 
supported due to poor management and dissemination of required information. Backeberg and 
Sanewe (2010), on the other hand, reported that the low levels of farmer education limit access to 
information and understanding of commercial farming concepts and development processes in 
smallholder irrigation schemes.  
Other than that there is currently inadequate information reaching small-scale farmers, the other 
challenge has been that information is mostly disseminated not in the first language of farmers. A 
lack of communication technology, particularly that providing market information using their 
first language, implies that small-scale farmers are at a disadvantage in the recently liberalised 
and now highly competitive South African agricultural market. Mthembu (2008) found strong 
relationships between rural poverty and isolation from information support infrastructure in the 
former KwaZulu-Natal homelands. Mthembu (2008) concluded that the high transaction costs 
had contributed significantly in creating barriers to market entry by resource poor farmer, 
resulting in their poverty. DWA (2012) agreed, highlighting that it is unlikely that irrigation 
access will enable people to truly escape from poverty without access to timely and reliable 
information and markets. 
One aspect of market access is that of ensuring good road and communication infrastructure. 
Makhura and Mokoena (2003) highlighted that under-investment in rural infrastructure, such as 
road and communication networks is what is inhibiting small-scale agriculture. The poor rural 
infrastructure curtails access to input and output markets, subsequently increasing small-scale 
farmers’ production and transaction costs (Makhura and Mokoena, 2003). According to 
Mthembu (2008), investment in rural infrastructure should be prioritised as this will increase 
small-scale farmers’ competitiveness in the market. This is because access to good road and 
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communication infrastructure reduces transaction costs for both services and technology, leading 
to better prices for small-scale farmers (Mthembu, 2008). According to Bryant (2005, as cited in 
Mthembu, 2008), these investments would help integrate small-scale farmers into modern market 
chains and promote long-term development. 
2.8.6 Extension and farmer training support 
Developing the skills base of farmers is the primary objective of extension. Extension officers 
bridge the gap between available technology and farmers’ practices by providing technical 
advice, information and training (Treguetha et al., 2010). However, due to the low number of 
extension officers, the accessibility of extension by the small-scale farmer is limited in South 
Africa (Greenberg, 2010). Hall and Aliber (2010) reported that only about 11% of the rural 
households contact an extension officer in a year. This implies that only a small fraction of the 
farmers get advice and/or training on modern farming methods. As a result, limited knowledge of 
crop production among farmers has been cited as one constraint to improved crop productivity in 
smallholder irrigation schemes (Machethe et al., 2004; Fanadzo et al., 2010; Fanadzo, 2012). 
According to Fanadzo et al. (2010), low yield levels caused by poor crop and water management 
practices by the farmers is arguably the main reason for the failure of many smallholder 
irrigation schemes in South Africa.  
Moreover, the education and training of the extension officers has also been under scrutiny. 
DAFF (2011), for instance, identified poor training of extension officers rather than the size of 
the workforce as a major challenge in the delivery of technological packages to small-scale 
farmers. The farmers too are generally critical of the extension officers’ skills and capacity. Vink 
and van Rooyen (2009) reported that farmers are of the opinion that they have better skill levels 
than the extension officers. Farmers also claim that extension officers lack basic project 
management skills (Treguetha et al., 2010). Consequently, the farmers in many cases are 
reluctant to implement the advice and recommendations of extension workers. 
According to Backeberg and Sanewe (2010), smallholder farmers do not have adequate technical 
expertise to operate viable farming projects. Backeberg and Sanewe (2010) highlighted that since 
the majority of the smallholder farmers’ main experience in crop production has been through 
trial and error, they do not possess all the skills required for commercial production such as 
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irrigation management, crop management, financial management, etc. Thus, there is a need to 
train the smallholder irrigation scheme members and provide knowledge specifically for 
commercial agriculture for them to practice sustainable farming (Backeberg and Sanewe, 2010). 
2.9 Irrigation project impact evaluation techniques 
The impact of smallholder irrigation investments on household welfare has been examined using 
different methods across the developing world. Few studies have used qualitative methods while 
many have used quantitative econometric techniques. Qualitative impact evaluation focuses on 
understanding processes, behaviours, and conditions as they are perceived by the individuals or 
groups being studied (Baker, 2000). Qualitative impact evaluation methods include rapid rural 
appraisal, beneficiary assessment, stakeholder analysis, and a wide range of social assessment 
methods (Bamberger, 2000). These techniques provide insight into the ways in which households 
and communities perceive an irrigation project and how they are affected by it (Baker, 2000).  
The benefits of qualitative assessments are that they are flexible, can be specifically tailored to 
the needs of the evaluation using open-ended approaches, can be carried out quickly using rapid 
techniques, and can greatly enhance the findings of an impact evaluation (Baker, 2000; García-
Bolanos et al., 2011). However, the subjectivity involved in data collection, the lack of a 
comparison group, and the lack of statistical robustness are the setbacks of qualitative impact 
evaluation methods (Baker, 2000). Use of mainly small sample sizes in qualitative methods 
makes it difficult to generalize to a larger, representative population (Baker, 2000). Ravallion 
(2008) argued that, although qualitative impact evaluation can be a valuable complement to 
quantitative methods, it is unlikely to provide a credible impact evaluation on its own. Hence, 
qualitative evaluation techniques have rarely been used on their own in evaluating irrigation 
impacts.  
Quantitative impact evaluations use quantitative data from statistically representative samples to 
assess causality using econometric methods (Baker, 2000). They dominate the literature on 
examining the impact of irrigation on household welfare. There are two designs in quantitative 
impact evaluation techniques: experimental (randomized) designs and quasi-experimental (non-
randomised) designs (Ravallion, 2008; Baker, 2000; Bamberger, 2000). Experimental or 
randomized designs are applicable if the intervention is allocated randomly among beneficiaries. 
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This random assignment process creates comparable treatment and control groups that are 
statistically equivalent to one another, given appropriate sample sizes (Dillon, 2008; Baker, 
2000). Randomization generates a control group that has the same distributions of both observed 
and unobserved characteristics as the treatment group (Smith and Todd, 2005). Consequently, 
experimental or randomized designs are generally considered the most robust of the evaluation 
methodologies (Ravallion, 2008; Baker, 2000).  
However, due to the fact that the experimental or randomized designs are often too expensive, 
unethical or simply impossible, they are rarely used in irrigation project impact evaluations 
(Baker, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005). Participating in an irrigation project is rarely a random 
event, but a targeted intervention (Bacha et al., 2011). In fact, the assignment of anti-poverty 
programs typically involves purposive placement, reflecting the choices made by those eligible 
and the administrative assignment of opportunities to participate (Ravallion, 2008). Therefore, 
randomized experiments are not always possible or cannot be plausibly implemented when 
dealing with anti-poverty programs (Baker, 2000).  
Quasi-experimental or non-random methods are used to carry out an evaluation when it is not 
possible to construct treatment and comparison groups through experimental design (Baker, 
2000; Ravallion, 2008). These techniques generate comparison groups that resemble the 
treatment group, at least in observed characteristics, through econometric methodologies, (Baker, 
2000; Ravallion, 2008). In contrast to experimental designs, evaluation methods that use non-
experimental data tend to be less costly and less intrusive (Smith and Todd, 2005). Also, for 
some questions of interest, they are the only alternative (Smith and Todd, 2005). Quasi-
experimental or non-random impact evaluation methods include matching methods, double-
difference methods, Heckman selection model, instrumental variable methods, and reflexive 
comparisons (Baker, 2000; Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). These methods have been used 
widely in the irrigation impact evaluation. 
The major obstacle in implementing a quasi-experimental evaluation strategy is choosing among 
the wide variety of estimation methods available (Smith and Todd, 2005). This choice is 
important given the accumulated evidence that impact estimates are often highly sensitive to the 
estimator chosen (Smith and Todd, 2005; Dillon, 2011). Among quasi-experimental evaluation 
techniques, matched-comparison techniques are generally considered a second-best alternative to 
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experimental design (Baker, 2000; Ravallion, 2008). However, project impact evaluators should 
be open-minded about methodology, adapting to the problem, setting and data constraints 
(Ravallion, 2008). The appropriate methodology for non-experimental data depends on three 
factors: the type of information available to the researcher, the underlying model and the 
parameter of interest (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). According to Khandker et al. (2010), it is 
advisable to use more than one analytical model for triangulation purposes and robustness 
checks. 
2.10 Irrigation impact on household welfare: Evidence from the empirical literature 
The evidence from international literature on the role played by smallholder irrigation on 
household welfare presents a mostly positive picture. Whereas few studies such as Jen et al. 
(2002) found an insignificant link between irrigation and input use or productivity of farming 
practices, there are a number of studies in different countries which show that irrigation has 
served as the key driver in increasing household income and alleviating rural poverty (e.g., 
Hussain et al., 2006; Namara et al., 2008; Dillon, 2011; Kuwornu and Owusu, 2012).  
Hussain et al. (2006) evaluated the impact of small-scale irrigation schemes on poverty 
alleviation in Pakistan using descriptive statistics. They used the FGT indices to measure 
poverty. The study found that poverty levels were higher in rain-fed than in irrigated areas. For 
example, poverty head count ratio was found to be 37% in rain-fed areas, compared to 29% in 
irrigated areas. Interestingly, the study found that poverty head ratio was even much lower (23%) 
in areas that practiced both irrigated and rain-fed farming. Namara et al. (2008) studied the role 
played by access to irrigation on rural poverty and inequality in Ethiopia using the logistic 
regression model. As expected, the poverty incidence, depth and severity values were lower for 
farmers that had access to irrigation compared to the non-irrigators. The main conclusion of the 
study was that the incidence, depth and severity of poverty were not affected by mere access to 
irrigation but by the intensity of irrigation use. The study concluded that there was an economy 
of scale in the poverty-irrigation relationship.  
Gebregziabher et al. (2009) and Kuwornu and Owusu (2012) evaluated the impact of access to 
small-scale irrigation on farm household welfare using the propensity score method (PSM). 
According to Gebregziabher et al. (2009), the average income of non-irrigating households was 
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less than that of the irrigating households by about 50% in Ethiopia. The study also found that 
farm income is more important to irrigating households than to non-irrigating households, and 
off-farm income was negatively related with access to irrigation. Kuwornu and Owusu (2012) 
concluded that irrigation investment in Ghana is justified due to significant irrigation 
contribution to consumption expenditure per capita in farm households. Dillon (2011) 
investigated the impact of small-scale irrigation investments on household consumption, assets 
and informal insurance in Mali using both PSM and the matched difference-in-difference 
method. The strength of this study was its use of panel data. Both estimation methods confirmed 
the positive role played by small-scale irrigation on household consumption and asset 
accumulation. 
Tesfaye et al. (2008) and Bacha et al. (2011) both assessed the impact of small-scale irrigation 
on household welfare in Ethiopia using the Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure. Both 
studies observed significant welfare differences between irrigators and non-irrigators, and 
concluded that access to irrigation had played a part in those observed differences. Tesfaye et al. 
(2008) found that about 70% of the irrigation users were food secure while only 20% of the non-
users were food secure in Filtino and Godino irrigation schemes in Ethiopia. The two studies 
found that irrigation participation was also influenced by unobservable factors, highlighting the 
need to model for unobservable variables in irrigation impact evaluations. 
As highlighted in the previous sections, most of the studies on smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa have argued that smallholder irrigation schemes have failed to meet the rural 
development and rural poverty reduction objectives. A review by Fanadzo (2012) concluded that 
smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa have failed to bring about the expected social and 
economic development in rural areas. However, most of these studies reviewed have not done 
any in-depth quantitative evaluations of the impact of smallholder irrigation on rural household 
poverty and food security but have mainly been descriptive. Most of these studies have relied on 
nothing more than gross margin or correlation analysis (e.g., Yokwe, 2009; Hope et al., 2008). 
Van Averbeke (2012) investigated the factors that contribute to differences in the performances 
of smallholder irrigation schemes in Vhembe district in South Africa. Using correlation analysis, 
the study found that gravity-fed schemes were more likely to be (and remain) operational 
compared to pumped schemes. Whereas associations between cropping intensity and scheme 
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characteristics were not very strong, the study found that cropping intensity was most strongly 
correlated with water restrictions at scheme level. This highlights the importance of ensuring 
household water security. The study reported that water security among irrigators was caused, at 
least in part, by the front-end blocks extracting more than their share, leaving too little for the 
tail-end blocks. Front-end tail-end differences in access to water among farmers were commonly 
reported on canal schemes. 
Although arguing that smallholder performance has been below expectations, gross margin 
analysis by Yokwe (2009) and Hope et al. (2008) indicated that irrigators have somewhat greater 
gross margins per ha compared to non-irrigators. For the Zanyokwe and Thabina smallholder 
irrigation schemes, Yokwe (2009) found greater gross margin per ha among irrigators for all the 
crops that were included. Hope et al. (2008), on the other hand found that smallholder irrigation 
provides expected incomes and food benefits for those plot holders with secure irrigation access, 
i.e., those with head plots. For example, head plots had an estimated average gross annual farm 
of US$2,047 per year compared to US$543 per year for the tail plots. Both studies, however, are 
limited as they rely on gross margin analysis. Gross margin analysis is descriptive, and does not 
account for other relevant socio-economic variables such as educational level, farmer experience, 
etc., that may influence the revenue differences between irrigators and non-irrigators. The 
welfare differences between irrigators and non-irrigators cannot be attributed to access to 
irrigation without controlling for these other important variables. 
One attempt to evaluate the household welfare impact of smallholder irrigation in South Africa 
was a case study of the Taung irrigation scheme by Tekana and Oladele (2011). Using the OLS 
procedure, the study concluded that irrigation plays a central role in the improvement of rural 
livelihood and food security. However, Baker (2000) and Bacha et al. (2011) point that self-
selection and endogeneity associated with irrigation participation results in biased estimates from 
the OLS estimating technique (Greene, 2003). The impact of access of irrigation is either 
overestimated or underestimated by OLS regression depending on whether the irrigation scheme 
beneficiaries are more or less able to realize the potential benefits of irrigation due to certain 
unobservable factors (Baker, 2000). Therefore, the results of Tekana and Oladele (2011) could 
be biased, pointing to the need for irrigation impact evaluation studies in South Africa that 
account for selection bias.  
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The above literature indicates that although there have been a number of comprehensive impact 
evaluations in other countries, this has not been the case in South Africa. Since smallholder 
irrigation schemes are not homogenous between countries, as explained earlier, there remains a 
case for in-depth quantitative impact evaluations specific to South Africa. The next chapter 
describes the research methodology that was employed in this study to achieve this objective.  
2.11 Summary 
Smallholder irrigation plays an important role in the fight against rural poverty in developing 
countries. Smallholder irrigation development in South Africa began in the nineteenth century 
due to contact with the European settlers and it has since then gone through different eras of 
development. Although participating in an irrigation scheme is necessary, it is not sufficient to 
lead to improved household welfare. Water security encourages investments in improved water 
management and agricultural technologies such as fertilizer and high yielding varieties, leading 
to increased agricultural production and improved household welfare. Irrigation impact on 
household welfare has been done using both qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques. 
Quantitative impact evaluation methods, particularly quasi-experimental econometric methods, 
have been more widely applied in irrigation project impact evaluations. Most of the studies have 
concluded that smallholder irrigation plays a positive role in household welfare. However, the 
conclusion in South Africa has generally been that smallholder irrigation has performed below 
expectations. This chapter has presented some evidence based on the available literature and the 
rest of the succeeding empirical chapters give more evidence for South Africa, drawing from the 
survey data analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the methodological approaches that were used in this study. The study 
area is briefly described before discussing data collection procedures and methods. The 
conceptual framework is then discussed, followed by a close look at the analytical models that 
were used in this study. Empirical methods that include PCA, the PSM method and the treatment 
effects model are explained in this chapter.  
3.2 Study area description 
The Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme is located in Msinga local municipality in the Mzinyathi 
District in KwaZulu-Natal Province. It is situated 120 km north of Pietermaritzburg, and the 
closest town is Greytown, which is located about 48 km from the scheme. Figure 3.1 (overleaf) 
shows the location of the Tugela Ferry area in the map of South Africa (See arrow). 
Dearlove (2007) provided a brief description of the geographic setting and socio-economic 
profile of the Msinga municipality. Msinga is composed of six traditional authority areas, 
namely; Bomvu, Mabaso, Mthembu, Mchunu, Ngome, and Qamu. The land in the Tugela Ferry 
irrigation scheme falls under three of the six different traditional authorities listed above. The 
population of Msinga is estimated to be 160,000 people, in an area of 2,500 km
2
, implying a 
population density of 64 people per square kilometre (Dearlove, 2007). According to Dearlove 
(2007), approximately 30% of the Msinga municipal area comprises commercial farmland, while 
70% is traditional land held in trust by the Ingonyama Trust. The study also reported that in 
terms of gender, women dominate in Msinga, comprising 58% of the population while men are 
about 42%. Men are fewer as they leave the rural area to search for employment opportunities in 
other areas. The study noted that the majority of the Msinga population (68%) is illiterate, 
particularly women. Msinga has few economic resources and little economic activity and is 
characterized by high poverty levels. Moreover, the area is characterized by high unemployment 
rates leading many to be involved in subsistence and informal activities. Almost half of the total 




Figure 3.1 Location of the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme in South Africa 
Subsistence agriculture, involving both crop and livestock production, forms the basis of the 
Msinga people’s livelihood and plays a significant role in the welfare of the poor in the area. 
Crop production is mainly practiced in areas adjacent the Tugela and Mooi rivers. Rain-fed crop 
production is difficult because the area is both hot and dry. Msinga is situated in a dry to semi-
arid zone with mean rainfall of 600-700 mm per annum and very high summer temperatures of 
up to 44
0 
C (Cousins, 2012). The area is characterised by frequent droughts, making irrigated 
plots the main site of household food production (Cousins, 2012). Irrigation farming also offers 
many of these rural people an opportunity to increase their incomes and participate in the local 
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economy. The Tugela Ferry and Mooi irrigation schemes play an important role in the local 
economy of Msinga as a source of food, employment and market for agricultural inputs. 
The Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme is located on both banks of the Tugela River. The scheme 
was planned and constructed by the Natal Native Trust between 1898 and 1902 and has been 
operational ever since (Cousins, 2012). The scheme consists of seven blocks of irrigable land 
covering 837 ha of which approximately 540 ha is flood-irrigated, and is amongst the largest in 
the province (Cousins, 2012; Fanadzo, 2012). A total of about 1,500 irrigators participate in the 
irrigation scheme growing various crops such as maize, cabbage, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, 
beans, beetroot, spinach and butternut. According to Cousins (2012), the Tugela Ferry irrigators 
comprise about 15 per cent of all smallholder irrigation farmers in the KwaZulu-Natal province.  
The land in the scheme is owned by three different traditional authorities (Mthembu: Block 1-5; 
Mabaso: 7A; and Bomvu: 7B). The ownership of Block 6 is uncertain, and it is currently not 
operating due to conflicts regarding its ownership. Farmers in the irrigation scheme were initially 
allocated two plots of 0.1 ha in size. Overtime, some farmers have managed to acquire more 
plots through leasing or borrowing from neighbours. The main access to land is through the 
traditional authorities, who allocate land to households. Selling of land is not permissible under 
the current traditional land tenure system. Land is to be returned to the traditional authority for 
re-allocation if the owner is no longer using it. Discussions with the farmers indicated that land 
allocations in the scheme are governed along the patriarchal nature of the area. For example, land 
is mainly registered to men, with women mainly getting registered after the death of the husband. 
Most women get access to land through marriage. Sons are the ones that can inherit the plots, 
while daughters cannot. Many people gain access to land through borrowing from other farmers. 
There is competition for land between farming and the expanding Tugela Ferry town. The need 
to evaluate the role played by the irrigation scheme on local people’s welfare to justify its 
existence in an area with increasing competition for land is without doubt relevant. 
The source of water to the different blocks of the irrigation scheme is the Tugela River. A canal 
31 km in length is used to draw water under gravity for blocks 1-3 and 5; while a diesel pump is 
used for block 4B and electric pumps for blocks 4A and 7. Initially, all the blocks obtained water 
from the main canal, but water shortages have meant that only four blocks benefit from the 
gravity-fed canal while other blocks use motorized pumps. The initial canal infrastructure has 
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deteriorated such that it is hardly capable of supplying the four blocks relying on gravity. 
Irrigators take turns to divert irrigation water to their plots, getting water at least once per week. 
Farmers reported inequities in water distribution at both scheme and block levels, as was 
highlighted by Mnkeni et al. (2010). The next section describes the data collection methods that 
were employed in this study. 
3.3 Data collection methods 
Data were collected over a period of three weeks in November 2012 by five enumerators who 
speak Zulu, the local language. The enumerators were trained in data collection methods and the 
contents of the questionnaire before going for the survey. Also, questionnaires were pre-tested 
before being administered. A sample of five households was interviewed in different blocks of 
the irrigation scheme during questionnaire pre-testing. Questions that were not clear during 
questionnaire pre-testing were modified to make them clearer. Possible responses that were not 
captured in the closed ended questions were also added to reduce the number of responses 
getting to ‘other’. Questionnaire pre-testing was also used in improving translation of the 
questionnaire to the local language. Pre-testing was also used to improve the reliability and 
validity of the questionnaire, i.e., ensuring that there was consistency of measurement and 
ensuring that the instrument measures what it is intended to measure. The sampling procedure 
and data collection tools that were used are discussed below.  
3.3.1 Sampling procedure 
A stratified random sampling technique was used to select the respondents. Households were 
categorized into two strata: irrigation participants and non-participants. A list of the irrigating 
farmers was obtained from extension officers, and farmers stratified according to their irrigation 
system i.e., whether they use gravity, electric or diesel pumps to divert water to their plots. The 
reason for stratification according to the irrigation system was to capture the differences that 
exist in the distribution of water in the different systems. From these sub-strata, simple random 
selection was done to obtain a sample of 185 irrigating farmers such that every irrigation system 
was represented by at least 10% to the final sample of irrigators. A sample of 185 irrigating 
households was considered appropriate as it represents above 10% of the 1,500 irrigating farmers 
in the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme (Terre-Blanche et al., 2006). 
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More than 10% proportional sample size was collected from those relying on the diesel pump. 
There is only one block using a diesel pump, and it has only 68 members. Maintaining 
proportional representation would have meant that only seven people would have been sampled 
among the diesel pump dependent irrigators. This small number of people would not have 
allowed good statistical comparisons between farmers using the different irrigation systems. 
Therefore, 30 farmers were interviewed in block 4B instead of just seven. There was no list for 
non-irrigators; therefore the non-irrigators that were interviewed were identified during the 
survey. A sample of 70 non-irrigators in the same geographic area was randomly interviewed to 
provide a counterfactual or control group. Since the population is largely homogenous, this 
sample size was considered large enough to provide a reliable control and provide for a 
reasonable number of matching counterfactual households. These non-irrigators were from the 
same location and geographic area so that all their characteristics matched that of irrigators.  
3.3.2 Data collection instruments 
Primary data were collected using structured questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions (See Appendix A for the questionnaire and Appendix B for the focus group 
discussion guide). Information on basic household head characteristics such as sex, age, marital 
status and education level was collected using the questionnaire. The questionnaire also included 
measures of household wealth such as the household assets, livestock, and type of houses; 
agricultural production activities; household expenditure, income amounts and sources. More so, 
the questionnaire sought to elicit farmers’ perceptions of the sufficiency and reliability of the 
irrigation water, their ability to pay for the water, and the security of their rights to the water. The 
same questionnaire was used for both irrigators and non-irrigators, but with extra sections to 
cover specific questions related to the irrigation scheme. The approach adopted in the survey is 
in line with Jalan and Ravallion (2003) who suggested that in project impact evaluations, it is 
important that the same questionnaire be administered to both groups, and that project 
participants and non-participants are from the same economic environment. 
Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were done to obtain explanations to issues 
captured in the questionnaires. Four key informants were interviewed, two of which were 
extension officers while two involved farmers who were knowledgeable with issues pertaining to 
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the farming activities in the scheme. Two focus group discussions were used to collect 
qualitative data which was used to explore people’s knowledge and perceptions concerning their 
water security, gender issues and their welfare. Focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews were used to generate data that complemented the structured questionnaire by 
providing the explanations and issues behind quantitative data. As explained in previous 
sections, the benefit of these qualitative assessments is that they can greatly enhance the findings 
of an impact evaluation. Qualitative assessments provide a better understanding of stakeholders’ 
perceptions, priorities, and the conditions and processes that may have affected project impact 
(Baker, 2000). 
3.4 Conceptual framework 
Irrigation water is a critical production input in agriculture. As highlighted by Hussain and 
Hanjra (2004), it is an important socio-economic good with a positive role in poverty alleviation. 
Irrigation directly impacts on household incomes by increasing farm revenues. There are two 
potential ways through which irrigation increases farm revenues. Firstly, it increases annual 
revenue per acre of land through its direct positive effect on total crop production in a given 
cropping season. Irrigation enhances the use of agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer and high 
yielding varieties), which, in turn, improves the productivity of land (Gebregziabher et al., 
2009). Moreover, irrigation water not only increases crop yields per hectare but reduces crop 
yield variability, thus stabilising household incomes (Tyler, 2007; Namara et al., 2008). 
Secondly, irrigation may increase farm revenue by allowing a plot to be planted for an extra crop 
season for a given year, i.e., irrigation induces the possibility of double cropping.  
Although it increases costs to the farmers (due to increased fertilizer use, water charges as well 
as soil fertility losses due to water logging and salinisation), the benefits of irrigation outweigh 
these additional costs. Irrigation water has high marginal returns, high enough to cover additional 
costs involved in water source development, scheme development and recurrent operating costs 
(Innocencio et al., 2007). The net result of these increased benefits and increased costs are 
significant profit margins to the farmers, leading to improved household incomes. The impact of 
irrigation on household incomes would increase household expenditure, ceteris paribus 
(Kuwornu and Owusu, 2012). Increased household expenditure implies improved welfare and 
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food security of the household. Indirectly, irrigation benefits the landless through higher wages 
as it results in higher marketed surpluses and increased employment opportunities (Jin et al., 
2012). Moreover, irrigation benefits the poor as it may lead to lower food prices. Lower food 
prices are especially beneficial to the poor since the poor spend a disproportionally large share of 
their income on food (Jin et al., 2012). Therefore, irrigation development benefits not only the 
participants but the non-participants as well through these spill-over effects. 
However, as has been highlighted in previous sections, irrigation participation although 
necessary, is not enough to induce farmers to produce more. It is mainly the water secure 
irrigators that invest more on improved agricultural inputs and technologies, and thus enjoy more 
benefits from irrigation participation than the water insecure irrigators. Therefore, the study 
aimed to evaluate the impact of small-scale irrigation schemes from two angles. First, it aimed to 
compare welfare differences between irrigators and non-irrigators, i.e., the extent to which 
irrigators are better-off compared to their non-irrigating counterparts. The second dimension of 
the evaluation was a comparison of the welfare differences between water secure and water 
insecure irrigators. 
The main issue in impact evaluation is that of missing data. Subjects cannot be observed in both 
statuses at the same time, i.e., participation in an irrigation project and non-participation in the 
project is mutually exclusive. In the absence of data on counterfactual outcomes i.e., outcomes 
for irrigation participants had they been non-irrigators, the impact evaluation problem becomes 
that of missing data. Unless the irrigation project participation was randomized, the missing data 
is not random (Cuong, 2007). Irrigators select into the project based on their decisions and 
project administrators’ decisions, implying that project participation is non-random. Impact 
evaluation can be rigorous in identifying project impacts by using different models to construct 
comparison groups for participants (Khandker et al., 2010). In light of these challenges, the next 
section describes the analytical approaches that were adopted to achieve the objectives of this 
study. 
3.5 Data analytical methods 
Different econometric models were used to achieve the specific objectives of this study. Table 
3.1 gives the specific objectives and the corresponding analytical methods that were used.  
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Table 3.1 Study objectives and data analysis approaches 
Objective Data analysis method 
To evaluate the impact of smallholder 
irrigation on household welfare 
Treatment effect model 
Propensity score matching (PSM) method 
To investigate the factors that determine the 
irrigator’s water security level 
Principal component analysis (PCA) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
To investigate the impact of water security on 
the irrigators’ welfare 
Treatment effect model 
Propensity score matching (PSM) method 
As shown in Table 3.1, the treatment effect regression model was used to evaluate the impact of 
the Tugela irrigation scheme on welfare. PSM was used as a robust check on the results of the 
treatment effect regression model. PCA was used to generate the water security index, and this 
index was used as a dependent variable in the OLS regression to determine the factors that affect 
the water security level of the irrigators. PSM and the treatment effect model were then applied 
to investigate the impact of water security on household welfare. These different econometric 
models are explained in detail in the following sections. Variables that were used in these 
econometric models are presented in Table 3.2 (overleaf). The variables and the codes as they 
were used in Stata analyses are presented in Appendix C. 
Household consumption per adult was used as the dependent variable to capture the welfare of 
the farmers. The water security index generated by PCA was used as the dependent variable to 
capture the perceived water security levels of irrigating farmers. Different socio-economic 
variables presented in Table 3.2 were used as independent variables in the different models that 
were estimated. The specifications of the different models estimated in this study are presented 
in the following sections. 
Most of the variables presented in Table 3.2 are straightforward in their derivation. Two 
variables, however, need further clarification on how they were generated. Household size in 
adult equivalents and livestock size in tropical livestock units (TLU) were generated using 
recommended scales. Appendix D indicates the scales that were used to calculate household size 





Table 3.2 Description of variables 
Variable  Variable description 
Dependent variables 
Household consumption per 
adult equivalent 
Total household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent in 
a year (Rands) 
Water security index Water security index generated by PCA  
Independent variables 
Irrigation participation 1= Irrigator, 0 = Non-irrigator 
Water security status 1= Water secure, 0 = Water insecure. 
Gender Household head gender: 1=Male, 0 = Female 
Age Household head age (years) 
Education level Household head education level (years of schooling) 
Marital status  Household head marital status: 1=Married, 0=Otherwise 
Household size Household size in adult equivalents 
Household size square Household size square in adult equivalents 
Religion Household main religion (1=Christianity, 0=Otherwise)                                   
Grant Access to government welfare grants (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Land size Household total land size (ha) 
Irrigated land Household irrigated land (ha) 
Off-farm income Off-farm income (Rands) 
Farm income Total income from farming activities (Rands) 
Livestock size Livestock size in Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 
Soil fertility Farmers’ perception of soil fertility status: 1=Good, 0= Poor 
Extension Access to extension service (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Credit Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Training Agricultural skills training (Yes=1, No=0) 
Market Market access (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Road Road access (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Scheme distance Distance of household to the irrigation scheme (km) 
Duration of scheme 
membership  
Years household has been a member of the irrigation scheme 
Pump_1 Pump used (1=Electric pump, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 
Pump_2 Pump used (1=Diesel pump, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 
Location_1 Location along the primary canal (1=Head-end, 0=Middle or 
otherwise) 
Location_2 Location along the primary canal (1=Tail-end, 0=Middle or 
otherwise) 
Association member Member of farmer association (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Decision making Scheme level decision making participation (1=Yes, 0=No) 
Occurrence of conflicts Occurrence of conflicts (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
As shown in Appendix D, people of different gender and age have different energy requirements. 
Therefore, instead of using household size in numbers, the approach used in this study was to use 
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the recommended scales to adjust household sizes to reflect the energy requirements of different 
households with different household compositions. The scales that were used to calculate 
tropical livestock units (TLU) are presented in Appendix E. Following the same reasoning 
concerning household size, using the numbers to determine the livestock size is limited as it 
would have meant that two goats, for instance, would have been equated to two cattle. The 
tropical scales presented in the above table, although they are also limited as they do not cater for 
the sex and age of the animals for instance, offer a useful way of comparing livestock sizes 
despite differing livestock compositions. 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive analysis for all the variables was carried out as a first step in data analysis. 
Descriptive analysis involved looking at means, frequencies and standard deviations of the 
variables. The t-test was used to make comparisons between irrigators and non-irrigators with 
respect to relevant continuous variables, and the χ
2
-test was used to test the degree of association 
between the irrigation access variable and other relevant categorical variables. Descriptive 
analysis is important as it can inform decisions on which variables to include in the impact 
analysis stage, and highlights data management issues, such as coding of variables and missing 
values (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006).  
3.5.2 The Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures 
Although poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, most empirical work on poverty 
measurement is based on incomes or consumption expenditures (Hussain and Wijerethna, 2004; 
Namara et al., 2008). As highlighted earlier, there is lack of consensus regarding the 
measurement of other forms of deprivation. Therefore, the approach followed in this study is the 
material dimension of poverty expressed in monetary values. Between income and expenditure, 
expenditure was chosen because it is the preferred poverty metric in developing countries (Achia 
et al., 2010). Whereas incomes are often under-estimated, expenditure has been found to better 
reflect the true welfare status of households in the developing countries (Achia et al., 2010). A 
poor household was thus defined as one with expenditure less than a specified level to meet basic 
food and non-food needs.  
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Based on the minimum per capita adult equivalent caloric intake (at 2,200 kcal per day) (Bacha 
et al., 2011), a figure of R5,276.64 per adult equivalent per annum was used as the poverty line. 
This figure was taken from that reported by Frye (2005), and then adjusted using the consumer 
price index (NDA, 2012) so that it reflects the current purchasing power of the rand. The FGT 
poverty measures were calculated to examine the incidence, depth and severity of poverty among 
irrigators and non-irrigators. The incidence of poverty (headcount index) measures the share of 
the population below the poverty line. The poverty depth index (poverty gap), on the other hand, 
captures information regarding how far off households are from the poverty line. The poverty 
severity index (poverty gap square) takes into account not only the distance separating the poor 
from the poverty line (the poverty gap), but also the inequality among the poor. That is, a higher 
weight is placed on those households who are further away from the poverty line. 
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          [1] 
Where: Pα is the FGT poverty index, n is the number of sample households, Yi is consumption 
expenditure per adult equivalent of the i
th 
household, z represents the cut-off poverty line, q is the 
number of households below the poverty line and α is the poverty aversion parameter. The 
poverty aversion parameter is a non-negative parameter indicating the degree of sensitivity of the 
poverty measure to inequality among the poor. A larger α gives greater emphasis to the poorest 
of the poor, indicating greater sensitivity of the poverty measure to inequality among the poor 
(Foster et al., 1984; Namara et al., 2008). The poverty aversion parameter takes a value of 0, 1, 
or 2.  
If α = 0, then the result of equation 1 is a poverty head count index, which measures the 
incidence of poverty within the sample. When α = 1, the result of equation 1 is a poverty gap 
index, which measures depth of poverty or the average consumption shortfall of the poor from 
the poverty line. Finally, if α = 2, the result is a squared poverty gap, which measures the 
severity or intensity of poverty (Foster et al., 1984; Bacha et al., 2011). The FGT poverty 
measures were calculated using the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) version 2.2, an 
ado Stata file created by Araar and Duclos (2012). 
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3.5.3 The treatment effect regression model  
The term treatment effect means a causal effect of a binary variable on a continuous variable of 
interest (Khandker et al., 2010). The major econometric problem in evaluating project impacts is 
selection bias (Maddala, 1983). Selection bias arises from the fact that treated individuals may 
differ from the non-treated for reasons other than treatment status. Smallholder irrigation usually 
purposively targets the poor, which are more likely to be poor without access to irrigation 
(Baker, 2000). It is expected that irrigation participants would have had far less consumption 
expenditure in the absence of the irrigation project (Baker, 2000). Therefore, using OLS when 
there is selection bias would underestimate the effect of irrigation participation on household 
welfare.  
Heckman (1979)’s basic model of selectivity has been widely applied in evaluating program 
benefits (or treatment effects) (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2003). The model corrects for the 
selection bias that arises from unobservable factors by estimating two equations: the selection 
(participation) equation and the response (outcome) equation. The discussion of the treatment 
effect model below derives from mainly Heckman (1979), Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003), 
and interested readers may consult these texts for detailed discussions. To understand how the 
treatment effect model (as estimated using Heckman’s two-step procedure) works, consider 
access to irrigation as the treatment variable. It must be noted, however, that the same 
explanations below hold for the impact of water security, with water security replacing irrigation 
access as the treatment variable.  
Assume that evaluating the impact of irrigation access on welfare involves estimation of the 
following equation: 
Yi= βxi + δPi + εi           [2] 
Where: Yi is the consumption expenditure per adult equivalent of household i; xi is a vector of 
household characteristics; Pi is a dummy variable indicating whether or not household i irrigates; 
β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated;  δ is the impact parameter and εi residual term.  
Estimating equation 2 using OLS would result in biased and inconsistent estimates due to 
possible biases arising from sample selection (Maddala, 1991; Greene, 2003). As explained 
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before, irrigation participation cannot be treated as exogenous since the likelihood of an 
individual household to have access to irrigation or not may be based on some selection process 
(Ravallion, 2008). The estimate δ in equation 2 is biased and inconsistent estimates (Heckman, 
1979). The welfare difference between irrigators and non-irrigators, therefore, cannot be 
attributed to access to irrigation so long as selection bias exists (Bacha et al., 2011). 
Selection bias could be as a result of selection on observables or unobservables. Selection on 
observables can be controlled by including all the variables in the model. Selection on 
unobservables is difficult to control by adding these variables as these variables are difficult to 
capture and not observed. Variables such as managerial ability, motivation, propensity to bear 
risks, etc., are some examples of variables that are hard to capture. Excluding these unobservable 
variables gives a biased estimate of δ as a result of omission of relevant variable specification 
error (Heckman, 1979). The treatment effect regression model is used in impact evaluation as it 
corrects for the selection bias that arises from unobservable factors. The treatment effect model 
is able to test and control for sample selection biases and thus results in unbiased and consistent 
estimates (Green, 2003). The treatment effect model involves the estimation of two equations: 
the selection (participation) equation, and the response (outcome) equation. The participation 
equation is used to generate a selection variable (inverse Mills ratio) which when included in 
equation 2, the OLS estimates become unbiased and consistent. 
Assume that irrigation participation is a linear function of the exogenous covariates (zi) and the 
residual error ui. Specifically, assume that the irrigation participation is modelled as follows: 
P*i = γzi + ui ,  
Pi = 1 if P*i > 0, and 0=Otherwise.        [3] 
Where: P*i is the latent endogenous variable such that Pi takes a value of 1 when P*i is greater 
than zero; zi is a vector of household characteristics that influence household’s access to 
irrigation; γ are the coefficients to be estimated; and ui is the residual term.  
Suppose that εi and ui have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ:  
εi ~ N(0,σ); ui ~ N(0, 1) and corr(εi, ui) = ρ  
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Therefore, according to Green (2003), the difference in expected consumption between irrigators 
and non-irrigators is:  
E[Yi׀Pi=1] - E[Yi׀Pi=0] = δ + ρσ[
       
                
]      [4] 
 Where: ϕ is the density function of a standard normal variable, Φ is the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard normal distribution; δ, zi, σ, ρ and γ are as defined above. Estimating 
equation 2 without correcting for selectivity is actually estimating equation 4. When ρ = 0, OLS 
regression of equation 2 provides unbiased estimates, but when ρ ≠ 0 the OLS estimates are 
biased as can be seen in equation 4. 
The irrigation participation equation (equation 3) was estimated during the first stage of the 
treatment effect model. The selection equation captured the factors influencing participation in 
the irrigation project. The dependent variable for this first stage of the treatment effect regression 
procedure was irrigation participation (Pi). Pi was a latent variable which represents a 
household’s probability of participation in the irrigation project. The independent variables (zi) 
were the relevant observable variables such as household head age, education level, gender, etc. 
For this purpose, a probit model was estimated in this study because the error term of this model 
is normally distributed, which is one of the assumptions underlying the treatment effect model. 
Using the selection equation (equation 3), the inverse Mills ratio was constructed as follows: 
λi = ϕ(γzi) / Φ(γzi)          [5] 
Where: λi is the inverse Mills ratio term, ϕ is the density function of a standard normal variable, 
Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, zi and γ are as defined 
above. The second stage of the treatment effect regression procedure involved adding the inverse 
Mills ratio to the response or outcome equation (equation 2) and estimating the equation using 
OLS as follows: 
Yi= βxi + δPi + βλλi + εi             [6] 
Where: Yi is total household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent; xi is a vector of 
household characteristics; Pi indicates whether a household is an irrigation beneficiary or non-
beneficiary; λi is the inverse Mills ratio, εi is the error term; while β and δ are parameters that 
were estimated.  
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Yi was a continuous variable measuring total food and non-food expenses incurred by 
households in a year. The food items produced and consumed by the household were converted 
to their market values using average prices. A non-significant coefficient of the inverse Mills 
ratio indicates that there is no self-selection problem while a significant coefficient term implies 
sample selection problem. Due to the inclusion of the selectivity term, the impact coefficient δ in 
equation 6 is unbiased although it is inefficient as the disturbance term εi is heteroskedastic 
(Greene, 2003). The correct standard errors can be generated from an asymptotic approximation 
or by resampling, such as through a bootstrap. The Stata software package, which was used in 
this study, automatically corrects for that bias in standard errors. 
The main assumption required to guarantee reliable estimates of the outcome equation is the 
existence of at least one additional explanatory variable in the selection equation which has no 
direct effect on the outcome (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). This 
variable is required to have a non-zero coefficient in the selection equation and to be independent 
of the error term εi. Even though the model would be identified, including the same number of 
variables in the selection and outcome equations would lead to the multicollinearity problem in 
the outcome equation which results in very imprecise estimates (Sartori, 2003). Although it is 
often difficult to find a variable that affects selection and does not affect outcome (Sartori, 2003), 
an effort was made in this study to ensure that the consumption expenditure equation included 
one variable less than the irrigation participation equation.  
There are two approaches to estimating the sample selection model under the bivariate normality 
assumption: the two-step procedure (as explained above) and full information maximum 
likelihood (Maddala, 1983). Although the two-step procedure has the desirable large-sample 
property of consistency, various studies have investigated and criticised its small-sample 
properties. Puhani (2000) provides a review of some of the papers that critique the two-step 
method. One major limitation of the two-step procedure is that it is less efficient compared to the 
full information maximum likelihood method. Both methods need the same level of restrictive 
assumptions (e.g., the normality assumption is necessary for consistency), implying that the two-
step estimator is no more robust than the full information maximum likelihood. Therefore, unlike 
previous irrigation impact studies such as Tesfaye et al. (2008) and Bacha et al. (2011), the full 
information maximum likelihood results were reported in this study. The two-step procedure was 
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also done, however, and the results presented in the appendices. Puhani (2000) advised that the 
two-step model estimation and presentation of its results should be done as a starting point and 
for comparison with the more efficient full information maximum likelihood estimator. 
3.5.4 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
PCA was used to generate the water security index of irrigating households. PCA is a 
multivariate statistical technique used to reduce the number of variables without losing too much 
information in the process (Achia et al., 2010). PCA has been used by several authors to 
construct an asset-based poverty index which gives the socio-economic status of households 
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006; Achia et al., 2010; Howe et al., 
2012). Following the same logic, PCA was used to create the water security index, which was 
used to determine the water security status of an irrigating household.  
Irrigators were asked to rank using their perceptions the correctness/truthfulness of statements 
which depicted components of water security. Perceived water security was thus assessed by the 
extent to which irrigators agreed or disagreed with statements such as “water to my plot is 
reliable” or “I have secure rights to the water”. The rankings took the value of 0 when the 
respondent strongly disagreed with the statement, through to 4 when the respondent strongly 
agreed. Likert scales with at least 5 categories are recommended as they limit distortions in data 
scaling caused by ordinal data, leading to reasonably robust correlation coefficients (Garson, 
2008). Perceptions of farmers were used because farmers plan their investment and production 
decisions based on their perceptions (Besley, 1995; Crewett et al., 2008; Speelman, 2009). PCA 
was then used to extract factor scores to construct the water security index.  
From an initial set of 12 correlated water security variables that were identified, PCA created 
uncorrelated indices or components, where each component was a linear weighted combination 
of the initial water security variables. In each component, the water security indicators were 
given eigenvalues, which can be interpreted as the weight by which each original water security 
indicator should be multiplied to get the component score  (Howe et al., 2012). Variables with 
low standard deviations would carry a low weight while those with high standard deviations 
carry a high weight from the PCA (Howe et al., 2012). In PCA, the components are ordered so 
that the first component (PC1) explains the largest possible amount of variation in the original 
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data. The second component (PC2) explains additional but less variation than the first component 
and is uncorrelated with the first component (PC1). Subsequent components are uncorrelated 
with previous components, while explaining smaller and smaller proportions of the variation of 
the original variables. PCA works best when variables are correlated and also when the 
distribution of variables varies across cases (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The higher the 
degree of correlation among the original variables in the data, the fewer components required to 
capture common information (Morrison, 2005).  
Use of PCA is predicated upon the assumption that data are continuous. This assumption was 
violated in this study by using ordinal variables. To correct the statistical error of using ordinal 
variables in a PCA analysis, polychoric correlation instead of the Pearson correlations were 
calculated and then the resulting correlation matrix used in the PCA analysis (Howe et al., 2012). 
Only the factor scores (eigenvectors) of the first PC were used to construct the water security 
index since the aim was to create a single measure of the water security status of the irrigators. 
The first PC captures the largest variation, hence its selection. The first PC created was then used 
as a dependent variable in an OLS regression to determine the determinants of water security. 
The independent variables of the OLS model included household characteristics such as age, 
gender, educational level, etc. 
3.5.5 Propensity score matching (PSM) method 
The impact of water security on household welfare was evaluated using both the treatment effect 
model and the PSM method. In order to apply these empirical methods, the continuous water 
security index generated by PCA above had to be modified to become a binary variable. Both the 
treatment effect model and PSM require a binary treatment variable. Therefore, there was a need 
to determine the water security status of an individual irrigator using the water security index. 
The challenge in categorizing irrigators into two groups of those water and insecure was in 
determining the cut-off line. Many studies on the socio-economic status of households have used 
the 40
th
 percentile as the poverty line (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Vyass and Kumaranayake, 
2006; Achia et al., 2010). The same approach was adopted in this study, and the water security 
index at the 40
th
 percentile was employed as the cut-off line.  
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The water security variable, therefore, took the value 1 for households above the cut-off line, and 
0 otherwise. Thus, as per the demands of the empirical models used, water security was thought 
of as a binary treatment; household consumption expenditure as an outcome; water secure 
households as a treatment group; and water insecure households as a control group. The 
treatment model was estimated as explained in Section 3.5.3, with water security replacing 
irrigation access as the treatment variable. The following paragraphs provide a discussion of how 
PSM was used to estimate the water security impact on household welfare. 
PSM is a method widely used in the estimation of the average treatment effects of a binary 
treatment on a continuous scalar outcome (Gebregziabher et al., 2009; Dillon, 2011; Kuwornu 
and Owusu, 2012). It uses non-parametric regression methods to construct the counterfactual 
under the assumption of a selection on observables (Baker, 2000; Blundell and Costa-Dias, 
2000). This assumption is commonly called the conditional independence or the 
unconfoundedness assumption (Khandker et al., 2010). PSM is useful when only observed 
characteristics are believed to affect selection (Khandker et al., 2010). The main purpose of 
matching is to re-establish the conditions of an experiment when no such data are available 
(Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000).  
To understand how PSM was employed in this study, assume that Si denotes the water security 
of household i; and that it can take two values; namely Si = 1 if the household is water secure; 
and Si = 0 if the household is water insecure. Further assume that if the i
th
 household is water 
insecure, then its consumption expenditure level is Y0i, which stands for household consumption 
expenditure when S = 0. If household is water secure, then its consumption expenditure is Y1i. 
Therefore, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on the whole sample is estimated as follows: 
ATE = E[Δi] = E[Y1i -Y0i] 
                     = E[Y1i -Y0i ׀Si=1] Pr(Si=1) + E[Y1i -Y0i ׀Si=1] Pr(Si=0)   [7] 
 Where: E[Δi] is the expected impact on household i; Pr is the probability, and other variables are 
as defined above. The ATE is the weighted average, which tells us what the expected effect of 
the water security would be on average consumption expenditure level for the entire population 
(Cobb-Clark and Crossley, 2003).  
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The interest of this study, however, was to evaluate the impact of water security on those 
households that are actually water secure. The focus is on estimating the Average Treatment 
effect on the Treated (ATT), the expected treatment effect over the sample of water secure 
irrigation participants, which is estimated as follows:  
ATT = E[Δi׀Si=1] = E[Y1i,t ׀Si=1] – E[Y0i,t ׀Si=1]       [8] 
Where: E[Δ׀Si=1] is the expected treatment effect; E[Yi1׀Si=1] is the average expenditure of 
water secure irrigators, and E[Yi0׀Si=1] is the average expenditure of the water secure 
households had they not been water secure. The ATT tells us what change in consumption 
expenditure (outcome) was realized by those households which are water secure subject to their 
water security status.  
Since the consumption expenditure level of water secure households if they were not insecure 
cannot be observed, the missing data was generated using the propensity score procedure (Baker, 
2000; Ravallion, 2008; Gebregziabher et al., 2009). Propensity scoring uses survey data to 
construct a comparison group by matching water secure households to insecure households from 
the community population over a set of socio-economic variables such as education level, 
gender, age, family size, etc. Estimating the propensity score, which is simply the probability 
that a household is water secure, is a crucial step in using matching as an evaluation strategy. 
The probit model, as specified in equation 3 (Section 3.4.3) was used to generate the propensity 
scores. The explanatory variables were the farmer characteristics such as gender, education level, 
agricultural training, access to extension, credit, etc.  
An estimate of the propensity score is not enough to estimate ATT as the probability of 
observing two units with exactly the same value of the propensity score is, in principle, zero 
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). As such, various matching algorithms have been proposed in the 
literature to determine the region of common support, and the most widely used are the nearest 
neighbour matching, radius matching, Kernel matching, and stratification matching (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005). The nearest neighbour matching and Kernel matching 
were used in this study. The nearest neighbour was chosen because it is generally used in 
practice due to its ease of implementation, while Kernel matching is a recently developed 
technique that is gaining popularity in non-experimental literature (Smith and Todd, 2005; 
Dillon, 2011).  
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The main advantage of the matching method is that it does not rely on a specific functional form 
of the outcome, thereby avoiding linearity imposition, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity 
issues (Cuong, 2007). Therefore, PSM was also used to evaluate the impact of irrigation 
participation on household welfare to provide robust checks on the results of the treatment effect 
regression model discussed earlier. To evaluate irrigation impact using PSM, the same approach 
as outlined above was followed, with irrigation participation replacing water security as a binary 
treatment; irrigators becoming the treatment group while non-irrigating households were the 
control group. PSM was estimated using Stata ado files created by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
The major limitation of the PSM method is its reliance on the degree to which observed 
characteristics derive irrigation participation (Khandker et al., 2010). Selection on unobservable 
characteristics violates PSM’s conditional independence assumption, resulting in unreliable 
estimates (Khandker et al., 2010). As such, the treatment effect model was also done to evaluate 
the impact of water security on household welfare. In conclusion, the two impact evaluation 
methods were used in evaluating both the impact of irrigation and the impact of water security on 
household welfare for triangulation purposes.  
3.6 Summary 
The Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme is located in Msinga local municipality in KwaZulu-Natal 
Province on both banks of the Tugela River. Primary data were collected using a structured 
questionnaire; administered using a stratified random sampling technique. Data were analysed 
using descriptive statistics and econometric techniques. Descriptive statistics involved t-tests, χ
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tests and the FGT poverty indices. Different econometric methods (such as the treatment effect 
model, PCA, OLS, and PSM) were used in this study. The impact of irrigation participation and 
water security on household welfare was examined using both the treatment effect model and the 
PSM method. These two econometric approaches have their own limitations, and the use of both 
methods is to provide robustness checks on the results. PCA was used to generate the water 
security index while OLS was used to estimate the determinants of water security. The irrigation 
impact results from these different estimation methods are presented in the next chapter, while 




CHAPTER 4 IRRIGATION IMPACT RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main findings of the study concerning irrigation impact on 
household welfare. The results presented in this chapter seek to achieve the first objective 
of the study, which is to evaluate the impact of the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme on 
household welfare
2
. The treatment effect model was used to achieve this objective, while 
the PSM method was used to provide robustness checks of the treatment effect model. 
Before presenting the econometric results, however, the next section describes the main 
characteristics of the sample. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
4.2.1 Household demographics and socio-economic characteristics 
The total number of households that were interviewed is 256, comprising of 70 non-
irrigators and 186 irrigators. However, 5 households were discarded in the final sample 
for analysis due to missing information. The total sample size analysed was thus 251, 
comprising of 65 non-irrigators and 185 irrigators. Descriptive analyses of both 
continuous and categorical variables indicated that there were no significant differences 
between the irrigators and non-irrigators in terms of their demographics. The results of 
descriptive analyses are presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Table 4.1 presents the 
results from continuous variables while Table 4.2 presents the results from categorical 
variables.  
The t-test results, presented in Table 4.1, indicate that there were no statistically 
significant differences between household age, household size and education levels. 
Since these households are from one community, it is expected that their demographics 
do not vary significantly. The age statistics for both groups suggest an ageing farmer 
population, with the much younger generation moving to more lucrative and higher 
                                                 
2
 A more condensed version of this chapter, entitled: The impact of smallholder irrigation on household 
welfare: The case of Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, was submitted to the 
Water SA journal and is under review 
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paying ventures in the non-farm sectors. Discussions with the farmers indicated that the 
youths were shunning the agricultural sector because it is less paying compared to other 
sectors. 
Table 4.1 Continuous variables description 
Variable definition Non-irrigators 
(N=65) 
Irrigators (N=186) T-test 
 Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  
Household age (years) 58.55 16.08 56.88 12.83 0.84 
Household size in numbers 5.98 3.14 6.30 2.69 -0.77 
Household size in adult 
equivalents 
4.34 2.24 4.84 2.20 -1.59 
Education level in years 2.48 3.85 2.32 3.64 0.30 
Total land size (ha) 0.59 0.73 0.24 0.15 6.16*** 
Non-irrigated land size (ha) 0.61 0.72 0.03 0.08 10.77*** 
Value of assets (Rands) 66950.38 114753 135186.8 1028149 -0.53 
Livestock units in TLU 3.18 4.99 3.22 9.76 -0.03 
Off-farm income (Rands) 42332.84 28465.19 36333.66 44701.01 1.01 
Farm income (Rands) 321.46 806.98 15341.31 9191.28 -13.1*** 
Food expenditure (Rands) 3484.42 1999.79 4631.23 3002.47 -2.86*** 
Nonfood expenditure (Rands) 642.11 879.48 1345.14 1326.01 -3.98*** 
Total expenditure (Rands) 4126.53 2368.14 5976.37 3862.35 -3.63*** 
Share of food expenditure 
(%) 
0.87 0.14 0.79 0.13 -4.15*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
Irrigators were found to have bigger families (both in numbers and adult equivalents) 
compared to non-irrigators, indicating a high labour demand for irrigation farming. 
However, the difference in household sizes between irrigators and non-irrigators was not 
significant. The results in Table 4.1 also indicate that the respondents had not achieved 
higher levels of education, with an average of below 3 years of education for both 
irrigators and non-irrigators. Although there was no statistically significant difference 
between the educational level of irrigators and non-irrigators, discussions with the 
farmers indicated that more household members of irrigators are educated compared to 
non-irrigators. This result, consistent with Tesfaye et al. (2008), suggests that money 
from irrigation is also being invested in services such as education for children. The 
irrigators reported that even though their welfare may not seem to have improved after 
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they joined the irrigation scheme, they had managed to educate their children. “My 
lifestyle has not changed much now that I have a plot. But all my kids are educated”, 
reported one farmer with a sense of achievement. 
Generally, there were high levels of illiteracy in the study area as highlighted by 
Dearlove (2007), while there were no statistically significant differences between 
irrigators and non-irrigators. Descriptive analyses, presented in Table 4.2, indicated that a 
high proportion of the farmers (65%) had never attended school, with only about 35% 
having attended school for at least a year. This percentage of illiterate people is close to 
that reported by Dearlove (2007), who reported that illiteracy is about 68% in Msinga. 
However, it is less than the above 80% illiteracy rate reported by Mnkeni et al. (2010). 
The difference could be attributed to different ways illiteracy was measured. Whereas 
Mnkeni et al. (2010) looked at the ability to read and write in defining illiteracy, this 
study defined illiterate farmers as those who never attended school. It is possible that 
some farmers who attended school for a year or two may still be unable to read or write, 
hence Mnkeni et al. (2010)’s higher illiteracy figure. 
In terms of land endowment, Table 4.1 show small land holdings for irrigators compared 
to non-irrigators. Whereas irrigators had an average of only 0.24 ha plot sizes per 
individual household, the non-irrigators operated on average about 0.6 ha per household. 
This implies that the land intensive nature of irrigation farming is such that irrigators 
have to operate less land, while the non-irrigators need to put more land under cultivation 
to cater for the extensive and risky nature of dry-land farming. Compared to non-
irrigators, the irrigators can achieve a given welfare level from a smaller land as irrigation 
access enhances land productivity. The results also show that irrigators operated small 
non-irrigated land (0.03 ha). In fact, a number of irrigators operated no non-irrigated land 
at all. This is particularly true of those farmers who stay in areas closer to the irrigation 
scheme. The demand for land near the scheme is high, such that outside irrigated land, 
farmers only have their yards with very small extra land. Otherwise, most of the land near 
the irrigation scheme is irrigated. However, the situation is different when one moves 
further away from the scheme, where some irrigators do operate about 0.5 ha of non-
irrigated land.  
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Irrigators had far higher farm income compared to non-irrigators. This statistically 
significant difference indicates that access irrigation improves the opportunities for 
farmers to engage in profitable farming activities. Farming contributes modestly to the 
total household incomes in the area, contributing only about 15%. This percentage is less 
but close to the 18% reported by Dearlove (2007) as contribution of farming to income in 
the Msinga area. Irrigators had more assets and bigger livestock sizes compared to non-
irrigators. However, these differences are not significant. Although non-irrigators had 
higher off-farm income compared to irrigators, this difference was also not significant. 
This difference in off-farm income does suggest that the high labour demands of 
irrigation limits irrigators from looking for other opportunities of augmenting household 
income.  
Irrigators, on the other hand, had far higher farm income compared to non-irrigators. This 
statistically significant difference indicates how the climatic conditions hinder rain-fed 
crop production in the study area, and the farm income of non-irrigators is mainly from 
livestock production. It must be highlighted, however, that farming contributes modestly 
to the total incomes in the area, contributing on average about 15%. This percentage is 
less but close to the 18% reported by Dearlove (2007) as contribution of farming to 
income in the Msinga area. Table 4.1 also indicates that irrigators’ welfare status was 
generally above that of non-irrigators as shown by their statistically significantly higher 
(by 45%) total expenditures per adult equivalent. There were statistically significant 
differences between irrigators and non-irrigators in terms of both food and non-food 
consumption. Non-irrigators spend much of their income on food, with food expenses 
contributing an average of 87% of total consumption expenditure. 
Women play a dominant role in both irrigation and non-irrigation farming, as shown by 
percentages presented in Table 4.2. The table above indicates that the majority (65.15%) 
of the households were female-headed, which supports the widely encountered 





Table 4.2 Categorical variables description 








Household head sex 0=female 65.15       66.84       0.063 
1=male 34.85 33.16 
Household marital 
status 
1=single 13.64       12.30       1.06 
2=married 50.00        57.22        
3=divorced 4.55       3.74       
4=widowed 31.82 26.74 
Household main 
religion 
0=no religion 7.58       5.38       1.49 
1=traditional 36.36       35.48       
2=Christian 56.06        57.53        
3=Muslim 0.00 1.61 
Literacy 0= illiterate 66.15 63.98 0.0996 
1=literate  33.85 36.02  
Access to extension 
services 
0=no 64.62       29.07       25.82*** 
1=yes 35.38 70.97 
Access to credit 0=no 76.92       65.78       2.7852* 
1=yes 23.08 34.22 
Access to good roads 0=no 69.23      46.24       10.21*** 
1=yes 30.77 53.76 
Training 0=no 90.77        88.17       0.3278 
1=yes 9.23 11.83 
Perception of land 
quality 
0=bad 30.77       12.85       25.53*** 
1=good 32.31       44.18       
2=very good 36.92 42.97 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
Most of the farmers were married and were of the Christian persuasion, with no 
statistically significant difference between irrigators and non-irrigators. Table 4.2 also 
indicates that there was a statistically significant difference between the support services 
that irrigators get compared to non-irrigators. The majority of the irrigators reported that 
they had access to extension, credit and good roads while the majority of the non-
irrigators had none. The pressure on the government to ensure that projects do not fail 
results in that skewed distribution of support to irrigators. Also, irrigators perceived their 




Descriptive analysis presented above highlights the fact that although the irrigators and 
non-irrigators have the same demographic patterns, the welfare of the irrigators is higher 
than that of non-irrigators. The question, then, is to what extent is the welfare difference 
between irrigators and non-irrigators as a result of irrigation participation and not of other 
factors? The econometric analyses presented in the following sections seek to answer this 
pertinent question. Before the econometric analyses, however, the next section presents 
results from FGT poverty analysis. 
4.2.2 FGT poverty indices according to irrigation access and gender 
The FGT poverty indices also indicated that the irrigators are better-off than non-
irrigators in terms of welfare. Table 4.3 indicates that poverty incidence is higher among 
non-irrigators compared to irrigators, with 75% of non-irrigators in the study area 
classified as poor compared to 55% of irrigators.  
Table 4.3 FGT poverty indices according to irrigation status 
FGT poverty index Non-irrigators Irrigators Total sample 
Poverty headcount index (α=0) 0.75 0.55 0.61 
Poverty gap index (α=1) 0.31 0.16 0.20 
Squared poverty gap index (α=2) 0.17 0.06 0.09 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
However, poverty incidence was generally high across the whole sample, i.e., even 
among irrigators. The study area experiences high levels of poverty as shown by high 
(60%) poverty incidence. The results are consistent with studies such as Hussain et al. 
(2006) and Namara et al. (2008). For example, Hussain et al. (2006) found that poverty 
incidence was 37% among non-irrigators compared to 29% among irrigators in Pakistan. 
These figures are lower than the ones reported here, highlighting the fact that poverty 
levels are lower in Pakistan compared to South Africa. Namara et al. (2008), on the other 
hand, found poverty incidences of 58.5% among irrigators and 77.1% among non-
irrigators. The study also found that the incidence of poverty among the sample 
households was still higher (58.5%) irrespective of access to irrigation. Comparisons of 




Table 4.3 also indicates that the depth and severity of poverty was higher among the non-
irrigators than among irrigators. The poverty gap index, a measure of depth of poverty, is 
31% for non-irrigators and 16% for irrigators. This implies that the current consumption 
level of the poor non-irrigators would have to increase by 31% to lift them out of poverty. 
On the other hand, the poor irrigators need their consumption level to be increased by 
only 16% to lift their consumption level above the poverty line. The squared poverty gap 
index (poverty severity) indicates that inequality among the poor is higher for non-
irrigators than it is for irrigators. The poverty gap index also shows that the consumption 
level of the poor in the study area needs to be increased by 20% to lift them out of 
poverty. The small poverty gap index square (9%) implies that inequality among the poor 
is generally low in the study area.  
The analysis of the FGT poverty indices indicates that although poverty is prevalent for 
both groups, it is more pronounced among non-irrigators. Figure 4.1 shows poverty 
incidence at different poverty lines according to irrigation access.  
 
Figure 4.1 Poverty incidence at different poverty lines according to irrigation access 



























The preceding figure indicates that the irrigators generally have lower poverty incidence 
levels compared to non-irrigators at different poverty lines assumptions. One important 
aspect of any project impact evaluation is the determination of the gender implications of 
the project. Further FGT poverty analysis indicated that, contrary to general opinion, 
poverty was more pronounced among male-headed households than it is among female-
headed households. Table 4.4 presents FGT poverty measures according to gender. 
Table 4.4 FGT poverty indices according to household head gender 
FGT poverty index Female Male Total sample 
Poverty headcount index (α=0) 0.58 0.65 0.61 
Poverty gap index (α=1) 0.19 0.21 0.20 
Squared poverty gap index (α=2) 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
As shown in Table 4.4, 58% of the female-headed households were classified as poor 
while 65% of the male-headed households were classified as poor. An explanation here 
could be that most rural development interventions target women, leading to more 
poverty reduction among female-headed households than in male-headed households. 
Table 4.4 also indicates that poverty is deeper among male-headed households than in 
female-headed households. The poverty gap index implies that the consumption 
expenditure of female-headed will have to be increased by 19% to take them out of 
poverty, while that of the poorest male-headed will have to be increased by 21% to take 
them out of poverty. The poverty incidence curves presented in Figure 4.2 indicate that 
although poverty incidence fluctuates at low poverty lines, female-headed households 




Figure 4.2 Poverty incidence at different poverty lines according to household head 
gender 
Source: Household survey 
However, the difference is small, as highlighted by the closeness of the two poverty 
curves. This implies that poverty incidence is to a large extent gender neutral in the 
Msinga area. The next section provides econometric models that were used to determine 
the extent to which irrigation increases household consumption. 
4.3 Empirical results 
The treatment effect model was used to evaluate the impact of access to irrigation on 
household consumption expenditure. The first stage of the treatment effect model 
involved estimating the participation model and the results are presented in the next sub-
section. The outcome model, the second stage of the treatment effect model, was 
estimated and the results are presented in the subsequent sub-section. The last sub-section 

























4.3.1 Factors influencing participation in irrigation  
The binary probit model was estimated to determine the household characteristics and 
resource endowments that predict household’s participation in irrigation farming. Table 
4.5 (overleaf) presents the results of the binary probit model. The results indicate that, 
collectively, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant since the LR statistic 
has a p-value less than 1%. The pseudo R
2
 value is about 60% which is high for cross 
sectional data. The model also correctly predicted about 91% of the cases, confirming 
that the model fits the data well. 
The results show that factors such as land size, perceived soil fertility, household size, 
and access to support services (such as market and extension services) are significant 
determinants of irrigation participation. Accordingly, as the size of land operated by a 
household increases, the chances of being an irrigator decline by about 31%. This implies 
that irrigators tend to intensify their farming, while rain-fed farmers try to put more land 
under cultivation. This is in line with previous studies (e.g., Tesfaye et al., 2008; Dillon, 
2011). The results also indicate that the perceived quality of land has a positive influence 
on irrigation participation. Those farmers who perceived their soil fertility to be good had 
a 21% more chance of being irrigators than those who felt that their soils are infertile. 
This result is not unexpected, as irrigation comes at a cost such that only those farmers 
with good land quality expecting better yield would engage in irrigation farming. This is 
consistent with results from Bacha et al (2011) and Tesfaye et al. (2008). 
Increasing household size was found to increase the probability of practicing irrigation 
farming. A unit increase in household size in adult equivalents results in an increase in 
the probability of irrigation participation of 7%. Increasing family size implies 
availability of cheap labour, hence the higher chances that the household will participate 
in irrigation farming. However, the relationship between household size and irrigation 
participation is not linear but inverted U-shaped, as shown by the negative coefficient of 
household size square. This implies that although increasing family size increases the 




Table 4.5 Determinants of irrigation participation: Probit regression results 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Value Std. error Value Std. error 
Value of assets (Rands) -8.86E-07 8.07E-07 -1.11E-07 9.98E-08 
Off-farm income (Rands) -7.10E-06 8.54E-06 -9.34E-07 1.07E-06 
Land size (ha) -2.414*** 0.744 -0.31*** 0.0879 
Soil fertility (1=Good, 0=Bad) 1.654*** 0.402 0.208*** 0.0435 
Livestock size in TLU -0.0063 0.014 -0.00082 0.00175 
Age 0.095 0.076 0.011 0.00959 
Age square -0.00084 0.00063 -0.0001 7.93E-05 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.154 0.305 -0.016 0.0386 
Education level (years in school) -0.038 0.048 -0.0052 0.0061 
Household size in adult equivalents 0.588*** 0.211 0.074*** 0.0253 
Household size square -0.039** 0.016 -0.005** 0.00196 
Access to grant (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.667 0.633 0.077 0.0801 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.443 0.316 -0.058 0.0400 
Market access (1=Yes, 0=No) 1.926*** 0.402 0.243*** 0.0413 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.938*** 0.341 0.121*** 0.0411 
Access to roads (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.388 0.318 0.048 0.0398 
Access to training (1=Yes, 1=No) -0.131 0.527 -0.018 0.0675 
Married (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) -0.120 0.484 -0.021 0.0609 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) 0.526 0.326 0.066 0.0406 
Distance from scheme (km) -0.114*** 0.026 -0.014*** 0.0029 
Constant -5.471** 2.498   
     
Correctly predicted 90.8    
LR χ
2
(19) 172.26***      
Pseudo R
2
 0.5999       
N 251    
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
Irrigation farming can only absorb a certain amount of labour, and increasing family size 
beyond that reduces labour returns, hence bigger families tend to look for other 
opportunities that have higher returns for their labour. The results also show that 
perceived access to the market increases the likelihood of households participating in 
irrigation farming. The farmers who reported that the market is easily accessible to them 
have a 24% chance of being irrigators than those who reported otherwise. As irrigation is 
meant to enhance productivity and marketable surplus, it is not surprising that those 
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farmers with better market access are more likely to participate in irrigation schemes. 
Access to extension services also improves the likelihood of irrigation participation, and 
extension officers are more visible in irrigation projects. Farmers who reported contact 
with extension officers have a 12% chance of irrigating than those who reported 
otherwise. This result is consistent with findings by Gebregziabher et al. (2009).  
The positive relationship between support services and irrigation can also be viewed as 
the tendency of government support to be concentrated to those households engaged in 
projects, a common practice by the South African government. Such an effort is rare in 
rain-fed smallholder agriculture. In Tugela Ferry, the Department of Agriculture is 
located right next to the irrigation scheme, making it more convenient to offer support 
services to the irrigators compared to the distant non-irrigators. This focus on farmers in 
projects has resulted in government support benefiting few people. As explained by Hall 
and Aliber (2010), the problem in South Africa has not been lack of support by the 
government, but the uneven distribution of that support to the farmers. However, it 
should also be highlighted that access to services by irrigators is also due to their 
entrepreneurship or initiatives. In reality, being an irrigator enhances entrepreneurship of 
the farmers. Irrigators take initiatives and try to find new markets and make follow ups to 
government institutions such as extension offices to get service, a practice not common 
among non-irrigators.  
As expected, distance of farmer’s homestead from the irrigation scheme had a negative 
influence on the farmer being an irrigator. Nearness to the scheme implies less time taken 
to the scheme, and ensures ease of management. Since the bulk of the farmers walk to the 
scheme, then the closer the farmer is to the scheme, the higher his/her chance of being an 
irrigator. Although not statistically significant, the negative sign on gender highlights that 
female-headed households are more likely to participate in irrigation farming than male-
headed households. This suggests that men have more opportunities in other sectors than 
women. Education had a negative but non-significant relationship with irrigation 
participation, suggesting that the educated people have higher opportunities elsewhere 
than the uneducated. 
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4.3.2 Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: Treatment model results 
Table 4.6 shows the results from the second stage of the treatment effect model and OLS. 
Although previous studies (e.g., Bacha et al., 2011; Tesfaye et al., 2008) have highlighted 
the likely endogeneity between irrigation participation and consumption expenditure, the 
Hausman test (F=0.74, p=0.39) indicated that there was no evidence of endogeneity 
between the two variables at the conventional 10% significance level in this study. Thus, 
OLS was used in the second stage of the treatment effect model as it results in consistent 
and unbiased estimates. Household distance from the scheme, although included in the 
selection equation, was excluded in the second stage of the treatment effect model to 
satisfy the condition for precise estimation of the coefficients.  
The insignificant rho in the treatment effect model indicates that there is no evidence of 
selection bias at the conventional 10% significance level. These findings demonstrate the 
possible insignificant effect of unobservable factors on household consumption 
expenditure per adult equivalent. The insignificant rho implies that those farmers who 
select into the irrigation sample have no higher welfare relative to those with average 
characteristics drawn at random from the population. Therefore, the OLS results in Table 
4.6 presented for comparison purposes are consistent and unbiased, and are close to those 
estimated using the treatment effect model.  
Henceforth, explanations concentrate on the treatment effect model results, although the 
same explanations do apply to the OLS results. The treatment effect model fits the data 
very well, as indicated by the high χ
2
 and pseudo R
2
 values. The Stata software program 
automatically corrects the standard errors (for heteroskedasticity) of the treatment effect 
model. The estimated coefficients are, therefore, unbiased and consistent, while the 
standard errors are efficient. Whereas the treatment effect model results presented in 
Table 4.6 are estimated using the full information maximum likelihood, the two-step 
model results are presented in Appendix F. As expected, the standard errors of the full 
information maximum likelihood estimators were generally smaller than those of the 




Table 4.6 Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: Treatment effect model 
and OLS results 
 Variable Treatment effect 
model 
OLS model 
 Coef.   Std. 
err 
 Coef. Std.  
err 
Constant 7552.6*** 2120.9 7383.5*** 2199.9 
Value of assets (Rands) 0.00014 0.0008 0.00011 0.0008 
Off-farm income (Rands) 0.019** 0.009 0.018* 0.0094 
Land size (Ha) 722.49* 387.45 639.45* 386.56 
Soil fertility (1=Good, 0=Poor) 138.78 478.61 246.87 475.03 
Livestock size in TLU 26.99* 16.01 26.65 16.69 
Age 37.87 71.17 43.76 73.79 
Age square 0.015 0.616 -0.037 0.638 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -278.01 314.68 -289.23 327.96 
Education level (Years in school) 102.03** 42.71 100.87** 44.54 
Household size in adult equivalents -2529.8*** 230.8 -2504*** 237.90 
Household size square 148.60*** 18.10 147.13*** 18.77 
Access to welfare grant (1=Yes, 0=No) -358.33 655.07 -360.63 683.53 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 503.15* 313.11 485.02 325.69 
Market access (1=Yes, 0=No) 185.74 387.08 306.67 365.24 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 672.34** 336.48 715.47** 345.68 
Agricultural training (1=Yes, 0=No) 883.48* 455.59 874.44* 475.21 
Access to good roads (1=Yes, 0=No) 1655.4*** 313.45 1684.6*** 324.41 
Married (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) 1.427 447.13 3.47 466.56 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) -83.21 299.06 -58.49 310.06 
Irrigation (1=Irrigator, 0=Non-irrigator) 2216.14*** 622.97 1888*** 451.31 
     
/athrho -0.119 0.164 - - 
/lnsigma 7.674*** 0.045 - - 
Wald Chi
2
(39)/F-test  452.69***   21.08***  
Adj R
2
 -  0.62  
N 251  251  
rho -0.11858 0.1615   
sigma 2151.251 96.471   
lambda -255.088 348.84   
     





p = 0.50 
   
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
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The results indicate that irrigation access significantly increases household consumption 
per adult equivalent as shown by a positive estimated coefficient of irrigation access with 
a p-value less than 1%. Access to irrigation enabled farmers in the study area to practice 
double cropping, and also grow crops such as cabbages and potatoes commercially. As a 
result, the irrigators were able to generate more money and achieve higher consumption 
expenditure compared to their non-irrigating counter parts. The consumption expenditure 
per adult equivalent per year of an irrigator was R2,216.14 more than that of a non-
irrigator, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(e.g., Tesfaye et al., 2008; Gebregziabher et al., 2009; Bacha et al., 2011; Kuwornu and 
Owusu, 2012). The conclusion here is that even though smallholder irrigation has 
admittedly failed in South Africa as many schemes have collapsed after government 
withdrawals, those irrigation schemes that remain operational are playing an important 
role in rural poverty reduction. 
The other factors that influenced household consumption were off-farm income, land 
size, livestock size, education level, family size and access to support services and 
infrastructure (such as credit, extension services, agricultural training and good roads). In 
line with expectations, access to more land increases household welfare in the rural areas. 
The households are dependent upon agricultural activity for their livelihood, and more 
land implies more opportunities of improving production. 
The positive sign on livestock size implies that having more livestock gives the 
households an opportunity to sell during periods of shock. Livestock production is an 
important livelihood strategy in the Msinga area. Farmers, particularly the non-irrigators, 
depend heavily on livestock production for their household welfare. Livestock are kept 
for both food consumption and are sold during the lean periods of the household. The 
results also support a widely held view that education is critical in the fight against 
poverty. Additional years of schooling of the household head were found to be positively 
related with consumption expenditure. Education implies more opportunities of 
generating income, and also implies better understanding of new and improved farming 
technologies. This result is consistent with findings from Namara et al. (2008) and 
Tekana and Oladele (2011). 
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As expected, households with many members consumed less per adult equivalent than 
those with fewer members. The relationship between family size and household total 
consumption expenditure was non-linearly, indicating that as the family size increases, 
the welfare of a family decreases but only up to a certain point. The U-shaped 
relationship between welfare and family size implies that beyond a certain point, welfare 
increases with increasing family size. This may be due to the labour-intensive nature of 
farming. Beyond a certain point, increasing labour within a household enables 
agricultural intensification. This result is consistent with findings from Bacha et al. 
(2011) and Kuwornu and Owusu (2012). 
Access to support services and infrastructure (such as credit, extension, agricultural 
training and good road network) played an important role in improving household 
welfare. Those households with access to these services and infrastructure consumed 
more than those without. The farmers indicated that they use credit to buy agricultural 
inputs and sometimes for meeting family emergencies. Access to credit support also 
ensures that farmers can secure inputs in time. This leads to improved agricultural output, 
resulting in increased farm revenues. Extension services imply access to new 
technologies which help improve agricultural production, while access to agricultural 
training improves farmers’ skills. Most of the farmers in the scheme use only trial and 
error, and those who have received some form of training are better-off as they would put 
these into use.  
As expected, access to a good road network has a positive impact on household food 
security. Those households connected by good road networks have better opportunities 
than those connected with poor roads. Good road network implies ease of accessing main 
market centres such as the Tugela Ferry town or Greytown. Due to the rugged 
topography of the Msinga municipal area, certain areas are relatively isolated from the 
main centres and the farmers struggle to access potential markets and other services. The 
above empirical model results have indicated that the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme has 
significantly improved household welfare. However, the results of the treatment effect 
model are only robust if the normality assumption is met. To support the treatment effect 
results and provide a robustness check, the PSM model which is non-parametric was 
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estimated. No impact evaluation technique is perfect, and it is, therefore, always desirable 
to triangulate (Baker, 2000). 
4.3.3 Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: PSM results 
Since there is no evidence of selection bias due to unobservables as indicated by the 
insignificant rho in the treatment effect model, the PSM method would result in unbiased 
and robust impact estimates. The balancing property was selected in estimating 
propensity scores. The use of the balancing property ensures that a comparison group is 
constructed with observable characteristics distributed equivalently across quintiles in 
both the treatment and comparison groups (Smith and Todd, 2005). In constructing the 
matching estimates, the common support was imposed. Heckman et al. (1997) 
encouraged dropping treatment observations with weak common support as inferences 
can be made about causality only in the area of common support. All standard errors were 
bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions following Smith and Todd (2005) and Dillon (2011).  
Two matching methods, the nearest neighbour and Kernel matching methods were used 
to estimate the impact. Comparing results across different matching methods can reveal 
whether the estimated project effect is robust (Khandker et al., 2010). PSM results 
presented in Table 4.7 support the conclusion that irrigation access does improve 
household expenditure, indicating that irrigators spend between R2,170 and R2,301 more 
than the non-irrigators depending on the matching method used. Detailed PSM results are 
attached as Appendices G, H and I. 
Table 4.7 Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 186 20 2301.12 (851.75) 2.702*** 
Kernel matching method 186 40 2170.31 (612.96) 3.541*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
The preceding table indicates that both the nearest neighbour and Kernel matching 
methods point to the fact that irrigation access has a significant effect on household 
welfare. The nearest neighbour matching method identified 20 matching households as 
79 
 
control, and concluded that irrigation access results in an increase of about R2,301 in 
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent per year over that of non-irrigators. The 
Kernel matching method, on the other hand, identified 40 matching households as 
control, and was somewhat conservative compared to the nearest neighbour matching 
method in calculating the impact estimate. The Kernel matching method concluded that 
irrigation access results in a gain of R2,170 in consumption expenditure of the irrigators. 
The PSM, although reporting slightly lower irrigation impact estimates, support the 
conclusion made by the treatment effect model that irrigation access has a significantly 
positive influence on consumption expenditure.  
In conclusion, it is noteworthy mentioning that the OLS and PSM estimates are smaller 
than treatment effect model irrigation impact estimates. The OLS and PSM models do not 
model the possible correlation between the selection and outcome equations, hence they 
underestimate the impact of irrigation on household welfare. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the important results of this study pertaining to the welfare 
impact of the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme. Although the demographic characteristics 
of the farmers were not significantly different, the irrigators were characterized by better 
welfare indicators compared to non-irrigators. The FGT poverty indices also indicated 
that poverty is more pronounced among non-irrigators than among irrigators. However, it 
must be noted that poverty incidence is still high among irrigators as well. The 
econometric models that were used to estimate the impact of irrigation access on welfare 
indicated that access to irrigation improves household welfare. Both the treatment effect 
and PSM methods indicated that irrigators have a significantly higher consumption 
expenditure compared to non-irrigators, highlighting the central role played by irrigation 
access on rural poverty reduction. However, poverty incidence was generally high across 
the whole sample, i.e., even among irrigators, indicating the high levels of poverty 
prevalent in the study area. 
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CHAPTER 5 WATER SECURITY IMPACT RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
Irrigation participation, although one of the important rural development interventions for 
poverty reduction, the previous chapter has supported the view that it is not sufficient. 
There was a high poverty incidence among the irrigators as well. This study hypothesized 
that it is water security, not just irrigation participation, which results in significant 
poverty reduction. The objective of this chapter, therefore, was to investigate this 
hypothesis. Analysis in this chapter involved only the sample of 185 irrigators. The water 
security index was created using PCA while OLS regression model was used to 
determine the factors affecting household water security level. The treatment effect 
regression model was used to evaluate the impact of water security on household welfare, 
with PSM method done for comparison purposes. Before presenting the econometric 
model results, however, the next section presents the key irrigation scheme descriptive 
variables.  
5.2 Description of key socio-economic variables of the irrigators 
Most of the main socio-economic descriptive variables of irrigators have been presented 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and discussed in the preceding chapter. Key points to be 
highlighted from the two tables in the previous chapter is that the irrigators were mainly 
women (66.84%), were generally of old age (mean = 56.88 years), were highly illiterate 
(63.98%), and had very small non-irrigated land (mean = 0.03 ha). Table 5.1 below 
focuses on the key descriptive variables of the irrigators which were not presented in the 
preceding chapter. Before explaining the results presented in Table 5.1, two continuous 
descriptive variables, household distance from the scheme and irrigated land size, are 
discussed.  
Most of the irrigators were situated close to the irrigators, with an average distance of 
3.53 km from the scheme. Some scheme members lived as close as 200 m from the 
scheme, while others stay as far as above 20 km from the scheme. On average, the 
irrigators operated 0.2 ha of irrigated land. This indicates that most farmers still operate 
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the 2 plots that they were initially allocated in the scheme. Whereas some farmers had 
been members of the irrigation for as long as 60 years, others were in their first year. On 
average, farmers had been members of the scheme for about 17 years.  
Table 5.1 Key descriptive variables of irrigators 
Variable Categories Percentage (%) 
Initial plot ownership 1=allocated 37.16 
 2=inherited 33.88 
 3=borrowed or borrowing 26.23 
 4=bought 2.73 
Mode of diverting water 1=gravity 31.89 
 2=electric pump 52.43 
 3=diesel pump 15.68 
Plot geographic location along the primary  1=head  33.70 
canal 2=middle 39.13 
 3=tail  27.17 
Occurrence of conflicts over water 0=rare 12.82 
 1=often  26.92 
 2=always 60.26 
Farmer association member 0=no 19.23 
 1=yes 80.77 
Canal maintenance participation 0=rare 10.26 
 1=sometimes 46.15 
 2=always 43.59 
Scheme management ratings 0=poor 19.78 
 1=average 35.71 
 2=good 44.50 
Scheme management participation 0=no 65.03 
 1=yes 34.97 
Scheme impacted welfare? 0=no 17.03 
 1=yes 82.97 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
Table 5.1 shows that most of the irrigators were either allocated (37.16%) or inherited 
(33.88%) their initial plots in the scheme. Borrowing or leasing (26.23%) were also 
important in ensuring access to the irrigation plots. However, very few (2.75%) farmers 
had bought the plots they were operating. Buying or selling of plots is illegal under the 
traditional land tenure security prevalent in the area, although there is evidence of a small 
informal market for land. The results also demonstrate that the majority (52.43%) of the 
farmers in the scheme depended on the electric pump to divert water to their plots. 
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Farmers in block 4A (the largest with about 1,000 members), and block 7, use electric 
pumps to divert water from the Tugela River to their plots. After the electric pump, 
farmers depend on gravity, while diesel is used by a small number of irrigators. The 
Tugela Ferry irrigation was originally designed to operate using gravity, but pumps had 
to be introduced due to water shortages in those blocks further downstream. The blocks 
still depending on gravity are blocks 1-3 and 5. Discussions with the farmers indicated 
that blocks 3 and 5 face serious water shortages, and only the first two blocks were the 
ones getting adequate water from the original gravity-depended system. 
In terms of geographic location along the primary canals diverting water into the 
respective blocks, most of the irrigators interviewed were located in the middle, while the 
others were either at the head-end or tail-end of the canals. Conflicts among the farmers 
were reported to be very common. Only 12.82% of the farmers felt that occurrence of 
conflicts was rare, while the remainder reported that occurrence of conflicts was 
common. The main cause of conflicts was reported to be over access to water. Those 
farmers on the head-end of the primary canal were reportedly drawing more water than 
their share, resulting in tail-end farmers failing to irrigate even during their turn to 
irrigate. The affected farmers would try to talk with the head-end farmers, leading to 
conflict outbreaks.  
Irrigators using pumps reported that they face water access problems due to frequent 
engine breakdowns, small engine sizes and the rising electricity or diesel costs. Those 
relying on gravity had to contend with the unreliability of the water-flow to their plots. 
The head-end versus tail-end conflict, although generally affecting all the irrigators in the 
scheme, had more negative effects on the gravity-reliant irrigators. Since they do not pay 
for water, it was reportedly difficult for them to fight for their right to the water. 
Although the specific problems vary depending on mode of drawing water, the irrigators 
generally reported that there were water supply and distribution issues that were affecting 
individual irrigators according to their socio-economic circumstances such as gender, 
marital status, age, etc. 
The other major cause of conflicts was reportedly the fact that other farmers would try to 
irrigate ahead of others, not according to the queuing order. The irrigation system is 
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operated on a first-come-first-serve basis, implying that those farmers who would have 
come first ought to irrigate first. However, some farmers were reportedly disregarding 
this rule, causing conflicts as a result. According to women, men have a tendency to 
forcefully irrigate ahead of women even if the women would have come first. The 
patriarchal nature of the area disempowers women, as it is a taboo for women to 
challenge men.  
The farmers, particularly the women, reported that they find solace in working as groups. 
The bulk of the irrigators were members of farmer associations in the scheme. According 
to the farmers, being a member of an association brought the advantage that the members 
would support each when faced with different challenges in the scheme. Being a group 
also was reportedly helping the women’s concerns to be heard and resolved. The 
irrigators also reported that they do participate in clearing logs and grass from the canal at 
least sometimes. Most of the scheme members felt that the management of the scheme 
was average to good, while the majority felt they were not participating in the general 
management activities of the scheme at the scheme level. The majority felt that the 
scheme was playing an important role in their welfare. In light of the issues raised above, 
it is important to empirically determine the factors that influence water security in the 
scheme. To be able to do this, there was a need to generate the water security variable. 
The PCA results for generating the water security index are presented in the next section. 
5.3 The water security index 
The water security index was generated using PCA. The perceptions of farmers relating 
to water security components were ranked using a Likert scale, and PCA used to extract 
the water security index. The sample size of 185 irrigators was considered sufficient 
following Garson (2008)’s rule of 10, which states that there should be at least 10 cases 
for each item in the instrument being used. The components of water security that were 
used to extract the water security index were 12, implying that they needed at least 120 
cases using the rule of 10.  
Six principal components were extracted using polychoric correlations instead of the 
Pearson correlations. Of the six components extracted, only two components that had 
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Eigen values greater than one were retained using the Kaiser criterion. Table 5.2 presents 
the two PCs that were retained, explaining 95.69% of the variance in the data. The first 
PC (PC1) explained 67.79% of the variation, while the second PC (PC2) explained 27.9% 
of the variation. Detailed results are presented in Appendix J. 
Table 5.2 Water security index generation: PCA results 
Variables Principal Components 
  PC1 PC2 
Water reliability 0.6520 -0.3510 
Water consistency 0.7606 -0.3251 
Water sufficiency 0.7289 -0.4980 
Water quantity satisfaction 0.7622 -0.4911 
Water quality satisfaction 0.6564 -0.3695 
Willingness to pay 0.7036 0.4155 
Ability to pay 0.6716 0.5726 
Never failed to pay 0.7238 0.5381 
Will never fail to pay 0.6376 0.6370 
Water use rights security 0.3573 0.0638 
Registered water user 0.4778 0.1486 
Canal maintenance satisfaction 0.5921 -0.1863 
   
Eigen value 5.1297 2.1114 
% of variance explained 67.79 27.90 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
PC1 indicates that almost all the variables are dominant, and they move in the same 
direction. This component indicates that those households which are water secure 
perceived water supply to be reliable, felt that water supply was consistency to their plots, 
were happy with the quantity and quality of water in their plots, were able and willing to 
pay for the water, had never failed to pay and they felt they will never fail to pay for 
water in the future. PC1 indicates that perceived security of rights to water and being a 
registered water user were less dominant among the water security variables. There was 
less variation in the ratings pertaining to water use rights and formal registration, with 
most farmers indicating that they were water secure even though they are not formally 
registered. This implies that the smallholder irrigators do not necessarily need to be 
registered or to be given formal rights to be water secure. The informal traditional 
structures play a huge role in shaping their perceptions of water-use security. PC2 was 
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dominated by the three water security components that spoke of the ability to pay for the 
water. At most, this principal component captures the ability to pay dimension of water 
security, leaving other dimensions. Therefore, PC1 was used to generate the water 
security index because it explained the highest variation (about 68%) and it captured 
most of the water security components. 
5.4 Determinants of perceived water security 
Table 5.3 presents the determinants of perceived water security that were estimated using 
OLS. The water security index generated using PCA was the dependent variable. The 
model fits data very well, as indicated by a highly significant F value. An R
2
 value of 
0.43 is considered relatively high for cross sectional data. Heteroskedasticity was 
remedied by use of robust standard errors. The model had no problem of 
multicollinearity, as it had a low average variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.26. The 
Ramsey’s RESET test indicated that the model had no omitted variables (See Appendix 
K, for detailed model results and model diagnostics). Therefore, the OLS model’s 
estimated coefficients are unbiased, consistent and efficient.  
The results indicate that factors such age, income, duration of scheme membership, 
occurrence of conflicts, method of pumping water, location in the scheme and access to 
agricultural training influenced irrigators’ perceived water security level. The results 
indicate that age plays a positive role in determining the perceived water security level of 
the irrigators. Age speaks of experience and wisdom in handling the water challenges and 
conflicts in the scheme, hence its positive influence on perceived water security. 
As expected, having more off-farm income increased perceived water security. More off-
income implies the ability to pay for water without failure, thus improving water security 
especially in those blocks that pay for water. In blocks where water is being paid for, 
paying for water is a pre-requisite for the irrigators to receive water to their plots. 
Therefore, having higher off-income serves to guarantee that even when irrigation 





Table 5.3 Determinants of water security: OLS results 
Variable Coefficients 
 Value Std. Err. 
Age (years) 0.01441** 0.00721 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) 0.09926 0.16391 
Marital status (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) 0.02035 0.25851 
Education level (Years of schooling) -0.0281 0.02625 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) 0.12199 0.15988 
Value of assets (Rands) 1.41E-08 1.24E-07 
Livestock size in TLUs -0.0053 0.00514 
Off-farm income (Rands) 1.5E-05*** 3.47E-06 
Irrigated land size (ha) 0.15253 0.89518 
Distance from scheme (km) -0.0054 0.01733 
Duration of scheme membership (years) -0.0176*** 0.0055 
Occurrence of conflicts (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.6469*** 0.15561 
Participation in canal maintenance (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.23197 0.20104 
Farmer association member (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.38608** 0.1599 
Scheme management participation (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.1748 0.1489 
Pump_1 (1=Electric pump, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 0.63564*** 0.179 
Pump_2 (1=Diesel, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 0.45794** 0.22428 
Location along the canal_1 (1=Head, 0=Middle or otherwise) 0.631*** 0.17237 
Location along the canal_2 (1=Tail, 0=Middle or otherwise) -0.3943** 0.18807 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.27079 0.18371 
Access to agricultural training (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.5988*** 0.20845 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.2139 0.18491 
Constant 1.25059** 0.51775 
F( 22, 162) 11.98***  
R
2
 0.43  
N 185  
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
Occurrence of conflicts in water distribution was also a significant factor that reduced the 
perceived water security levels of the irrigators. Those farmers who reported that they 
had encountered conflicts in their blocks felt less water secure than those without 
conflicts. Some upper-end farmers were reportedly blocking water from flowing 
downstream in the canal until they are done with irrigating themselves. This is not only a 
major cause of conflicts, but also a critical determinant of water insecurity in the Tugela 
Ferry irrigation scheme.  
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Contrary to apriori expectations, the duration of scheme membership in years had a 
negative influence on water security. One would have expected that those farmers who 
have been members of the scheme would have learnt some strategies of ensuring water 
security to their plots. Multicollinearity was shown to be not the problem, as the VIF was 
only 1.35 and the scheme membership duration variable was not correlated with age as 
suspected. The negative influence of duration of scheme membership may be explained 
as indicating that the farmers who have had the experience of going through all the water 
problems that have befallen the scheme members in the past have developed pessimism 
regarding water security in the scheme. Water supply has been relatively reliable in 
recent years, particularly after the introduction of pumps for the other blocks, hence the 
optimism of the new comers. 
The mode by which water is channelled to farmer’s plots also played a significant role in 
determining the perceived water security level of the farmers. There was a significant 
difference between the farmers using an electric pump than those using gravity. The 
irrigators using diesel pump also felt they were more water secure compared to gravity-
fed irrigators. The level of organization and farmers’ active participation in the blocks 
with motorized pumps implies that they perceive themselves to be more water secure 
than the gravity irrigators. The farmers using gravity, because they do not pay for water, 
are limited in terms of demanding water when it does not reach their plots, resulting to 
their vulnerability to water insecurity. Block 5, a block using gravity, for instance, was 
largely uncultivated in the past year because water did not reach the block. There was 
limited activity in block 3 as well, another block using gravity.  
It must be highlighted, however, that this should not be taken as a contradiction to Van 
Averbeke (2012)’s conclusions that gravity-fed schemes are less likely to collapse after 
government withdrawal compared to motorized schemes. Whereas the farmers may feel 
that they are less water secure under gravity-fed systems, the low cost of maintaining 
gravity-based irrigation systems results in their sustainability in the long-run. This is, of 
course, at the expense of the investment incentives of the farmers. The argument here is 
that in terms of poverty reduction effectiveness, it is more preferable that household 
water security be established in irrigation schemes. This calls for ways of the encouraging 
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farmer initiative and active participation in the gravity-fed systems to improve their sense 
of water security. 
In line with expectations, geographic location in the scheme significantly determined the 
perceived water security level of the farmers. Farmers who were located in the head-end 
of the primary canal perceived themselves to be more water secure than those located in 
the middle-end of the canal. On the other end, farmers on the tail-end predictably felt 
they were more vulnerable to water shortages compared to those located in the middle-
level. Since no farmer can control the amount of water he or she receives, those who are 
near the water source have a greater chance to withdraw more water, while those located 
far from the source receive less water, leading to their water insecurity. Water 
distribution is a major problem in South African irrigation schemes, and this result is 
consistent with results from Denison and Manona (2007a), Hope et al. (2008), Van 
Averbeke (2008) and Mnkeni et al. (2010).  
Farmers who had received agricultural training felt more water secure compared to those 
who did not receive any. The χ
2
 analysis indicated that the trained farmers were more 
likely to rate water sufficiency to their plots higher than the untrained farmers. This 
implies that although both the trained and untrained farmers may draw the same quantity 
of water to their respective plots, the trained would apply the water conservation 
strategies leant. While the untrained irrigators would need more water, the trained 
irrigators are more likely to perceive themselves to be water secure at lower water 
volumes compared to the untrained irrigators. Another reason why the trained irrigators 
felt more water secure has to do with their confidence levels. Their confidence in their 
agricultural production abilities means they feel that they will always be able to pay for 
the water and water-related services. 
Members of farmer association perceived that they were more water secure compared to 
the non-members of farmer associations. Joining a farmer association empowers farmers 
to have their voices heard through collective action. Members of irrigator associations 
were reportedly at an advantage in terms of water access as they had people to fight in 
their corner in times of water shortages and conflicts. Although the results indicate that 
the male irrigators are more water secure than female irrigators, this was not significant. 
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As reported above, the men were sometimes reportedly forcing their way to accessing 
water at the expense of women. The model, however, indicate that this may not have led 
to significant differences in perceived water security levels. The model results also 
highlight that the married farmers had higher perceived water security levels compared to 
the unmarried. This was, however, also insignificant at the conventional 10% significance 
level.  
One option of generating the water security index was to simply add the ratings instead of 
using PCA. This was done and the index generated through addition used as the 
dependent variable in the OLS model. Generating the water security index by simply 
adding the ratings did not give results that differed from those estimated using the index 
generated from PCA. The PCA method of generating the index is more robust, and thus it 
was more preferred. 
5.5 FGT poverty indices according to water security status 
The water security index was used to classify irrigators into two categories: those who are 
water secure and those who are water insecure. The water security status variable was 
thus a categorical variable taking the value 1 for the water secure irrigators, and 0 for the 
water insecure. The last 40% of the irrigators were cut-off as water insecure, while the 
rest were treated as water secure. While there is no strong justification for the choice of 
the 40% percentile, this approach is used by many researchers to determine the relative 
poverty status of households, and is adopted here to determine the relative water security 
status of irrigators. This is because no arbitrary value could be used as the cut-off point, 
since no such value exists as yet. Table 5.4 presents the FGT poverty indices which show 
the differences in welfare between the water insecure and water secure irrigators. The 







Table 5.4 FGT poverty indices: Differences between water secure and insecure irrigators  
FGT poverty index Water 
insecure 
Water secure Total sample 
Poverty headcount index (α=0) 0.58 0.53 0.55 
Poverty gap index (α=1) 0.17 0.15 0.16 
Squared poverty gap index (α=2) 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
The incidence of poverty was higher (58%) among water insecure irrigators compared to 
that of water secure irrigators (53%). The results also indicate that whereas the 
consumption expenditure of water insecure farmers would need to be raised by 17% for 
them to be above the cut-off line, the consumption expenditure of the poor water secure 
irrigators will need a 15% increase. Inequalities are low in both groups, as indicated by 
squared poverty gap index of 7% for water insecure farmers and 5% of water secure 
farmers. Although these poverty differences may seem small, the question is: are they 
significant? The next section presents the empirical results that seek to answer this 
question. 
5.6 Empirical results 
The impact of water security on welfare was estimated using the treatment effect model 
and the PSM method. Irrigators who are water secure, as has been explained earlier, may 
differ in many (measured and unmeasured) characteristics from people who do not. 
Water security could be influenced by some external process (e.g., political process, 
intelligence, experience and managerial ability) which may result in certain farmers being 
more water secure than others. If these characteristics are related to household 
consumption expenditure, the coefficient of the water security variable may catch up 
these effects and be biased and inconsistent if estimated using OLS regression. As such, 
the treatment effect model was used to determine the impact of water security on 
household welfare as it accounts for this selection process. The water security variable 
was used as a binary variable as explained above.  
The probit model was used to estimate the probability that a household will be water 
secure in the first stage of the treatment effect model. The probit results are presented in 
91 
 
Appendix J. The purpose of the probit model was to estimate propensities that a 
household will be water secure. The results of the probit model indicated that 
determinants of water security were age, livestock size, income, duration of scheme 
membership, conflict occurrence, pumping method, geographic location in the scheme, 
and agricultural training. These are the same factors that were identified using the OLS 
regression in Section 5.3, except for livestock size. This, coupled by the fact that 
generating the water security index by mere addition of ratings generated relatively 
similar results, indicates that the model results are robust.  
A significant livestock size variable implies that livestock size had a positive influence on 
the chances of being water security. This can be explained as indicating the importance of 
livestock as a livelihood activity in the area. Selling livestock to meet the household 
expenses, which may include paying for water and water-related services, was reportedly 
common in the study area. The following section presents the results from the second 
stage of the treatment effect model. 
5.6.1 Impact of water security on household welfare: Treatment model results 
The Hausman test (F=2.22, p=0.14) indicated that there was no evidence of endogeneity 
between water security and consumption expenditure at the conventional 10% 
significance level. Therefore, the OLS procedure was used during the second stage of the 
treatment effect model. The model relied on the non-linearity assumption for 
identification since the same number of variables appears in the water security and 
response equations (Sartori, 2003). Because the household distance from scheme variable 
was insignificant in the water security equation, excluding it in the outcome equation 
would not have improved identification, hence the reliance on the non-linearity 
assumption for model identification. The results of the treatment effect regression model 
are presented in Table 5.4, while the less efficient results estimated using the two-step 




Table 5.5 Impact of water security on household welfare: Treatment effect model and 
OLS results  
Variables Treatment effect 
model 
OLS model 




Constant 1.251 0.518 2936.1 2279.6 
Age (years) -3.229 24.64 9.7 27.4 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -814.34 583.85 -830.7 533.6 
Marital status (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) 716.1 816.99 591.4 1265.4 
Education level (Years of schooling) 91.1 80.29 71.1 78.7 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) -140.59 549.64 -136.8 606.7 
Value of assets (Rands) 0.00079 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005 
Livestock size (TLU) -23.91 26.87 -18.6 15.8 
Off-farm income (Rands) 0.0629*** 0.014 0.07*** 0.019 
Irrigated land size (Ha) 1679.1 2614.36 1668 3762.9 
Household distance from scheme (km) -42.01 67.86 -35.4 56.3 
Scheme membership (years) 48.26** 21.75 30.1 19.7 
Conflicts occurrence (1=Yes, 0=No) 604.4 646.4 156.8 657.3 
Canal maintenance (1=Yes, 0=No) -697.56 708.51 -554.1 746.4 
Association member (1=Yes, 0=No) 293.14 569.61 549.3 494.9 
Scheme management (1=Yes, 0=No) 36.4 567.5 45.6 575 
Pump_1 (1=Electric pump, 0=Gravity) -1156.86* 684.27 -425.3 722.3 
Pump_2 (1=Diesel pump, 0=Gravity) -974.92 902.92 -392.2 847 
Canal location_1 (1=Head, 0=Middle) -684.88 642.58 -126.6 666.7 
Canal location_2 (1=Tail, 0=Middle) -645.87 638.93 -1059** 494 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 161.86 659.04 372 554.2 
Access to training (1=Yes, 0=No) 484.35 878.28 1123.8 1019.5 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 1274.96** 575.7 1081.5 714.3 
Water secure (1=Secure, 0=Insecure) 3706.9*** 1252.1* 1171 682.5 
/athrho -0.524** 0.246 - - 
/lnsigma 8.121*** 0.069 - - 
Wald χ
2 
(43)/F-test 102.98***  3.6***  
R
2
 -  0.34  
N 185  185  
rho -0.48 0.189   
sigma 3363.26 230.4   
lambda -1617.87 712.34   
LR test of independent equations (rho=0):  χ
2 
= 3.38* 
p = 0.067  
  
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
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The significant rho in the treatment effect regression model indicates that there is 
selection bias in the model. The OLS results are, therefore, biased and inconsistent. 
Henceforth, the discussions are based on the selection bias corrected treatment effect 
model estimates. The treatment effect regression model fits the data relatively well, as 
shown by highly significant Wald χ
2 
value. In line with expectations, the results indicate 
that water security has a significant impact on household welfare. Water secure 
households consumed significantly higher than water insecure households. As a result, 
the hypothesis put forward cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. In passing, it 
should be noted that OLS underestimates the impact of water security due to selection 
bias. Other factors that influenced household welfare were off-farm income, duration of 
scheme membership, use of electric pump and access to credit. 
The treatment effect model indicates that increasing off-income increases household 
welfare. This result is not surprising, as one would expect households to spend their 
earnings from non-farm activities on meeting their consumption needs. An interesting 
result in this model is that duration of scheme membership had the effect of increasing 
household welfare. This implies that those households that have been part of the scheme 
for longer periods have higher consumption expenditures. The experienced irrigation 
members have established connections from input suppliers to output buyers, resulting in 
them making more money than the new comers. This result highlights that, although 
these veteran irrigators are generally pessimistic about their water security as shown in 
the previous sections, they are the ones enjoying better welfare compared to new comers.  
The results also indicate that access to credit improves household welfare. This indicates 
the important role of credit in irrigating farming as it ensures farmers can buy inputs in 
time. The farmers reported that saving money was difficult, and most of the farmers were 
spending the money on other household needs and then fail to buy the inputs for the next 
crop. Borrowing then helps in filling this gap, hence the improved welfare of those with 
access to credit. PSM was estimated to provide robustness checks to the treatment effect 
model results and results presented in the next section.  
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5.6.2 Impact of water security on household welfare: PSM results 
Table 5.6 presents results from the PSM model that was estimated for comparison 
purposes with the treatment effect model results. The household variables indicators used 
in the probit specification to generate the propensity scores satisfied the balancing 
property (See Appendix N for detailed results). As explained in the previous chapter, the 
balancing property was selected in estimating propensity scores, while the common 
support was imposed and all standard errors were bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions in 
constructing matching estimates. 
The PSM results, presented in Table 5.6, indicate that water security has a significant 
impact on the household welfare status of irrigators. Water secure irrigators consumed 
between R1,983.45 and R2,274.14 more than the water insecure irrigators based on the 
matching method adopted. Two matching estimators, the nearest neighbour and the 
Kernel matching methods were employed as robustness checks.  
Table 5.6 Impact of water security on household welfare: PSM results 
Matching method Number of 
households 
ATT Std. err t-test 
 Treatment Control    
Nearest neighbour 111 35 2274.14 851.286 2.671*** 
Kernel matching method 111 59 1983.45 601.774 3.296*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Source: Household survey (2012) 
The nearest neighbour matching method identified 34 comparable control households, 
while the Kernel matching method identified 59 control households from the 74 water 
insecure irrigators. The average expenditure gain estimated using the nearest neighbour 
matching method is higher than that of the Kernel matching method, indicating that the 
Kernel matching method is somewhat conservative. To conclude, both matching methods 
indicate that water security plays an important role in poverty reduction in rural areas. 
Comparing the results across the different matching methods indicate that the estimated 
project impact is robust. The PSM results support conclusions by Hope et al. (2008) that 
security of irrigation access plays a key role in determining the poverty reduction impact 
of irrigation.  
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It is important to highlight that whereas the OLS and PSM impact estimates are generally 
close to each other, the treatment effect model impact estimate is significantly higher than 
all estimates. Interestingly, it is the treatment effect model results that are more robust in 
the presence of selection bias on unobservable characteristics. The PSM method is robust 
when there is only selection on observables. However, selection on unobservables as 
indicated by a significant rho in the treatment effect model violates that assumption 
leading to a biased PSM estimate. In conclusion, all the models and their variations 
indicate that water security plays an important role in household welfare. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has indicated that it is water security that is desirable, as water secure 
irrigators had higher consumption expenditures compared to water insecure irrigators. 
The results imply that ensuring water security is vital for irrigation to achieve its 
objective of reducing rural poverty. However, it must be noted that both water secure and 
water insecure households were characterized by higher levels of poverty, indicating the 
prevalence of poverty in the study area. Based on these results and the analysis done in 
the thesis, the next chapter highlights the main conclusions and proposes several 
recommendations. This last chapter also highlights the remaining research questions that 
deserve investigation in the future.  
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Recap of the research objectives and methodology 
The study’s general objective was to evaluate the impact of smallholder irrigation and 
water security on rural household consumption expenditure. It had two impact evaluation 
parts. Firstly, the objective of the study was to evaluate the impact of smallholder 
irrigation on household welfare. Secondly, the study aimed to evaluate the impact of 
water security on household welfare. It was argued in the study that irrigation 
participation alone is not sufficient in poverty reduction. It is also vital that individual 
irrigators have water security at the household level. The second evaluation dimension 
makes this study different from many others that assume that irrigation participation 
results in the same level of water access by individual irrigators. Since water security is 
least understood, the study also sought to generate the water security index using PCA.  
Using a total sample of 185 irrigators and 66 non-irrigators which was generated through 
a stratified random sampling procedure, data analysis involved both descriptive and 
econometric techniques. Descriptive analysis made use of the t-tests, χ
2 
tests and FGT 
poverty measures, while econometric analysis involved methods such as PCA, OLS, 
PSM and treatment effect model. Data from qualitative sources (key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions) were used to contextually interpret the quantitative results 
from the econometric models. This chapter presents the main conclusions of this study. 
Based on the empirical results, the chapter also draws several policy recommendations. 
Furthermore, the last section of this chapter presents the remaining knowledge gaps and 
suggests areas of further investigation in the future.  
6.2 Conclusions  
This study found that, although the irrigators and non-irrigators had the same 
demographic patterns, the welfare of the irrigators was better than that of non-irrigators. 
The analysis of the FGT poverty indices indicated that, even though poverty is prevalent 
for both groups, it was more pronounced among non-irrigators. The majority of the non-
irrigators in the study were classified as poor compared to irrigators. The econometric 
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models indicated that the irrigators had significantly higher consumption expenditures 
compared to non-irrigators. Therefore, it was concluded that smallholder irrigation plays 
a positive role in rural poverty reduction. The implication of this finding is that, although 
smallholder irrigation schemes have admittedly failed in the sense that many have 
collapsed after government withdrawal in South Africa, when operational, they play an 
important role in poverty reduction in the rural areas. Therefore, government investment 
in smallholder irrigation for rural poverty reduction should continue. 
However, it must be highlighted that poverty incidence is also high among irrigators, as 
the majority of this group were classified as poor. This may be the reason why many 
researchers and policy makers have been disappointed by the poverty reduction 
performance of smallholder irrigation in South Africa. What is clear from this study is 
that even though smallholder irrigation access reduces poverty among farmers, it is not 
enough on its own to significantly reduce poverty to low levels. This should not be 
interpreted as failure of smallholder irrigation, but an indication of the need for a holistic 
package of complimentary rural development strategies where smallholder irrigation 
plays a part. As has been noted by some studies, smallholder irrigation is not a ‘magic 
bullet’ that completely eradicates poverty on its own. Clearly, reducing poverty to low 
levels in the poor rural areas of South Africa will require several strategies, and it is 
unconceivable that there is one strategy capable of single-handedly accomplishing that. 
This study has also demonstrated that one way of enhancing the effectiveness of 
smallholder irrigation in poverty reduction is to ensure that irrigators are water secure at 
the household level. The empirical results presented in the preceding chapter indicated 
that perceived water security had a significant impact on the household welfare status of 
irrigators. Water secure irrigators were found to consume more than the water insecure 
irrigators, and the incidence of poverty was found to be higher among water insecure 
irrigators compared to that of water secure irrigators. Given the evidence that water 
security enhances the poverty reduction effectiveness of smallholder irrigation, the study 
also investigated the determinants of water security.  
The empirical results indicated that factors such as age, off-farm income, use of pumps, 
location on the upper-end of the canal and access to training increase household water 
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security level while factors such as size of irrigated land and location on the tail-end of 
the canal decrease the level of household water security. One implication of this result is 
that there is a need to introduce more pumps in different blocks to enhance water security 
in the Tugela Ferry. The small motor pumps (diesel or electric) that are used in blocks 4 
and 7 have significantly improved the farmers’ perceived water security levels, compared 
to those blocks relying solely on gravity. Two blocks in the Tugela Ferry irrigation 
scheme that may need to be given pumps are blocks 3 and 5, while blocks 1 and 2 could 
still rely on the original gravity system as water is reliable in the latter two blocks. 
One other important conclusion of this study is that it highlights the importance of access 
to support services (such as extension, credit, agricultural training, market support, etc.) 
in poverty reduction efforts. These support services were found to positively influence 
irrigation participation, water security and household welfare. Despite their significant 
role in poverty reduction, few farmers receive these government services. There is a need 
for increased government visibility among the smallholder farmers to enhance the 
poverty reduction effects of smallholder farming. For example, the role played by 
training in enhancing perceived water security was significant. Training farmers in water 
conservation techniques would go a long way in improving water efficiency in the 
farmer’s individual plots, resulting in their improved perceived water security. With the 
same water quantities, the trained farmers would be in a better water security level 
compared to the untrained farmers. The implication of this conclusion is that there may 
not be a need to improve the volume of water reaching the irrigators’ plots to improve 
their perceived water security level, but ensuring the wise use of water would be an 
important strategy. Since training and field visits are common in the area, it is 
recommended that the water conservation modules be strengthened.  
To sum up, smallholder irrigation is negatively correlated with rural poverty, and thus 
should continue to be prioritised in the poverty-stricken rural areas of South Africa. There 
is also a need to ensure water security among irrigators for better welfare outcomes. In 
light of the empirical results and research conclusions, the following section provides 
specific recommendations to policy makers. 
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6.3 Policy recommendations 
Based on the empirical results, this study recommends that: 
 Smallholder irrigation should continue to be supported by the government as it 
plays an important role in the welfare of rural households; 
 A holistic approach should be adopted in addressing poverty in the rural areas. 
Access to irrigation alone is not enough to significantly reduce poverty as poverty 
prevalence was still high even among the irrigators. Other rural micro-projects 
and development initiatives (such as sewing projects, poultry projects, etc.) 
should be supported among irrigators so that rural poverty is significantly 
reduced; 
 Water security among the irrigators should be prioritised by policy makers, as 
there was less poverty among the water secure farmers compared to the water 
insecure farmers. Specifically, it is recommended that pumps be introduced for 
blocks 3 and 5 in the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme to enhance their water 
security status. In fact, introducing small motorised pumps could be the answer to 
most of the water access challenges in the smallholder irrigation sector; 
 Agricultural training, particularly in water conservation techniques, should be 
offered and emphasised to irrigators. Water security is not only a matter of water 
supply but also a function of the efficient use of the diverted water.  
 Farmer empowerment and participation should continue to be promoted. The 
blocks where farmer participation was high were found to be more water secure 
than those with little farmer participation. Specifically, it is recommended that 
farmer associations be promoted in the scheme, particularly at block level. The 
formation and running of these associations should be farmer-led and farmer-
driven, with outsiders only involved at a coordination level and offering technical 




6.4 Areas of further study 
The single difference method of project impact evaluation based on cross section data 
adopted in this study can be strengthened by using panel data. It is, therefore, 
recommended that data be collected for several seasons and more robust methods such as 
difference-in-difference methods that use panel data be used to evaluate the impact of 
smallholder and water security on household welfare. There is greater need for panel 
datasets that observe small-scale irrigators over time to better understand the dynamics of 
irrigation. Moreover, it is clear that irrigation benefits non-irrigators indirectly through its 
spill-over effects. It is suggested that a study be done to determine the extent to which 
non-irrigators benefit from the Tugela Ferry smallholder irrigation scheme. The welfare 
impacts of the irrigation could be understated in this study as the non-irrigators may be 
also benefitting from the scheme. Although the study has highlighted how perceptions of 
irrigators could be used to generate the water security index, the water security concept 
needs further empirical investigation. There may be a need to modify or add more water 
components beyond those that were identified in this study, while objective 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire used for data collection 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
The impact of smallholder irrigation on household welfare: The case of Tugela Ferry irrigation 
scheme 
Questionnaire 
All the information provided here will be treated as STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
Name of interviewer……………………………………………………………………………….. 
Date:……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Household name/ reference number:………………………………………………………………. 
 
1. Household demographics 
1.1 What is the total number of your household members? Please complete table below (Record 















in the farm 
(Days per 
week) 
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Key 
Household position 
1 Household head* 
2 Spouse 
3 Daughter /son 
4 Other (specify e.g., cousin) 














1=Fulltime farmer           6=Student 
2=Regular salaried job    7=Retired  
3=Temporary job             8=Other (specify) 
4=Unemployed  
5=Self employed                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
* Household head refers to the de facto household head that stays in the household for 4 or more days per week 
 
 
1.2 Are any of your household members receiving a government grant? Yes=1, No=0  
1.3 If yes on 1.2, how many are on the: Old age grant?    
Child grant?   
Disability grant?   
1.4 What is the household’s main religion? No religion=0 Traditional=1 Catholic=2 
Protestant=3 Pentecostal=4 Other (Specify)………………………=5 
 
 
2. Household expenditure patterns and income sources  
2.1 Please indicate the food items your household bought, the frequency and the cost incurred in 
buying the food items in the last month? (Complete table below) 
List of  food items 
consumed by the household  
Quantity consumed 
(specify units e.g., 
kg, l) 
Quantity bought 







Mealie meal      
Rice       
Flour       
Vegetables and fruits      
Sugar       
Salt and spices      
Eggs       
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Samp       
Oil       
Margarine       
Fish       
Beans       
Meat  
    
            
Beef      
Chicken      
Sheep      
Pork       
Tea / coffee       
Beverages / soft drinks       
Other (specify)      
 





2.3 Answer questions 2.31-2.39 using the answers below. 
0=Never 
1=Rarely= Once or twice in the past four weeks 
2=Sometimes= Three to ten times in the past four weeks  
3=Often= More than ten times in the past four weeks 
 
2.31 In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?  
2.32 In the past four weeks, were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods 
you preferred because of lack of resources? 
 
2.33 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat limited variety of foods 
due to lack of resources? 
 
2.34 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat some foods that 
you really did not want to eat because of lack of resources? 
 
2.35 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat less than you felt 




2.36 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a 
day because there was not enough food? 
 
2.37 In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household 
because of lack of resources to get food? 
 
2.38 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go a whole day and night 
without eating anything because there was not enough food?      
 
2.39 In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry 
because there was not enough food? 
 
 
2.4 Please indicate the non-food items your household mainly spent money on, how much was spent 
and the frequency in the past 12 months (Complete table below) 
Expenditure item/s Total amount Frequency 
Educational School fees   
Stationary (books, pens, pencils, etc)   
Uniforms    
Other (specify)   
Service bills  Electricity   
Water   
Telephone   
Other (specify)   
Medical expenses   
Transport   
Clothing    
Toiletries (soap, washing powder, etc)   
Entertainment (tobacco, liquor, etc)   
Home (furniture, maintenance, etc)   
Other (specify)   
 
2.5 What were the sources of your household income in the last 12 months? (Indicate approximately 
how much each source contributed and how often).  
Source of household income Total amount (Rands) How often? e.g. monthly 
Remittances    
Agricultural activities Irrigation farming   
Dry land farming   
Livestock production   
Arts and craft    
Permanent  employment    
Temporary employment   
Welfare grants   




3. Land  
3.1 What is the total area of land your household operates?  
(If irrigator, include both dry land and irrigated land) 
Dry land         ha 
Irrigated land         ha 
3.2 How much land was cultivated in the past 12 months? Dry land         ha 
Irrigated land         ha 
3.3 How far away is your household to the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme?        km 
3.4 Are you a member of the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme? Yes=1 No=0.  
If No, proceed to question 3.6. 
 
3.5 If yes in 3.2, how long have you been a member of the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme?     years 
3.6 Which block do you belong to?  
 
3.7 Indicate the number of plots you have, their sizes and the means of ownership by completing the 
table below (Include both irrigated and dry land plots if irrigator). 
Plot number Size of plot 
(ha) 
Means of ownership  Farming practice Land fees paid 
for the plot per 
year 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
1=Maize           6=Cabbage 
2=Tomatoes     7=Beans 
3=Potatoes       8=Onions 
4=Sugarcane    9=Butternut 
5=Spinach       10=Other 
(specify)…………………….. 
Means of ownership 
1=Allocated                     4=Bought 









3.8 Generally, are you satisfied with the present security of your land? 
Yes=1 No=0 
(a) Dry land   
(b) Irrigated land  
3.9 Rate the quality of your land for crop production  
1=Poor 2=Good 
(a) Dry land  
(b) Irrigated land  
 
4. Cropping and marketing system 
4.1 Please indicate the crops you planted in the past summer (rainy) season, the area you planted, the 
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Key 
Crops 
1 Maize           6 Cabbage 
2 Tomatoes     7 Beans 
3 Potatoes       8 Onions 
4 Sugarcane    9 Butternut 
5 Spinach       10 Other  
                          (specify) 
Farming practice 
Irrigated=1 






1=Local shop    5=Shops in town 
2=Neighbors     6=Other (specify)          
3=Contractor     
4=Hawkers 
Inputs used 
1 Fertilizers            6 Seeds 
2 Herbicides          7 Pesticides 
3 Labor                  8 Tillage 
4 Transport            9 Packaging 
5 Marketing          10 Other   
                               (Specify) 
Supplier 
1 Local shop 
2 Town (specify) 
3 Co-operative 
4 Donation/ friend 
 
4.2 Please indicate the crops you planted in the past winter (dry) season, the area you planted, the 
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Key 
Crops 
1 Maize           6 Cabbage 
2 Tomatoes     7 Beans 
3 Potatoes       8 Onions 
4 Sugarcane    9 Butternut 
5 Spinach       10 Other  
                          (specify) 
Farming practice 
Irrigated=1 






1=Local shop    5=Shops in town 
2=Neighbors     6=Other (specify)          
3=Contractor     
4=Hawkers 
Inputs used 
1 Fertilizers            6 Seeds 
2 Herbicides          7 Pesticides 
3 Labor                  8 Tillage 
4 Transport            9 Packaging 
5 Marketing          10 Other   
                               (Specify) 
Supplier 
1 Local shop 
2 Town (specify) 
3 Co-operative 




4.3 How often do you fail to sell your farm produce due to lack of market? Never=0 
Sometimes=1 Always=2 
 




5.1 How is water pumped to reach your irrigation plot(s)? Gravity=1 Electric pump=2  
Diesel pump=3 
 
5.2 What is your position along the primary canal? Head=1 Middle=2 Tail=3  
5.3 What is your position along the secondary canal? Head=1 Middle=2 Tail=3  
5.4 Do you pay any fees for water or water related services?  Yes=1 No=0  
5.5 If yes in 5.4, how much per 0.1ha per month?  R 
5.6 How many times per week do you have access to water in your plot(s)?       days 
5.7 Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements pertaining to water access 
to your irrigation plot(s) (Tick appropriate box). 
 Strongly 
disagree=1  
Disagree=2  Neutral=3  Agree=4  Strongly 
agree=5 
Water is reliable                                                                    
I always get water in my plot(s)       
Water is sufficient for my cropping 
requirements                     
     
I am satisfied with the water I receive 
in my plot(s) 
     
I have the ability to pay for water and 
water-related services 
     
I never fail to raise money to pay for 
water or water related-services 
     
I will always be able to raise money to 
pay for water or water-related 
services? 
     
My right or claim to water is secure                                                        
I have problems with too much water 
in my plot(s) 
     
 
5.8 Do you face conflicts in water sharing in the scheme? Yes=1 No=0                                                  
5.9 If yes in 5.8, how frequently do you face conflicts in water sharing in the scheme 1=Very 
rare 2=Rare 3=Often 4=Very often 
 




5.11 If yes in 5.10, how often does it happen? 1=Very rare 2=Rare 3=Often 4=Very 
often 
 
5.12 What do you do if you don’t receive water on your irrigating day? Nothing=0 
Report to the irrigation committee=1 Talk to farmers upstream myself=2 
 
5.13 If you report to the committee or talk to other farmers yourself in 4.12, how often 
has your problem been heard and resolved? Never=0 Sometimes=1 Always=2 
 
5.14 In your opinion, who should pay for water services? 0= No one, government only  
1=Everyone in the scheme 2=Only those irrigating a lot 3=Only those that are making 
more money 
 
5.15 If water supply and water related services were to be improved, how much will 
you be willing to pay per 0.1ha plot per year for those supply and services improvements? 
0=None   1=A given amount per 0.1ha per year (specify in 
Rands/0.1ha/year)………………... 2=An amount depending on your farm income 
(specify as %)…………. 
 
 
6. Scheme management  
 
6.1 Is there a farmer association in the irrigation scheme? Yes=1 No=0  
6.2 If yes in 6.1, are you a member of the farmer association? Yes=1 No=0  
6.3 How would you rate the overall scheme management  Very poor=0  Poor=1 Average=2 
Good=3 Very good=4 
 
6.4 Do you participate in management of the scheme? Yes=1 No=0  
6.5 If yes in 6.4, are you satisfied by your participation in the management of the scheme? Not 
at all=0 Somewhat=1 Absolutely=2 
 
6.6 Do you know about water user associations? Yes=1 No=0  
6.7 If yes in 6.6, are you a member of a water user association Yes=1 No=0  
6.8 If no in 6.6, would you be interested in joining a water user association? Yes=1 No=0  
6.9 Generally, do you think the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme has improved your welfare as 
a farmer? No=0 Yes=1 
 
 
7. Support services 
 
7.1 Did you use any credit or loan facility in the past 12 months? Yes=1 No=0  
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7.2 If yes in 7.1, what was the main source of credit/loan? Relative or friend=1 Money lender=2 
Savings club (stokvel)=3 Input supplier=4  Financial institution=5 (Specify name of financial 
institution…………………………) Output buyer =6  Other=7(Specify)……………………) 
 
7.3 What was the purpose of the loan/credit? Family emergency=1 Agricultural purposes=2 Other 
(specify…………………………………….)=3 
 
7.4 Were you able to pay back the loan/credit in time? Yes=1 No=0  
7.5 Did you receive funding or any other sources of credit support from government in the past 12 
months?  Yes=1    No=0 
 
7.6 If yes in 7.5, how often? Sometimes=1  Always=2  
7.7 Did you have any contact with extension officer in the past 12 months?  Yes=1    No=0  
7.8 If yes in 7.7, how often did you contact extension officers? Sometimes=1  Always=2  
7.9 If yes on 7.7, did you invite the extension officers?  Yes=1  No=0  
7.10 Are the extension officers from: 1=Government/parastatal?   2=Non-governmental 
organisation (NGO)?          3=Private company? 
 
7.11 Did you receive any free inputs in the past 12 months? Yes=1 No=0  
7.12 If yes in 7.11, what was the source? 1=Government 2=Non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) 3=Private company 
 
7.13 If yes in 7.11, please specify the type of inputs received…………………………………………. 
7.14 What is your main source of farming information 0=None 1=Radio/television 
2=Extension officer 3=Cell phone/SMS 4=Internet 5=Newspaper 6=Other farmers 7=Other 
(specify)………………………………. 
 
7.15 Do you understand the information disseminated by the main information source in 6.14? 
Not at all=0 Somewhat=1  Absolutely=2 
 
 
7.16 Are you satisfied with the following infrastructure in your farming area?  
 Strongly 
disagree=1  
Disagree=2  Neutral=3  Agree=4  Strongly 
agree=5 
a) Road accessibility      
b) Markets      
c) Electricity      
d) Storage dams      
e) Water supply      
 
8. Asset and livestock ownership 
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8.1 Do you own the following assets? (Indicate number owned in the appropriate box, zero if not owned) 
 
Block, tile house  Car  Telephone  Tap  
Block, zinc house  Motor cycle  Cell phone  borehole  
Round, thatch 
house 
 Bicycle  TV  Protected well  
Round pole and 
mud or shack 
house 
 Tractor  Radio  Unprotected well/ dam  
Spades  Wheel barrow  Plough  Water tank  
Hoes  Knapsack 
sprayer 
 Other (specify)  Other (specify)  
 
8.2 Do you own the following livestock? (Indicate number owned in the appropriate box, zero if not 
owned. Complete table below) 
Livestock type Number 
currently 
owned 
Money spent on feeds, 
chemicals, vet services, 
etc in the past 12 months 
Number sold in 







in the past 12 
months 
Cattle      
Goats      
Sheep      
Pigs      
Chickens      
Other (specify)      
      
 
9. Concluding remarks 







Appendix B: Focus group discussion guide 
1. Opportunities, challenges and constraints faced as farmers/irrigators/women 
2. Solutions to the challenges and constraints? 
3. How can we describe water security? Supply? Affordable? Rights/entitlements to the water? 
 Proportion of farmers have water security i.e., is the water reliable?  
 Reasons for lack of water security 
 Differences of water security by gender 
4. Skills (production, harvesting, farm management & marketing) necessary for effective 
participation in agriculture?  
 What is the level of competence of the farmers in these agricultural skills? 
 Does the level of competence in different skills differ between men and women? 
How? (Explore)  
5. Training offered to farmers. 
 Is there training specifically meant for women? 
 What are the weaknesses/shortcomings of the training? 
6. Is there any specialization in the farming activities undertaken: Cropping (production & 
marketing), livestock 
7. Institutional arrangements regarding access to land and water? Disincentives to use of land 
and water by gender. 
8. What are the challenges faced when marketing? 
 Are the challenges faced by women different from those faced by men? 
9. Does the Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme improve livelihoods of irrigators significantly 





Appendix C: Variable codes as used in Stata estimations 
Variable code Variable description 
conseq Total household consumption expenditure per adult equivalent in a year 
watersec_4 Water security index generated by PCA  
wats40_4 Water security status (1=Water secure, 0=Water insecure) 
irrigat Irrigation access (1=Irrigator, 0=Non-irrigator) 
gender Household head gender (1=Male, 0 = Female) 
age Household head age in years 
educat Household head (years of schooling) 
marstatus Household head marital status (1=Married, 0=Non-married) 
adulteq Household size in adult equivalents 
adlteqsq Household size square in adult equivalents 
relgn Household main religion (1=Christianity, 0=Otherwise                               
grant Access to government welfare grants (1= Yes, 0=No) 
landsize Household total land size in hectares (ha) 
irrland Household irrigated land in hectares (ha) 
nofinceq Off-farm income  (Rands) 
tlu Livestock size in Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 
asetveq Value of assets (Rands) 
soilq3 Farmers’ perception of soil fertility status: 1=Good, 0= Poor 
extaces Access to extension service (1= Yes, 0=No) 
credtuse1 Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 
training Agricultural skills training (Yes=1, No=0) 
mkt1 Market access (1=Yes, 0=No) 
road1 Road access (1=Yes, 0=No) 
sch_dist Distance of household to the Tugela irrigation scheme 
sch_yrs Years household has been a member of the Tugela irrigation scheme 
Pump1 Pump used (1=Electric pump, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 
Pump2 Pump used (1=Diesel pump, 0=Gravity or otherwise) 
loc_pr1 Location along the canal (1=Head-end, 0=Middle or otherwise 
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lo_pr2 Location along the canal (1=Tail-end, 0=Middle or otherwise 
asocmemb Member of farmer association (1=Yes, 0=No) 
schmnpart Scheme level decision making participation (1=Yes, 0=No) 
conflict Occurrence of conflicts (Yes=1, No=0) 
Part_canal Participation in canal maintenance (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Appendix D: Equivalence scales of recommended energy intakes by age categories 
Category Age (Years) Average energy 
allowance per day 
(Kilocalories) 
Equivalence scale 
Infants and children 0-0.5 650 0.22 
0.5-1 850 0.29 
1-3 1300 0.45 
4-6 1800 0.62 
7-10 2000 0.69 
Males 11-14 2500 0.86 
15-18 3000 1.03 
19-25 2900 1 
25-50 2900 1 
51+ 2300 0.79 
Females 11-14 2200 0.76 
15-18 2200 0.76 
19-25 2200 0.76 
25-50 2200 0.76 
51+ 1900 0.66 
Source: NRS (1989), cited in Wale (2004). 











Appendix F: Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: Treatment effects model 
estimated using two-step procedure  
 Variable Treatment effects model 
 Coef.   Std. err 
Constant 7694.27*** 2143.60 
Value of assets (Rands) 0.00016 0.00076 
Off-farm income (Rands) 0.019** 0.0090 
Land size (Ha) 792.05* 410.34 
Livestock size in TLU 27.28* 16.058 
Age 32.93 71.98 
Age square 0.059 0.62 
Soil fertility (1=Good, 0=Poor) 48.23 509.78 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -268.60 316.04 
Education level (Years in school) 103.00** 42.87 
Household size in adult equivalents -2551.84*** 235.20 
Household size square 149.84*** 18.30 
Access to welfare grant (1=Yes, 0=No) -356.40 656.87 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 518.34* 315.28 
Market access (1=Yes, 0=No) 84.43 433.19 
Access to extension services (1=Yes, 0=No) 636.22* 344.30 
Agricultural training (1=Yes, 0=No) 891.04* 457.06 
Access to good roads (1=Yes, 0=No) 1630.95*** 317.72 
Marital status (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) -0.287 448.36 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) -103.92 302.44 
Irrigation (1=Irrigator, 0=Non-irrigator) 2491.00*** 813.99 
   
Mills lambda -468.36 532.87 
Wald Chi
2
 494.08***   
N 251  
   
rho -0.217  
sigma 2157.11  
lambda -468.36  






Appendix G: Irrigation participation propensity scores  
 
99%     .9999874       .9999997       Kurtosis       4.133488
95%     .9999474       .9999978       Skewness      -1.510927
90%      .999819       .9999874       Variance       .0662637
75%     .9982122       .9999841
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .2574173
50%     .9563171                      Mean           .8225408
25%     .7370653       .1036384       Sum of Wgt.         226
10%     .4127772       .0872609       Obs                 226
 5%     .1926912       .0733444
 1%     .0872609       .0645219
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
The region of common support is [.06452187, .99999969]
Note: the common support option has been selected
Note: 2 failures and 0 successes completely determined.
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.520704   1.199356    -2.10   0.036    -4.871398   -.1700102
 sch_dist_01    -.1149652   .0263898    -4.36   0.000    -.1666884   -.0632421
       relgn     .5120821   .3208513     1.60   0.110    -.1167748    1.140939
   marstatus    -.1962825   .4619599    -0.42   0.671    -1.101707    .7091422
    training     -.081455   .5182631    -0.16   0.875    -1.097232     .934322
       road1     .3713062   .3122743     1.19   0.234    -.2407401    .9833525
     extaces     1.040383   .3284124     3.17   0.002     .3967062    1.684059
        mkt1     1.821204   .3752358     4.85   0.000     1.085756    2.556653
    credtuse    -.4599219   .3137783    -1.47   0.143    -1.074916    .1550723
       grant       .58551   .6101884     0.96   0.337    -.6104372    1.781457
    adlteqsq    -.0406426   .0157924    -2.57   0.010    -.0715951   -.0096902
     adulteq     .6266711   .2055257     3.05   0.002      .223848    1.029494
      educat    -.0618666   .0450033    -1.37   0.169    -.1500714    .0263381
      gender    -.1059787   .2994782    -0.35   0.723    -.6929452    .4809877
         age     -.006161   .0113912    -0.54   0.589    -.0284874    .0161655
      soilq3     1.522321   .3805579     4.00   0.000     .7764407      2.2682
         TLU    -.0067887   .0135921    -0.50   0.617    -.0334287    .0198512
    landsize     -2.44659   .7457677    -3.28   0.001    -3.908268   -.9849121
    nofinceq    -4.80e-06   8.12e-06    -0.59   0.554    -.0000207    .0000111
     asetveq    -7.32e-07   7.94e-07    -0.92   0.356    -2.29e-06    8.23e-07
                                                                              
     irrigat        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -58.257223                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5942
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(19)     =     170.61
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        251
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -58.257223
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -58.257245
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -58.279081
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -58.921672
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -62.233396
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -74.890805
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -143.56463
Estimation of the propensity score 
      Total          251      100.00
                                                
          1          186       74.10      100.00
          0           65       25.90       25.90
                                                
    IRRIGAT        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
The treatment is irrigat
**************************************************** 
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score 
**************************************************** 
> aces road1 training marstatus relgn  sch_dist_01, pscore(irrigat_2) comsup




End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total          40        186         226 
                                             
       .95           1        115         116 
        .9           2         25          27 
        .8           2         12          14 
        .6           8         19          27 
        .4          10         11          21 
        .2           7          2           9 
  .0645219          10          2          12 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block          IRRIGAT
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
is not different for treated and controls in each block
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 7
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 









Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
                                                         
      186          20    2301.115     851.747       2.702
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Bootstrapped standard errors
(random draw version)
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method
                              N = normal, P = percentile, BC = bias-corrected
                                                                             
                                                      322.5819  3229.174 (BC)
                                                      292.4344  3218.798  (P)
     bs1     1000   2301.115   -268.922   851.7466    629.6972  3972.533  (N)
                                                                             
Variable     Reps   Observed       Bias   Std. Err.   [95% Conf. Interval]
Bootstrap statistics
(obs=251)
statistic:   r(attnd)
> credtuse mkt1 extaces road1 training marstatus relgn sch_dist_01     , pscore(irrigat_2)   comsup 
command:     attnd conseq irrigat asetveq nofinceq landsize TLU soilq3 age gender educat adulteq adlteqsq grant 
Bootstrapping of standard errors 
nearest neighbour matches
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
                                                         
      186          20    2301.115    2045.617       1.125
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Analytical standard errors
(random draw version)
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method 
 This operation may take a while.
 The program is searching the nearest neighbor of each treated unit. 
> t1 extaces road1 training marstatus relgn  sch_dist_01, pscore(irrigat_2) comsup bootstrap rep(1000)
. attnd conseq irrigat asetveq nofinceq landsize TLU soilq3 age gender educat adulteq adlteqsq grant credtuse mk
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Appendix I: Impact of access to irrigation on household welfare: PSM using Kernel 
matching method   
                                                          
      186          40    2170.313     612.956       3.541
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Bootstrapped standard errors
ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method
                              N = normal, P = percentile, BC = bias-corrected
                                                                             
                                                       711.358  3151.976 (BC)
                                                       816.021  3158.515  (P)
     bs1     1000   2170.313  -48.78974   612.9556    967.4848  3373.141  (N)
                                                                             
Variable     Reps   Observed       Bias   Std. Err.   [95% Conf. Interval]
Bootstrap statistics
(obs=251)
statistic:   r(attk)
> redtuse mkt1 extaces road1 training marstatus relgn sch_dist_01     , pscore(irrigat_2) comsup    bwidth(.06)
command:     attk conseq irrigat asetveq nofinceq landsize TLU soilq3 age gender educat adulteq adlteqsq grant c
Bootstrapping of standard errors 
the bootstrap option to get bootstrapped standard errors.
Note: Analytical standard errors cannot be computed. Use
                                                         
      186          40    2170.313           .           .
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
 This operation may take a while.
 The program is searching for matches of each treated unit. 
> 1 extaces road1 training marstatus relgn  sch_dist_01, pscore(irrigat_2) comsup bootstrap rep(1000)
. attk conseq irrigat asetveq nofinceq landsize TLU soilq3 age gender educat adulteq adlteqsq grant credtuse mkt
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Appendix J: PCA generation of the water security variable 
 
 
. matrix r = r(R)
185
. display r(sum_w)
cansatfd          1
           cansatfd
cansatfd  .46634714  .41592571  .49315866  .58939025  .47425804  .36863747  .25559354  .34847656  .24486337  .23055626  .25461754
reg_user  .36732782  .25953522  .23266102   .2709739  .22979881  .44504399  .36839487  .34279329  .40686013  .31018452          1
rightsec  .12982744  .25472843  .21184059  .22736891  .26300778  .20999401  .24360464  .27859945  .29020681          1
monalway  .25992323  .29154825  .15122973  .13399576  .15760556  .64851967  .75978831  .86664831          1
pay_fail  .24636313  .37023955   .2717916  .28461419  .33081019  .69236173  .78447486          1
 ablepay  .16394874  .36977075  .22460244   .2692515  .20840344  .79072453          1
wilngpay  .32148978  .38513805  .28602686  .34403987  .29939205          1
qltsatfd  .46319154  .61317276  .63414948  .74024627          1
qntsatfd  .61580322   .7370652  .80459215          1
sufcient  .68844902  .77135075          1
 constnt  .63243102          1
reliable          1
           reliable    constnt   sufcient   qntsatfd   qltsatfd   wilngpay    ablepay   pay_fail   monalway   rightsec   reg_user
Polychoric correlation matrix
. polychoric  reliable constnt sufcient qntsatfd qltsatfd wilngpay ablepay pay_fail monalway rightsec reg_user cansatfd
                                                                                             
        cansatfd     0.5921   -0.1863    0.0156    0.1610   -0.0639   -0.2119        0.5396  
        reg_user     0.4778    0.1486    0.3163    0.1649   -0.0845    0.0896        0.6072  
        rightsec     0.3573    0.0638    0.0669    0.2897    0.0945    0.1595        0.7455  
        monalway     0.6376    0.6370    0.0999   -0.0393    0.2104   -0.0335        0.1308  
        pay_fail     0.7238    0.5381   -0.1404    0.0022    0.1706   -0.1110        0.1254  
         ablepay     0.6716    0.5726   -0.1422   -0.0928   -0.1486    0.0993        0.1603  
        wilngpay     0.7036    0.4155    0.0091   -0.0406   -0.2684   -0.0222        0.2580  
        qltsatfd     0.6564   -0.3695   -0.1826    0.1830    0.0410   -0.0026        0.3640  
        qntsatfd     0.7622   -0.4911   -0.1263    0.0583   -0.0799   -0.0251        0.1514  
        sufcient     0.7289   -0.4980   -0.0152   -0.1352    0.0544    0.0412        0.1975  
         constnt     0.7606   -0.3251   -0.0516   -0.1618    0.0715    0.1635        0.2551  
        reliable     0.6520   -0.3510    0.3208   -0.1629    0.0237   -0.0880        0.3140  
                                                                                             
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6     Uniqueness 
                                                                                             
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(66) = 1575.26 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
       Factor12        -0.19463            .           -0.0257       1.0000
       Factor11        -0.13237      0.06227           -0.0175       1.0257
       Factor10        -0.10876      0.02360           -0.0144       1.0432
        Factor9        -0.07447      0.03429           -0.0098       1.0576
        Factor8        -0.06359      0.01088           -0.0084       1.0674
        Factor7        -0.01027      0.05332           -0.0014       1.0758
        Factor6         0.13895      0.14922            0.0184       1.0772
        Factor5         0.20435      0.06540            0.0270       1.0588
        Factor4         0.25674      0.05239            0.0339       1.0318
        Factor3         0.30985      0.05312            0.0409       0.9979
        Factor2         2.11139      1.80154            0.2790       0.9569
        Factor1         5.12971      3.01832            0.6779       0.6779
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =       57
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        6
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      185
(obs=185)
. factormat r, n(185)
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                  Prob > F =      0.8602
                 F(3, 159) =      0.25
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of watersec_4
. estat ovtest
    Mean VIF        1.26
                                    
         tlu        1.11    0.898500
   marstatus        1.14    0.879257
    training        1.15    0.868785
     asetveq        1.15    0.868653
     conflct        1.16    0.862387
    totinceq        1.17    0.853533
      lo_pr2        1.18    0.845785
   credtuse1        1.18    0.844733
     irrland        1.20    0.836495
      asocmb        1.20    0.830363
    schmnpa1        1.21    0.827352
       relgn        1.21    0.827182
     loc_pr1        1.23    0.814431
      gender        1.24    0.805151
     sch_yrs        1.30    0.769743
    part_can        1.33    0.753815
    sch_dist        1.35    0.738867
      educat        1.37    0.728778
       pump1        1.38    0.725842
     extaces        1.42    0.706196
         age        1.52    0.655857
       pump2        1.58    0.631503
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
                                                                              
       _cons     1.250585   .5177453     2.42   0.017     .2281854    2.272985
   credtuse1     -.213916   .1849127    -1.16   0.249    -.5790659     .151234
    training     .5987995   .2084463     2.87   0.005     .1871772    1.010422
     extaces     .2707869   .1837078     1.47   0.142    -.0919837    .6335576
      lo_pr2    -.3943219   .1880676    -2.10   0.038     -.765702   -.0229419
     loc_pr1     .6309972   .1723689     3.66   0.000     .2906176    .9713769
       pump2     .4579364     .22428     2.04   0.043      .015047    .9008257
       pump1      .635644   .1790049     3.55   0.001     .2821603    .9891278
    schmnpa1     .1747954    .148901     1.17   0.242    -.1192418    .4688326
      asocmb     .3860799   .1599042     2.41   0.017     .0703147    .7018452
    part_can     .2319724   .2010397     1.15   0.250     -.165024    .6289687
     conflct    -.6469295   .1556121    -4.16   0.000    -.9542191   -.3396399
     sch_yrs     -.017642   .0054975    -3.21   0.002    -.0284979    -.006786
    sch_dist    -.0054053   .0173298    -0.31   0.756    -.0396267    .0288162
     irrland     .1525313   .8951823     0.17   0.865    -1.615199    1.920262
    totinceq     .0000151   3.47e-06     4.36   0.000     8.25e-06    .0000219
         tlu    -.0053334   .0051393    -1.04   0.301     -.015482    .0048152
     asetveq     1.41e-08   1.24e-07     0.11   0.909    -2.30e-07    2.58e-07
       relgn     .1219929   .1598792     0.76   0.447    -.1937232    .4377089
      educat    -.0281298   .0262463    -1.07   0.285    -.0799587    .0236992
   marstatus     .0203519   .2585068     0.08   0.937    -.4901256    .5308294
      gender     .0992604   .1639064     0.61   0.546    -.2244081     .422929
         age       .01441   .0072062     2.00   0.047     .0001797    .0286403
                                                                              
  watersec_4        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .99481
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4313
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 22,   162) =   11.98
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     185
> a1  pump1 pump2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training credtuse1, r
. regress watersec_4 age gender marstatus educat relgn asetveq tlu totinceq irrland sch_dist  sch_yrs conflct part_can asocmb schmnp
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Appendix L: Determinants of household’s water security status: Probit results  
Variables Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Value Std. Err. Value Std.Err. 
Constant -1.875** 0.845  -  - 
Age (years) 0.017 0.011 0.0047* 0.0027 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -0.077 0.298 -0.033 0.073 
Marital status (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) -0.113 0.352 -0.062 0.084 
Education level (Years of schooling) -0.021 0.037 -0.0031 0.0092 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) -0.058 0.254 0.011 0.063 
Value of assets (Rands) 6.4E-07 4.6E-06 -5E-08 2.3E-07 
Livestock size in Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 0.071** 0.033 0.015* 0.0091 
Off-farm income (Rands) 4.6E-05*** 1.5E-05 6E-06** 3.3E-06 
Irrigated land size (ha) 0.169 1.227 -0.032 0.314 
Distance from scheme (km) 0.0048 0.032 0.0015 0.0078 
Scheme membership (years) -0.035*** 0.010 -0.01*** 0.0023 
Conflicts occurrence (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.645** 0.309 -0.19*** 0.072 
Participation in canal maintenance (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.220 0.343 0.051 0.084 
Farmer association member (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.429* 0.250 0.116* 0.062 
Scheme management participation (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.017 0.270 0.0075 0.067 
Pump_1 (1=Electric pump, 0=Gravity) 1.198*** 0.304 0.323*** 0.063 
Pump_2 (1=Diesel, 0=Gravity) 0.937** 0.392 0.244*** 0.092 
Location along the canal_1 (1=Head, 0=Middle) 0.750*** 0.268 0.208*** 0.062 
Location along the canal_2 (1=Tail, 0=Middle) -0.551** 0.276 -0.146** 0.064 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.420 0.299 0.105 0.075 
Access to agricultural training (1=Yes, 0=No) 1.437*** 0.549 0.307** 0.121 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.119 0.270 -0.063 0.065 
Correctly predicted 74.59    
LR Chi
2
(21) 75.41***    
Pseudo R
2
 0.30    
N 185    
Notes: *** means significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% significance levels.   







Appendix M: Impact of water security on household welfare: Treatment effects model 
using two-step procedure  
Variables Treatment effect model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant 2396.171 1908.66 
Age (years) -10.3958 28.3838 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female) -805.273 620.154 
Marital status (1=Married, 0=Otherwise) 785.0717 874.019 
Education level (Years of schooling) 102.1641 86.9334 
Religion (1=Christian, 0=Otherwise) -142.661 583.684 
Value of assets (Rands) 0.000844 0.00131 
Livestock size in Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) -26.8224 28.8844 
Total household income (Rands) 0.05822*** 0.01645 
Irrigated land size (Ha) 1685.266 2776.25 
Distance from scheme (km) -45.6407 72.2809 
Scheme membership (years) 58.32043** 27.7806 
Conflicts occurrence (1=Yes, 0=No) 851.9925 784.66 
Participation in canal maintenance (1=Yes, 0=No) -776.906 762.171 
Farmer association member (1=Yes, 0=No) 151.4557 642.803 
Scheme management participation (1=Yes, 0=No) 31.3516 602.691 
Pump_1 (1=Electric pump, 0=Otherwise) -1561.54* 956.069 
Pump_2 (1=Diesel pump, 0=Otherwise) -1297.27 1079.02 
Location along the canal_1 (1=Head, 0=Otherwise) -993.713 830.946 
Location along the canal_2 (1=Tail, 0=Otherwise) -417.137 763.992 
Access to extension (1=Yes, 0=No) 45.59662 722.25 
Access to agricultural training (1=Yes, 0=No) 130.5959 1079.29 
Access to credit (1=Yes, 0=No) 1381.986** 633.05 
Water security (1=Water secure, 0= Water insecure) 5109.763** 2531.31 
   
Mills lambda -2478.54* 1523.97 
Wald Chi
2 
 112.41***  
N 185  
rho -0.48 0.189 
sigma 3363.26 230.4 
lambda -1617.87 712.34 
Notes: *** means significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% significance levels. 




Appendix N: Impact of water security on household welfare: PSM results 
 is not different for treated and controls in each block
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 6
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
99%     .9999996              1       Kurtosis       1.830786
95%     .9855713       .9999996       Skewness      -.1428071
90%     .9765974         .99998       Variance       .0624876
75%      .863476       .9998233
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .2499753
50%     .6185159                      Mean           .6388962
25%     .4420329       .1985104       Sum of Wgt.         172
10%     .2897864       .1702004       Obs                 172
 5%     .2183404        .166779
 1%      .166779       .1396549
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
The region of common support is [.13965493, 1]
Note: the common support option has been selected
Note: 0 failures and 1 success completely determined.
                                                                              
       _cons    -.9547206   .7797241    -1.22   0.221    -2.482952    .5735105
   credtuse1     -.341202   .2540961    -1.34   0.179    -.8392212    .1568172
    training     1.112299   .4533876     2.45   0.014     .2236754    2.000922
     extaces     .2435148   .2891469     0.84   0.400    -.3232027    .8102323
      lo_pr2    -.4746379    .255407    -1.86   0.063    -.9752264    .0259507
     loc_pr1     .7815221   .2656183     2.94   0.003     .2609197    1.302124
       pump2     .9711295   .3836565     2.53   0.011     .2191765    1.723082
       pump1     1.097059   .2734054     4.01   0.000     .5611942    1.632924
    schmnpa1    -.1120022   .2529411    -0.44   0.658    -.6077576    .3837532
      asocmb      .456687   .2451986     1.86   0.063    -.0238934    .9372675
    part_can     .1896585    .317606     0.60   0.550    -.4328379    .8121548
     conflct    -.7530413   .2943338    -2.56   0.011    -1.329925   -.1761576
    sch_dist     .0124964   .0299767     0.42   0.677    -.0462569    .0712498
     irrland    -.4031272    1.19801    -0.34   0.736    -2.751184     1.94493
    totinceq     .0000246   .0000135     1.82   0.068    -1.82e-06     .000051
         tlu     .0510899   .0336945     1.52   0.129      -.01495    .1171299
     asetveq     4.07e-08   1.05e-06     0.04   0.969    -2.02e-06    2.10e-06
       relgn    -.0397888   .2423388    -0.16   0.870    -.5147642    .4351866
      educat    -.0147928   .0355197    -0.42   0.677    -.0844101    .0548244
   marstatus    -.1423202   .3251363    -0.44   0.662    -.7795757    .4949354
      gender    -.0362575   .2723869    -0.13   0.894    -.5701261     .497611
         age     .0025488   .0100008     0.25   0.799    -.0170524    .0221501
                                                                              
    wats40_4        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -89.150362                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2840
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(21)     =      70.71
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        185
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -89.150362
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -89.150378
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -89.176314
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -89.838746
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -92.868946
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -124.50716
Estimation of the propensity score 
      Total          185      100.00
                                                
          1          111       60.00      100.00
          0           74       40.00       40.00
                                                
   wats40_4        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
The treatment is wats40_4
**************************************************** 
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score 
**************************************************** 
> mp2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training  credtuse1, pscore(wat40_4) comsup blockid(myblock)






End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total          61        111         172 
                                             
        .9           2         37          39 
        .8           4         10          14 
        .6           9         31          40 
        .4          24         23          47 
        .2          19          9          28 
  .1396549           3          1           4 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         wats40_4
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
The balancing property is satisfied 
********************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
********************************************************** 
nearest neighbour matches
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
                                                         
      111          35    2274.139     851.286       2.671
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Bootstrapped standard errors
(random draw version)
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method
                              N = normal, P = percentile, BC = bias-corrected
                                                                             
                                                      1113.999  3948.149 (BC)
                                                      64.97716  3452.915  (P)
     bs1     1000   2274.139  -477.0856    851.286    603.6254  3944.653  (N)
                                                                             
Variable     Reps   Observed       Bias   Std. Err.   [95% Conf. Interval]
Bootstrap statistics
(obs=185)
statistic:   r(attnd)
> schmnpa1 pump1 pump2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training credtuse1     , pscore()   comsup 
command:     attnd fdexeq4 wats40_4 age gender marstatus educat relgn asetveq tlu totinceq irrland sch_dist conflct part_can asocmb 
Bootstrapping of standard errors 
nearest neighbour matches
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
                                                         
      111          35    2274.139     786.072       2.893
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Analytical standard errors
(random draw version)
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method 
 This operation may take a while.
 The program is searching the nearest neighbor of each treated unit. 
> ump1 pump2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training  credtuse1, comsup bootstrap rep(1000)












                                                         
      111          59    1983.466     601.774       3.296
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
Bootstrapped standard errors
ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method
                              N = normal, P = percentile, BC = bias-corrected
                                                                             
                                                      865.1194  3307.474 (BC)
                                                      767.8194  3110.102  (P)
     bs1     1000   1983.466  -63.43858   601.7743    802.5791  3164.352  (N)
                                                                             
Variable     Reps   Observed       Bias   Std. Err.   [95% Conf. Interval]
Bootstrap statistics
(obs=185)
statistic:   r(attk)
> chmnpa1 pump1 pump2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training credtuse1     , pscore(wat40_1) comsup    bwidth(.06)
command:     attk fdexeq4 wats40_4 age gender marstatus educat relgn asetveq tlu totinceq irrland sch_dist conflct part_can asocmb s
Bootstrapping of standard errors 
the bootstrap option to get bootstrapped standard errors.
Note: Analytical standard errors cannot be computed. Use
                                                         
      111          59    1983.466           .           .
                                                         
n. treat.   n. contr.         ATT   Std. Err.           t
                                                         
ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
 This operation may take a while.
 The program is searching for matches of each treated unit. 
> mp1 pump2 loc_pr1 lo_pr2 extaces training  credtuse1, pscore(wat40_1) comsup bootstrap rep(1000)
. attk fdexeq4 wats40_4 age gender marstatus educat relgn asetveq tlu totinceq irrland sch_dist conflct part_can asocmb schmnpa1  pu
140 
 
 
 
 
 
